Frontex has become one of the major players in European external border management. As its powers and resources have increased, so have the challenges surrounding its compliance with fundamental rights. A major concern continues to be how to ensure legal accountability for fundamental rights violations that occur in the context of its activities. While Member States can be held accountable before their own national courts and before international courts, neither of these options are available in relation to Frontex. But it can be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union to account for the conformity of its conduct with EU law. This Article explores the potential of the EU action for damages to offer a remedy for fundamental rights violations committed by Frontex. It identifies where public liability law falls short of providing a remedy for fundamental rights violations committed by EU bodies, explores the possibilities to close that gap, and assesses the implications this has for Frontex’s liability. The Article argues that the action for damages may be the means to close the accountability gap in the specific case of Frontex, but also more generally in circumstances where EU administration is delivered in the form of informal or factual conduct. If it is to fulfill that role, the CJEU would have to lower the threshold for EU liability where fundamental rights are concerned.

Very seldom has a judgment or advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) received so much media coverage as the recent Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo rendered on 22 July 2010 in response to a question posed by the General Assembly. The question had been forwarded on behalf of a request by Serbia and was phrased in the following way: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

The international arena is increasingly important in EU legal discourse. Using the word “global” is highly fashionable at present, but what does it mean to refer to this concept? It is not an exaggeration to claim that if “constitutionalism” is added to the picture you have a new catchphrase for understanding the EU legal architecture beyond the nation state and its interrelationship with the external sphere: “Global constitutionalism.” Much of the discussion on the normative dimension of EU powers is centered on the function of the EU as a promoter of values abroad. This is also what the Lisbon Treaty promises as set out in Article 3(5) and Article 21 in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) by guaranteeing, inter alia, that the EU shall uphold its values in the relationship with the wider world and contribute to the protection of its citizens. As witnessed in the recent judgment on the validity of the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS), the EU's values may sometimes spill over to the global level. In the ETS case, the Court of Justice set out to make a powerful statement on the importance of environmental protection, even when such concerns extend beyond the borders of Europe. Therefore, the question of global constitutionalism in the EU seems inextricably linked to the normative question of what values the EU should promote or conversely “borrow” from the outside world.

The German Basic Law is a resilient constitution. It has proved able to cope with both the new beginning of the constitutional tradition in Germany after the cataclysm of 1945 and German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. To be sure, there is reason for some critical reflection concerning concrete questions and even fundamental issues—not the least of which is the question whether German reunification should have been marked by a process of constitutional self-reflection and renewal beyond what has been done. All in all, however, the Basic Law is, in historical perspective, a remarkable success. Therefore, it is not surprising that it has gained much international attention. Some aspects of the Basic Law have even become a kind of attractive export article not accounted for in Germany's foreign trade balance, but nevertheless of considerable importance.

The new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 2004, brings fundamental changes in the application of European competition law. It replaces the Antitrust-Regulation No. 17 which has been in force for more than 40 years. Regulation No. 1/2003 establishes a system of direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC-Treaty, which abandons the requirement of notification as a key element of the old system under Regulation No. 17. Under the new scheme set up by Regulation No. 1/2003 Article 81(3) will be directly applicable. This enables national competition authorities and national courts to apply Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty in their entirety, including paragraph 3 of Article 81. Although the new regulation is to be considered as an important step in strengthening and reinforcing European competition policy, in particular in view of the enlargement of the European Union, the numerous changes involve uncertainties which call for adjustment. The following article gives an overview of the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, set up by Regulation No. 1/2003.

It is a generally held assumption that the EU economic free movement rights are tools in the creation of a European internal market; and that their main goal is the (negative) market integration of different national markets. Yet these freedoms do not determine how market integration is to proceed, or which kind of integrated European market will emerge. The resulting market may be more or less regulated, and the creation of the relevant regulatory rules may be allocated to a variety of sources. These options are reflected in the different proposed tests used to determine whether a national measure prima facie infringes one of the market freedoms. The proposed tests fall into two main categories—broad tests and narrow tests—and each type has its own implications for European integration. Broad tests, usually associated with obstacle tests or even with economic due process clauses, tend to be seen as having three main outcomes. One result of broad tests is centralization, implying that ultimate decisions concerning the legitimacy of national law rests with EU institutions, and particularly with the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court” or “CJEU”). Another outcome of broad tests is the possible harmonization of national laws through the European political process by increasing the amount of national legislation susceptible to being harmonized under Articles 114 to 118 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). A third consequence of broad tests is deregulation through the elimination of national rules creating obstacles to trade. Alternatively, narrow approaches-usually associated with discrimination or typological tests-are usually coupled with regulatory pluralism via a greater degree of control of the harmonization competences of the EU, decentralization through the protection of a greater sphere of Member States' autonomy, and economic agnosticism. Views on the potential outcomes of broad and narrow tests are, in turn, related to normative debates about the ideal levels of centralization, harmonization, and regulation in the internal market.

It should be no surprise that a case can be made both for and against the legality of secondary market bond purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB), and of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program in particular. It is also no secret that the ECB—like many other institutional actors in Europe—is in several ways testing the boundaries of legal provisions as a consequence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Still, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Order of 14 January 2014 on the OMT Program is surprising for several reasons.

The Federal Republic of Germany counts among the earliest States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It ratified the ECHR on 5 December 1952, three years ahead of Italy, and hence found itself among the original members of the treaty system when the ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953. For the new democratic Government, it was a decision of principle to affirm its willingness to cooperate peacefully within the group of European States, submitting to an international review mechanism with regard to all of its activities. Therefore, very shortly afterwards, it accepted also the individual application under Article 25 ECHR, which at that time was not yet compulsory for all States parties. For many years under the Nazi dictatorship, Germany had brought death and destruction to its neighbours. Now, organized under a democratic and liberal constitution, the Basic Law (BL), it wanted to manifest its newfound identity as a civilized State abiding by the rule of law.

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) seeks to harmonize national asylum procedures. The initial implementation design of the CEAS, reflective of the theory of executive federalism, foresaw that national authorities were to conduct asylum processing and implement the harmonized norms. The implementation design of the EU asylum policy has, nevertheless, started to shift. An integrated European administration is emerging. One area this is pronounced in is asylum decision-making, where patterns of joint implementation have surfaced. This term broadly refers to staff and experts deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an EU agency, working alongside national administrators, including on the processing of asylum claims. This Article scrutinizes the emergence of joint implementation patterns in EU asylum policy and the resulting accountability challenge, drawing both from legal analysis and political science theories. I also refer to administrative practice as documented in secondary sources. EASO is currently subject to a mosaic of accountability processes. Two main pitfalls emerge: the intricate balance between accountability and independence; and accessibility for the individual. Against this backdrop, I focus on extra-judicial accountability through the European Ombudsman which, combined with the envisaged internal “individual complaints mechanism” within EASO, could go some way in ensuring applicants’ procedural rights.

The Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption (KorrBekG – Anti-Corruption Act), enacted in 1997, was the last measure to improve Germany's anti-corruption criminal law that was solely initiated by German political actors. Since then all amendments originated in international legal instruments. Implementing only the minimum requirements of these international provisions has led to inconsistencies within the criminal law dealing with active and passive bribery. Further anti-corruption conventions signed by the German government require additional modifications. This opportunity should be used as a starting point for a thorough reform of Germany's anti-corruption criminal law.

From the moment of its inception the European Union (EU) has included a court that was entrusted to give coherence and integrity to the interpretation and application of the Union's primary and secondary law. That the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was to play an important role in settling disputes was clear. But few anticipated how instrumental the Court would become in the development of EU law.

This contribution deals with a topic that has so far received scant attention: the administrative governance of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Over the course of the last 65 years, the CJEU has developed its own particular version of judicial self-government. This article analyzes its genesis, its characteristic features and provides a comprehensive assessment. Three arguments are put forward: First, self-government at the CJEU can be associated with a number of positive effects for the Court as an institution. It contributes to keeping the Court out of the public limelight, to fostering its judicial authority vis-à-vis key compliance constituencies and to securing its judicial independence. Second, while strong forms of judicial self-government can lead to a lack of transparency and accountability, these problematic side effects have been largely avoided at the CJEU. This is, in many respects, due to the dialogic accountability relationship that has been established with the European Parliament in the context of the EU budgetary process. Nevertheless, third, as regards more recent developments, such as the establishment of an expert panel for selecting new CJEU members and the Court's legislative role in amending its own Statute, from the perspective of transparency, room for improvement exists.

On 18 December 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered Opinion 2/13 and stunned the legal world by declaring that the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Accession Agreement) was incompatible with the constituent treaties of the Union. Although some experts, admittedly, had been skeptical about certain aspects of Draft Accession Agreement, no one seems to have expected an opinion so critical and uncompromising. The opinion has consequently received widespread disapproval in the EU legal blogosphere.

Despite the increasing urgency of global environmental issues, international environmental law continues to struggle for relevancy and effectiveness. Even as legal efforts have intensified, the global environment has continued to deteriorate. In particular, state-centric, multilateral “hard law” instruments have proven an increasingly ineffectual means of regulating the global environment.

The controversial decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the quartet of cases that are grouped under its “Laval/Viking jurisprudence” are rapidly becoming entrenched as a key dimension of the European Union (EU) constitutional imaginary. This comes with a certain “immunization” against challenge as they become much harder to treat as mistakes. In their elevated status they have aligned stances and expectational structures. They have also had significant impact on the “Nordic” models; Charles Woolfson shows, for example, how subsequent to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision, the rulings of the Swedish Labour court has “seem[ed] to confirm that the ‘Swedish model' has, at the very least, been significantly redefined, if not fundamentally altered, in the light of Laval.” While EU lawyers largely sit it out in relative passivity, wondering what the fuss is really about, labor lawyers have been vocal in their disagreement. But the latter's voices in this debate—if we can call it such—have in turn been drowned out by the ululations of lawyers and theorists from the “new,” post-2004, EU countries loudly proclaiming a victory against the arrogance of the older Member States. If the workers of the Baltic states want to sell their labor—and their life—cheap, goes the “inclusionary” argument, why should they be constrained from doing so under protectionist regulatory policies that undercut their competitive advantage by those unwilling to rein in the exclusionary structures of social protection that limit access and opportunity for their workforce to join the Continent-wide economy? The massive impact that the decisions have had on the regulation of industrial relations in the countries of the European Union and on the position of the trade unions has hardly been ameliorated by the debacle that was the rapid withdrawal of the proposed Monti II Regulation in the face of resistance to it by national parliaments.

This Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.

The European Central Bank's (ECB) program of purchasing government bonds, the OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions Program), which was announced on 6 September 2012, is illegal. With this program, the ECB transgresses its powers. This is the central message of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 14 January 2014. However, the decision is not final. The Federal Constitutional Court has suspended the trial and has referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. Only after the ECJ has examined the compatibility of the OMT program with European law will the Federal Constitutional Court pronounce its final judgment.

The current contribution will elaborate on the manner in which the Declaration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (hereinafter the 1998 Declaration) functions as an instrument of governance for the purpose of promotion and persuasion. The purpose of this activity is to improve the observance by States of certain principles contained in the 1998 Declaration. At the outset one should stress that this governance technique is a trade mark of the ILO as a whole and not only of the 1998 Declaration. The basic premise of the ILO is to rely on cooperation and dialogue rather than sanctions in its efforts to realize its goals.

As a normative social practice, law mediates between the “is” and the “ought,” between prescription and description. Obviously, narratives and narration play a role in law when it comes to describing facts and events: The testimony of a witness in court, the presentation of the case in a judgment, or (semi-)fictional cases used for legal education spring to mind. In this Article, however, the focus is on the prescriptive side of law. If, in line with the definition given by Matías Martínez and Michael Scheffel, a narrative is to be understood as a “sequence of events and actions producing at the level of [literary] action an autonomous structure of meaning,” it becomes possible to identify narratives and narrative elements within legal norms and provisions. The first part of this paper will deal with grand historical —or historicizing—narratives and cast some light on how they are used to give sense and direction to the interpretation and application of, especially, constitutional principles. The second part will suggest a narratological perspective on statutory law and attempt to reconstruct the process of norm application. This Article argues that this process relies mainly on comparative methods, and that narratives mediate between the seemingly opposed spheres of law and fact. Both kinds of narratives, the grands récits of constitutional law and the petits récits of statutory law, though quite different at first sight, possess common traits. They both fit the definition of narrative just cited; they both result from a process of selection and are thus prone to exclusionary effects. Moreover, the grand narratives of constitutional law also affect statutory law, its interpretation, and its application.

There is no cause for celebration: Instead, the judgement coming out of Karlsruhe must be seen as an expression of the Federal Constitutional Court Justices' fear of subjecting themselves to the European Court of Justice. Indeed, the judgment raises questions about Germany's commitment to Europe.