“Sozialstaatlichkeit” is a collection of essays dedicated to the author of Negative Freiheitsrechte und gesellschaftliche Selbstorganisation? Reflections on the survival of welfarism in the postnational constellations after his analyses of globalisation and Europeanisation? Affirmative references to the Discourse Theory of Law and Habermasian notions of Proceduralisation at all levels of governance against “Proceduralisation and its use in a post-modern legal policy?” “Are you trying to deliver something like an Anti-Ladeur.” No, neither Sisyphus nor Hercules, let alone Friedrich Engels, has inspired this essay. Its argument should rather be observed in the spirit of conflict-of-laws, i.e. of a discipline which accepts as a normative fact that different academic projects may be worthwhile despite of, or even because of, the differences of their premises and of the logics of their development, which may be inspired by complementary perceptions of a common problématque.

In an age of profound democratic anxiety, significant academic attention has been paid to the crisis in constitutional democracy. Constitutional lawyers, however, are still grappling with the relationship between public law and the current actual and perceived threats facing constitutional democracy in countries worldwide. This Introduction considers how the articles in this special volume address three pressing questions. How should we should define the current threats to democracy, and populist challenge? Second, how might public law be a potential cause or contributing factor? Third, how might public law still provide some answers to the contemporary challenges to constitutional democracy? In Prof Dixon’s view, constitutional democracy is a good worth preserving and there are models of at least relative “success” in the current constitutional universe. But Prof Dixon shares the view of many contributors to the special volume that the challenge is immense, and urgent, and that there are no easy solutions.

This article attempts to present a comprehensive and coherent picture of the position occupied by science under the SPS Agreement and in the SPS case law. It claims that the approach adopted by the Appellate Body reflects the explicit language of the SPS Agreement and is predominantly based on a technical paradigm. In consequence, science plays a critical role in distinguishing between legal and illegal SPS measures.

The article argues that such an approach is generally compatible with the text of the SPS Agreement and provides a coherent SPS system. However, it also identifies certain areas, which lack coherence, as certain standards seem to violate the right of the Member States to establish an appropriate level of protection. These are: ascertainability of the risk as a precondition for valid risk assessment; strict specifity of the risk assessment in low-risk situations; the proportionality between the risk identified and the SPS measure; the notion of negligible risks; and the concept of likelihood in the quarantine risk assessments. The article claims that these standards cannot be generally applied in SPS disputes as, in certain situations, they will result in the violation of the right of the Member States to establish an appropriate level of SPS protection. Finally, a number of specific issues, which require resolution, are highlighted, namely the quality of minority scientific opinions, the relationship between the insufficiency of scientific evidence and scientific uncertainty. The article suggests that the ultimate role ascribed to science under the SPS Agreement can be assessed only after an interpretation of those issues is provided by future case law.

The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was widely lauded as a success with regard to the recognition and potential prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence. More than twenty years later, however, many observers are disillusioned with the ICC’s dire track record concerning the implementation of its progressive legal framework. In many cases, the Court and particularly its Prosecutor have been criticized for failing to adequately address and prioritize sexual violence, culminating in only a single final conviction since 2002. Nevertheless, the ICC’s emerging practice shows progress with regard to the conceptual understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and the realization of the Statute’s full potential in ensuring accountability for sexual crimes. Taking into account the evolving jurisprudence, the Article explores the persisting challenges and the perceived gap between aspirations and reality regarding the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC.

There is hardly a set of legal institutions that has more contributed to the creation of the common market than the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. The expanding concepts of freedom of establishment and of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital have, during the thirty years since the European Court of Justice\'s (ECJ) decision in \”Dassonville\”, by far become the Community\'s most effective deregulatory instruments. The driving force behind this development has been the case law of the Court. This case law has, on an initially slim basis in the Treaty, established the fundamental freedoms as the central element of a \“new legal order\” which has direct effect, results in the automatic inapplicability of incompatible national law and which can be invoked by every citizen in national administrative or judicial proceedings. Furthermore, it is enforced not only by Community institutions but also by EU-citizens acting as \“private public attorneys\” when bringing claims under European law against Member States for damages resulting from violations of the Treaty.

From Apology to Utopia is a disturbing reading experience. I first came across Martti Koskenniemi's book of 1989 during research for my thesis on Hans Kelsen. In his monograph “Das Problem der Souveränität”, published immediately after the First World War, Kelsen attempted to destroy the central doctrinal pillars of the nineteenth century German international law discourse by exposing the ideological nature of its central doctrines, such as the concept of the sovereign will of the state, autolimitation and consent. 70 years later, the analytical programme of From Apology to Utopia deconstructed international law by exposing the inherent “political” nature of international legal discourse, interpreted as an argumentative practice. Exposing the unstable discursive boundaries between politics and international law is the central objective of this monograph. Martti Koskenniemi portrays international legal doctrine as an inherently contradictory and repetitive argumentative routine that is incapable of producing meaningful “legal” results. International lawyers somewhat tragically feel compelled to engage in this Sisyphean routine in order to maintain their professional identity.

In his famous talk “The Force of Law,” given at Cardozo Law School in 1989, Derrida linked his work with the Critical Legal Studies movement. This lecture signposted a change of direction in deconstruction. Early deconstruction had been criticized for formalism, aestheticism and scant recognition of political realities. Derrida's (in)famous statement that “there is nothing outside of the text,” was a rare philosophical sound-bite meaning that language, communication and social interaction cannot avoid, as commonly assumed, the uncertainties and ambiguities of the written text. But the aphorism was often misinterpreted to signify extreme idealism, disregard for the real world and literary and philosophical reductionism. But the “Force of Law” signified a clear turn towards political and ethical engagement, symbolized by the discussion of law and justice. After that talk, deconstruction became obsessed with questions of ethical responsibility, the meaning of friendship and the complex relationship with the other. Before his death, Derrida wrote a number of essays on contemporary political events. He denounced the Kosovo and Iraq wars and devoted a book to ‘rogue’ elements and states, in which he attacked the United States as the greatest rogue. Just before his untimely death in 2004, Derrida had become preoccupied with the concept of sovereignty at the basis of the tragedies and abuses of modernity. It is this political and ethical turn of deconstruction that I would like to address in the context of critical legal theory.

This year we celebrate a United States Supreme Court decision that marks the beginning of modern jurisdiction over constitutional questions: Marbury v. Madison. This is all the more remarkable since, when it was decided two hundred years ago in 1803, it was controversial and many still maintain it was wrongly decided. Chief Justice Marshall ruled on a dispute which he had earlier had a hand in causing, since the alleged legal error – the untimely delivery of a commission to Justice of the Peace Marbury – fell within his area of responsibility as Secretary of State. He dismissed the petition because the incorrect legal procedure had been chosen. However, he did not examine this question at the outset but – contrary to the accepted procedural rules of his time – at the end. This left room for a wide-ranging discussion of the right of judicial review, which was not required by law, and was, therefore, obiter dicta. Thomas Jefferson later referred to this discussion as the Chief Justice's “obiter dissertation.” Of course, Adams himself contended that the case turned on the judicial right of review, since this was a component of his argument that the petition should be dismissed.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has changed the framework and possibilities of the development of European Union (EU) criminal law. Gone is the long-lived and awkward cross-pillar character of EU criminal law, as mainly a third pillar EU ‘intergovernmental’ issue but also partly a first (EC) pillar question. The Lisbon Treaty marks a new era for the criminal law as it brings it within the core of the EU law project. Nevertheless, Article 10 of the transitional protocol as attached to the Lisbon Treaty stipulates a five-year transition period before former third pillar instruments will be treated in the same way as EU acts. This paper will focus on two issues in particular. The first question that will be addressed concerns what EU law principles drive or decide the EU's involvement in criminal law. After having identified these principles the second question is whether they should drive it and if so what implications will it have for the criminal law in the future.

This contribution will contain an analysis of important European dynamics, particularly at this moment when it seems to be necessary to restart the process of a unified European identity, which was, in a way, compromised after the failure of the EU Constitution and the difficulty of giving effectiveness to democracy:

The Article deals with the protection of consumer borrowers and lending investors in peer-to-peer lending within the legal framework provided by EU credit laws. This is the legal framework for EU Member States in the area of loans to consumers. In particular, the article analyses the business model of taking lending decisions on financial technologies (“Fintech”) and big data vis-à-vis the legal obligation of the creditworthiness assessment by lenders. At the same time, it extends the applicability of such a business model to the credit-risk analysis undertaken in the interest of lenders. Ultimately, it questions to what extent EU law caters for peer-to-peer lending, and and to what extent consumers and lenders can find protection. It hints that peer-to-peer lending presents risks for both consumers and lenders, falling short of legal obligations and established practices for their protection.

Driven by the need to address the immediate public health threats of the COVID-19 pandemic, this has seen a rise of the technocratic mode of governance around the world. A technocratic approach is evidence-based and relies upon the guidance of experts to respond to the public health crisis. The rise of technocracy reflects a utilitarian calculus that seeks to preserve the greater good. Taiwan’s pandemic response exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of this type of governance. Based on an analysis of the relevant case law of the Taiwan Constitutional Court, legislation, and political developments this Article takes a legal-historical look and traces the current technocratic approach—defined for this Article as an experts-driven and procedural-driven process—which is a hallmark of Taiwan’s pandemic response. Examining Taiwan’s pandemic response through a human rights lens sheds light on a more complex relationship between the collective right to health and life, and the individual rights to health, work, privacy, and liberty during the pandemic.

This study examines how the climate litigation approach builds pathways to face climate emergency. In light of recent jurisdictional developments, this article underlines the links between legislation, litigation, and public policies to trace ways, progress and obstacles to face it. Those emergent dynamics contribute to build a lasting and sustainable climate change legal regime. Intertwining the different climate disputes in the world and the progress made through the elaboration of different climate laws allow to have a panoramic visibility on this new mode of climate governance which appears in filigree today all over the world and especially in France.

The continuing proliferation of transnational private regulatory governance challenges conceptions of legal authority, legitimacy and public regulation of economic activity. The pace at which these developments occur is set by a coalescence of multiple regime changes, predominantly in commercial law areas, but also in the field of internet governance, corporate law and labor law, where the rise to prominence of private actors has become a defining feature of the emerging transnational regulatory landscape. One of the most belabored fields, the transnational law merchant or, lex mercatoria, has gained the status of a poster child, as it represents a laboratory for the exploration of “private” contractual governance in a context, in which the assertion of public or private authority has itself become contentious. The ambiguity surrounding many forms of today's contractual governance in the transnational arena echoes that of the far-reaching transformation of public regulatory governance, which has been characteristic of Western welfare states over the last few decades. What is particularly remarkable, however, is the way in which the depictions of “private instruments” and “public interests” in the post-welfare state regulatory environment have given rise to a rise in importance of social norms, self-regulation and a general anti-state affect in the assessment of judicial enforcement or administration of contractual arrangements. A central challenge resulting from case studies such as the transnational law merchant is from which perspective we ought to adequately study and assess the justifications, which are being offered for a contractual governance model, which prioritizes and seeks to insulate “private” arrangements from their embeddedness in regulated market contexts, on both the national and transnational level.

From 16–27 April 2007, the UN Forum on Forests (“UNFF”) gathered in New York for its 7th session (“UNFF7”). After two weeks of intense and difficult negotiations, in the early hours of 28 April, UNFF adopted three documents. The main document was the “Non-legally binding instrument on sustainable forest management of all types of forests” (the “Instrument”), which was adopted by the General Assembly by resolution on 17 December 2007.

On 19 January 2010 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked to rule on the application and scope of the general principle of non-discrimination under Community law. In Kücükdeveci the Court had the opportunity to clarify a number of questions concerning the principle of non-discrimination and the application of Directive 2000/78 that had remained unanswered after the famous Mangold judgment and subsequent case law. The case was particularly apt to clarify the scope of Mangold, as it concerned a similar factual situation, albeit after the implementation period of Directive 2000/78 had expired. Consequently, many issues addressed in that judgment arose anew. The Court had to deal with the relationship between Directive 2000/78 and the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, the possibility of justifying differential treatment on the basis of national social and employment policies, the extent of the doctrine of indirect effect, and the direct horizontal effect of directives.

In the early Nineties the Hague Conference on International Private Law on initiative of the United States started negotiations on a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Hague Convention“). In October 1999 the Special Commission on duty presented a preliminary text, which was drafted quite closely to the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Brussels Convention“). The latter was concluded between the then 6 Member States of the EEC in Brussels in 1968 and amended several times on occasion of the entry of new Member States. In 2000, after the Treaty of Amsterdam altered the legal basis for judicial co-operation in civil matters in Europe, it was transformed into an EC Regulation (the “Brussels I Regulation”).

With considerable regularity, the established and functioning scientific apparatus is able to reshape itself, to confirm or change its course and the respective lenses of observation through the rationalization of themes, trends and through the identification of individuals and groups of scholars who are being associated with these developments. This exercise, leaving its traces in conferences, edited volumes and the formation of scientific associations, is largely centred around the formulation, assessment and defence of scholarly projects and tasks. The importance of such undertakings lies, however, in their ability to never let the forces of institutionalization, formalization and bureaucratization take the upper hand over the continuing diversity and curiosity that reigns beneath their surface. The awarding of academic honours and prizes themselves are part of the institutionalization of scholarly projects, but they come with the calming realization that, despite all the festivity, it is clear to everyone that there is no one who deserves the prize. There is in fact no prize recipient. What remains is the constantly nagging doubt whether curiosity and critical inquiry still govern our search, whether ears and eyes continue to be open.

The Africa Caribbean Pacific–European Union (ACP-EU) Development and Trade Cooperation Relationship is currently regulated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This agreement, which has been described as “the only one of its kind in the world” is based on the three pillars of politics, trade, and development between the EU and its Member States on the one hand and a group of developing countries on the other.

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.