Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T00:59:37.316Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ECB, ECJ, Democracy, and the Federal Constitutional Court: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's Referral Order from 14 January 2014

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Dietrich Murswiek

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The European Central Bank's (ECB) program of purchasing government bonds, the OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions Program), which was announced on 6 September 2012, is illegal. With this program, the ECB transgresses its powers. This is the central message of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 14 January 2014. However, the decision is not final. The Federal Constitutional Court has suspended the trial and has referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. Only after the ECJ has examined the compatibility of the OMT program with European law will the Federal Constitutional Court pronounce its final judgment.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 2: Special issue - The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court , 01 March 2014 , pp. 147 - 165
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html [hereinafter ECB referral decision].Google Scholar

2 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESMT), Feb. 2, 2012, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1 [hereinafter ESMT]. See also Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 2. Februar 2012 zur Einrichtung des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus [Act to the Treaty of 2 February 2012 Establishing the European Stability Mechanism], Sep. 27, 2012, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II [BGBl. II] at 1086, for the German ratification of the ESMT.Google Scholar

3 ESMT art. 3.Google Scholar

4 According to the prevailing view in the German literature, which in my opinion is correct, the no bailout clause does not limit itself to the clarification that Member States are not obliged to provide assistance, but rather it prohibits the provision of financial assistance. The ECJ saw this differently in the Pringle judgment: Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12 (Nov. 27 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en. This shall not be discussed at length here, since it is not relevant for the subject of this paper.Google Scholar

5 ESMT arts. 12(1), 13(3).Google Scholar

6 ESMT art. 18.Google Scholar

7 Draghi, Mario, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at the Global Investment Conference in London (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (stating that, “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.”).Google Scholar

8 Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). This press release is cited word for word in the ECB referral decision supra note 1, at para. 3.Google Scholar

9 Or of the EFSF (European Financial Stabilization Facility), the preliminary mechanism to save the euro, which could provide assistance loans until mid-2013.Google Scholar

10 Currently, the ESM can employ a maximum of 500 billion euros for stability support (cf. ESMT Preamble Recital 6, art. 39). Some 450 billion euros are still available after the appropriation of assistance to Spain and Cyprus. Adjustments to the maximum lending volume and the authorized capital stock are possible (cf. ESMT art. 10).Google Scholar

11 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 39, which references the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 119(1), 119(2), 127(1) May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] and Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, art. 2, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 230.Google Scholar

12 Federal Reserve Act § 2A, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000).Google Scholar

13 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 56–83.Google Scholar

14 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 58–59.Google Scholar

15 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 64.Google Scholar

16 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 65.Google Scholar

17 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 67.Google Scholar

18 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 70, 73.Google Scholar

19 Cf. ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 72.Google Scholar

20 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 72.Google Scholar

21 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 74–78.Google Scholar

22 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 84–94.Google Scholar

23 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 99–100.Google Scholar

24 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 100.Google Scholar

25 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para. 83.Google Scholar

26 Id. Google Scholar

27 TFEU arts. 130, 282(3).Google Scholar

28 Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1107/77, 58 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, 27 (June 23, 1981).Google Scholar

29 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155, 175 (Oct. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Maastricht] (including the note: “Divergence from 58 BVerfGE 1 at 27”).Google Scholar

30 Maastricht, supra note 29.Google Scholar

31 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1848/07, para. 12 et seq. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html.Google Scholar

32 ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 15.Google Scholar

33 Cf. Thym, Daniel, Anmerkung zum Urteil vom 7.9.2011, 2011 Juristenzeitung 1011; Ruffert, Matthias, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht – Anmerkung zum Urteil vom 7. September 2011, 2011 Europarecht 842, 847.Google Scholar

34 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10, 129 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 124, 175–76, para. 116 (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter EFSF].Google Scholar

35 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at paras. 44–53.Google Scholar

36 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267, 351–53, 356 (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Lisbon].Google Scholar

37 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at paras. 45–46, 53.Google Scholar

38 See Maastricht, supra note 29, at 187–88; Lisbon, supra note 36, at 357–58; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286, 303–04 (July 6, 2010) [hereinafter Honeywell].Google Scholar

39 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 26.Google Scholar

40 See Lisbon, supra note 36, at 353–54.Google Scholar

41 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, arts. 79(3), 20.Google Scholar

42 Id. art. 23(1), cl. 3.Google Scholar

43 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 27.Google Scholar

44 Treaty on European Union (TEU) arts. 5(1), 5(2).Google Scholar

45 See Maastricht, supra note 29, at 187–88.Google Scholar

46 However, in the ECB proceedings, the Federal Constitutional Court states that it is impossible that an act, which touches the identity of the Constitution, is based on a primary legal foundation because the power for such acts, pursuant to Article 23(1) cl. 3 of the Basic Law, could not have been transferred to the EU in the first place. See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 27. However, it is conceivable that an unconstitutional transfer of powers has occurred, e.g. because, at the time of the transfer, one did not realize how a treaty norm could later be interpreted. In the Lisbon judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court still stated that it would have to determine the inapplicability of an EU act in Germany if the act violates the identity of the Constitution “within or outside the framework of the transferred sovereign rights.” See Lisbon, supra note 36, at 400.Google Scholar

47 See EFSF, supra note 34, at 177; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12, 132 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 195, 239, para. 106 (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter ESM temporary decision].Google Scholar

48 See EFSF, supra note 34, at 177–78; ESM temporary decision, supra note 47, at 239, para. 106.Google Scholar

49 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, at para. 28; ESM temporary decision, supra note 47, at 239, 240–41, paras. 106, 109–10.Google Scholar

50 TFEU art. 267.Google Scholar

51 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, para 27; cf. Honeywell, supra note 38, at 303, para. 57.Google Scholar

52 See Honeywell, supra note 38, at 304, para. 60.Google Scholar

53 See Honeywell, supra note 38, at 304, para. 61.Google Scholar

54 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 99–100.Google Scholar

55 See Lisbon, supra note 36, at 353 et seq., 359 et seq., 369 et seq., 432 et seq.; EFSF, supra note 34, at 179 et seq., 185–86.Google Scholar

56 Cf. TFEU arts. 273, 263(1).Google Scholar

57 Cf. TFEU art. 263(1).Google Scholar

58 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 102–03.Google Scholar

59 See EFSF, supra note 34, at 177, 179–80; ESM temporary decision, supra note 47, at 239–41.Google Scholar

60 See Maastricht, supra note 29, at 171–72; Lisbon, supra note 36, at 330 et seq., 340 et seq.; EFSF, supra note 34, at 167 et seq.Google Scholar

61 See Maastricht, supra note 29, at 172.Google Scholar

62 See ECB referral decision, supra note 1, paras. 44, 53.Google Scholar

63 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 20(2).Google Scholar

64 The critique in Judge Lübbe-Wolff's dissenting opinion (para. 16) is therefore not convincing, the more so since, in contrast to her view, every not democratically legitimated exercise of public authority is incompatible with the unchangeable democracy principle and thus in any case impairs the structural significance of the constitutional identity (at least, if it cannot—like the independence of the central bank within its narrowly-understood monetary mandate—be justified by special material reasons, and provided that this exception itself rests upon a democratically legitimated decision of the parliament).Google Scholar

65 See Lisbon, supra note 36.Google Scholar

66 Id. at 353.Google Scholar

67 Id. at 354–55.Google Scholar