The emergence of new interactions, notably those online, has led to the parallel development of criminal behaviors—not all of which are captured by the current legal framework. This article addresses the challenge posed to criminal law by the emergence of technologically facilitated violence, specifically its sexualized online forms. In particular, it argues for cautious yet specific criminalization of violent behaviors online whilst considering the broader criminal liabilities of all actors involved in the facilitation and perpetration of digital sexual violence. This article draws upon national—contentious—examples of attempts to regulate disruptive sexual violence perpetrated through digital means, with particular attention given to provisions in the UK, Germany, and France.

The Italian model of judicial self-government is often presented as a successful example of institutional reform to be copied in young democracies. This paper provides a deeper and multifaceted image of it and takes stock of its performance in securing the independence and the accountability of the judiciary. It first maps the rationale and the actors of judicial self-government in Italy, stressing, in particular, that the Italian model of judicial self-government not only aims at preventing the influence of the judiciary by external powers, but it is also equally concerned by threats to judicial independence coming from within the judiciary. It then provides a longitudinal analysis of the impact of this model of judicial self-government on the values of the independence and the accountability of the judiciary after the establishment of the High Council of the Judiciary in 1958. While acknowledging the crucial role of this body in securing the independence of the judiciary, this article claims that the values of independence and accountability of the judiciary have been achieved only progressively and partially.

In this Article we argue that rule of law indices are a powerful tool to detect ills in the rule of law of EU Member States. In order to explain how to improve the indices’ potential, we give a critical overview of the methodological issues of the four rule of law indices which we consider particularly instructive for our purpose. These are the indices provided by the Freedom House (“Freedom in the World,” FIW), the Bertelsmann Stiftung (“Bertelsmann Transformation Index,” BTI), the World Bank (“Worldwide Governance Indicators,” WGI), and the World Justice Project (“Rule of Law Index,” WJP RLI). After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of these indices, we turn to the EU Justice Scoreboard (EUJS). While the introduction of the EUJS in 2013 has already been an important step in order to lay the ground for an EU-wide analysis, in this Article we suggest how the EUJS should be further developed into a proper rule of law index by aggregating expert opinions into a single number. This would make the EUJS a significantly more useful tool in the ongoing EU rule of law crisis.

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.

Almost exactly one year after the famous judgments of the Court of First Instance on the precautionary principle, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “the Court”) has issued a preliminary ruling further exploring this concept. The ruling arose from a national dispute concerning a temporary ban on novel foods produced from genetically modified organisms (hereinafter “GMOs”). This recent Monsanto judgment is the first case in which the Court has directly invoked the precautionary principle regarding Member States’ power to adopt a provisional prohibition on the marketing of GMO-derived novel foods. Simultaneously, the Court lent an ear to the arguments of Monsanto by declaring the validity of the simplified procedure laid down in the novel foods Regulation 258/97 and based on the contentious concept of substantial equivalence. Thus, it seems to have favoured the free circulation in the Community market of novel foodstuffs notwithstanding the presence of residues of genetically modified (hereinafter “GM”) protein, on the condition that there is no risk to human health.

Judicial councils are often presented as a panacea for many disorders of judicial systems, including low public confidence in the judiciary. Nevertheless, the assessment of their impact has so far been neglected. The article offers a unique view on the relationship between judicial councils and the level of public confidence in courts. It draws a novel conceptual map of factors influencing public confidence in the judiciary, stressing its complex and multifaceted character. Situating the judicial councils on the map, it explores how they can help to potentially increase the level of public confidence in the judiciary, and assesses to what extent this has been true in the countries that have adopted them. The results reveal a considerable gap between the promises, expectations, and practice, and raise doubts about the ability of judicial councils to enhance confidence in courts. Judicial councils rarely manage to substantially improve institutional performance: they can enhance the quality of judicial systems which have already functioned quite well, but they do not tend to bring about change in the judicial systems that have been previously significantly flawed. The analysis of the longitudinal Eurobarometer data showed that, on average, the EU countries without judicial councils are better off in terms of public confidence. Although the existence of judicial councils does not make a difference regarding public confidence in the judiciary in the new EU member states, in the old EU member states, judicial systems with judicial councils enjoy lower levels of public confidence than the ones without them.

This Article analyzes the state of democracy in the EU through the study of the European Citizens’ Initiative. The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) represents one of the main ways the European institutions chose during the making of the European Convention, and then reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty, to beat populism by bringing decision-making closer to the citizens and promoting a new legitimization of Europe’s political unity. This Article starts by arguing that if one wants to understand European versions of populism it is necessary to pay attention to the reason why “democratic deficit” and “Euroscepticism” are predominant problems that the European Union is facing. It then analyzes the implementation of the ECI and the main issues of this instrument of democratization pointing at three flaws: a) the problem of e-democracy; b) the difficulty of stimulating large participation of civil society and people for the purposes of the ECIs; c) the cumbersome role of the EU Commission and the difficulties to ensure a real participatory instrument for the European citizens. From the analysis of the ECI this Article first advocates for a more robust public sphere in Europe as indispensable ground for a supranational democracy; second, it supports the revision of the ECI procedural aspects to transform it into a viable channel for amending EU policies in a more democratic way; third, this Article participates in the debate over the brand of democracy most suited to EU governance and polity.

This article offers an opening to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) situation and attacks against the judiciary in this region since 2010. The focus is not primarily on historical path dependence like the rest of this issue. Instead, the focus aims at the nature of attacks on the judiciary. Such attacks have appeared in CEE and the US in recent years. Its interest lies in explaining similar patterns visible in the judiciaries of CEE. Particularly, it looks at the current conditions in the Czech judiciary, political interventions in Poland since 2015 and in Hungary since 2010, and undermining of trust towards judiciary in the U.S., where attempts for delegitimizing the judiciary have happened since 2016. The article draws on similarities of attacks of authoritarian governments and responses of judiciaries. The authors highlight similarities and diversities of CEE countries 30 years after the fall of the communist regime and a path of these resemblances and varieties.

This Article discusses the extraterritorial human rights obligations of states and proposes a new approach for conceptualizing them. While extraterritorial state obligations within the concept of state jurisdiction are indisputably recognized, a more comprehensive perspective beyond jurisdiction is generally lacking. This Article aims to fill that gap. First, it discusses the traditional notions of extraterritorial state obligations and demonstrates their weaknesses. Second, a new concept of extraterritorial state obligations borrowing elements from systems theory is then suggested. The Article argues that comprehensive and general extraterritorial state obligations mainly build upon the normative idea of human rights. Human rights have universal validity and prescribe obligations that are independent of the jurisdiction of a state. What matters is that states can violate human rights beyond their jurisdiction and can influence violations of human rights committed by other actors. Finally, this Article outlines the scope and content of extraterritorial human rights obligations of states.

The contributions to this Special Issue of the German Law Journal originate from a meeting in July 2004 at the European University Institute, which was convened following a disappointing experience. The participants – lawyers, historians, political scientists – had co-operated intensively in the preparation of a project on “The Shadows of the Past(s) over the Construction of Europe” which they had submitted to the Volkswagen Stiftung. Although the foundation acknowledged the core aspirations and importance of its individual components, our application was, however, criticized for its overly broad scope and alleged lack of coherence. Should we, however, retain our loose multi-disciplinary, multi-issue and multi-national exploratory approach? Or, should we instead seek to tighten up the whole enterprise and explain what form of common result we would like to deliver? What was planned as a debate on these alternatives developed into enormously interesting, sometimes breath-taking discussions. At the end, we felt that we were able to articulate what we had more intuitively sought for, namely, a formula that would link our concern about European past(s) with our concern for Europe's present and future.

On a global level, we are witnessing a revitalisation of religion, which also includes a re-politisation of religion, particularly within contemporary Islam. Religion has become, once again, a political topos. The secularised western world is thus facing a new challenge, for which it appears to be inadequately prepared. The idea of freedom of religion, guaranteed as a fundamental right, obliges western democratic states to respect the religious activities of their citizens and to secure their free development. Therefore, the state is principally neither allowed to favour nor to discriminate against certain professions of faith. This concept of equidistance is known as the principle of state neutrality: it commits the state to generally withdraw from religious issues, especially the political act of defining what can legitimately be classified as religion and religious behaviour. The leeway given to the self-conception of religious groups by the German Federal Constitutional Court and its wide understanding of what kind of behaviour has a direct relationship to faith and therefore deserves protection by the freedom of religion, is to be understood against the context of this general principle. However, with regard to the new challenges mentioned above, the neutrality principle increasingly serves yet another purpose. The courts use it as an exit-option in order to avoid addressing problems which appear to be too complex for the law relegating religion to sociological study. In this context, state neutrality merely functions as a chiffre for indifference. But this strategy of avoidance, though understandable in the light of the complexity of religious pluralism, undermines the law's function of conflict resolution. Furthermore, it neither corresponds to the historical development nor to the functional aspects of the idea of religious freedom.

When the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) decided to refer the question of whether the European Central Bank's (ECB) decision on the purchase of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) is compatible with EU primary law, it effectively forced the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) into a game of “chicken.”

International courts and tribunals are firstly and particularly conceived to settle legal disputes between States and/or other organs or individuals admitted as parties according to the statute of the respective court by means of a binding decision. An advisory function is not inherent in the function of a judicial body, but has to be transferred expressly upon a court or tribunal in the constituent instrument. For non-standing judicial bodies, i.e., arbitral tribunals, an advisory function is rather unusual, but not altogether ruled out: The parties to a compromis may empower the tribunal to give an advisory opinion.

“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect shall be the duty of all state authority.” It is with this proclamation in Article 1(1) Basic Law (“Grundgesetz” or “GG”) that the German Constitution starts its section on fundamental rights. When the Parliamentary Council formulated this basic right, they had in mind the denial of fundamental rights during the period of National Socialism and the atrocities of the Holocaust. The framers, however, did not envisage a constitutional right to state benefits despite Article 151(1) of the Weimar Imperial Constitution of 1919 linking the ordering of economic life with the purpose of ensuring a dignified existence for all. Utilizing a constitutional originalism approach the German Federal Constitutional Court (“FCC”) never could have arrived at what is referred to as the Hartz IV decision. This decision creates a constitutional right to guarantee by law a subsistence minimum based on Article 1(1) GG in conjunction with the social state principle in Article 20(1) GG. The decision can be read as—possibly the first—conceptualisation of a constitutional socio-economic right to statutory state benefits by a Constitutional Court.

The principle of equal treatment is essential to the process of European integration. It is one of the main principles – if not the main principle – driving this process forward. Equal treatment between States and the prohibition to discriminate on grounds of nationality are indeed cornerstones of the European project. Furthermore, the principle of equal treatment is a fundamental right according to which comparable situations must not be treated differently, and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. This fundamental right has also been given more specific expression in a set of Treaty provisions and Directives prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. Precisely because the principle of equal treatment performs several important functions in the EU legal order, it is shaped by several sets of actors: constituent powers, legislature and judiciary. The article first maps out the various functions that the principle of equal treatment fulfills in EU law, placing emphasis on the complexity of the relevant constitutional framework. This sets the floor for a critical discussion on how different institutional visions of the principle may compete, and a reflection of the role of the concept of ‘essence’ to articulate these competing visions.

The foodborne disease and other incidents of food contamination, such as the dioxins crisis, have tested the internal market of the European Union (EU) in relation to the free movement of goods. The protective measures adopted under the safeguard clause obliged EU Member States to act in co-ordination with the European Commission and, in fact, to modify elements of their food chain structure. Certainly the agrofood safety crisis of the 1990s and the review of European food law have resulted in a system in which the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) plays a key role.

Given the fast development of the field of AML Regulation, this Article aims to answer the following questions: First, how is money laundering dealt with and regulated on the EU level? Second, to which legal concerns do the chosen regulatory strategy give rise? Accordingly, this Article provides an overview of the various regulatory strategies in the global and EU regional AML Regime while at the same time points out some of the most pressing legal concerns in AML Regulation. These include the blurred line between administrative and criminal law measures and the protection of individual rights and fundamental freedoms including data protection and privacy issues in administrative and criminal law contexts respectively. Although briefly mentioning the global and international context, the focus of this Article is the EU regulatory action, its outcome and critique, and possible future.

On 7 February 2014 in the OMT Case, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe referred a question about the interpretation of Treaty law to the European Court of Justice for the first time. The question was whether the European Central Bank exceeded its mandate when it declared, in September 2012, that it was prepared to make emergency, unlimited purchases of specific states' bonds. Some view the referral as a genuflection acknowledging the judicial superiority of European Union jurisprudence. Has the Karlsruhe Court relinquished its role as “the final arbiter” and thereby surreptitiously bid farewell to the German sovereignty that the same Senate of the Constitutional Court so vigorously endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009?

The purpose of this essay is to consider the significance of new developmentalism for the field of law and development. New developmentalism refers to a theory and practice of development economics, which appears to have entered mainstream development thinking. Its core elements also seem to have been a factor in the dynamic economic growth that has occurred in a number of emerging economies. This trend is significant for the field of law and development because: (a) conventional economic development orthodoxies are seen to have shaped previous law and development movements; (b) these models and their corresponding law reform projects were arguably inadequately adapted to existing domestic circumstances; and (c) new developmentalism represents a departure from conventional development orthodoxies, as it necessitates both learning and adapting to local settings. Yet such a system also creates new challenges for law reformers and policymakers within the international development community (not to mention domestic reformers), and it remains unclear (if not doubtful) that new developmental states can be engineered by external actors and institutions.