¹ The CJEU consists of two courts, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (GC).Google Scholar

² Such as Paul Reuter, La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier 140 (1953) (underlining innovative features from an international law perspective such as direct standing for undertakings); see also Mosler, Hermann, Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. Entstehung und Qualifizierung 14 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1, 42–43 (1951) (comparing the functions of the Coal and Steel Court to those of an administrative and constitutional tribunal).Google Scholar

³ On the broader objectives of the special issue of which this contribution forms part, see, David Kosař, Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance in Europe, 19 German L.J. (2018).Google Scholar

⁴ For overviews written by Court insiders see, Roger Grass, Les ressources humaines à la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, in Le droit a la mesure de l'homme. Melanges en l'honneur de Philippe Leger 69 (Yves Bot et al. eds., 2006); Grass, Roger and Escobar, Alfredo Calot, 2004-2014: Une période déterminante pour les ressources de l'institution, in La Cour de justice de l'Union europeenne sous la presidence de Vassilios Skouris (2003-2015). Liber amicorum Vassilios Skouris 227 (Antonio Tizzano et al eds., 2015); for contributions that – exceptionally – take a more normative take on the issue, Marc van der Woude, Towards a European Council of the Judiciary: Some Reflections on the Administration of the EU Courts, in Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union. Essays in Honour of Japp W. de Zwaan 63 (Flora A.N.J. Goudappel & Ernst M. H. Hirsch Ballin eds., 2016); and Dehousse, Franklin, The Reform of the EU Courts (II). Abandoning the Management Approach by Doubling the General Court, in 83 Egmont Paper (2016).Google Scholar

⁵ Documents have been received through access to documents requests 0017/2015D and 0008/2018D.Google Scholar

⁶ See, Kosař, , supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁷ Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.Google Scholar

⁸ The main procedural venue in the original setup of the Coal and Steel Court, the annulment procedure, reflects a strong imprint of French administrative law; see Koopmans, Thijmen, The Birth of European Law at the Cross-Roads of Legal Traditions, 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 493, 500 (1953).Google Scholar

⁹ L'Huillier, Jean, Une conquěte du droit administratif français: Le contentieux de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, 13 Recueil Dalloz: Chronique 63, 66 (1953) (my translation).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Recounting this anecdote, van Houtte, Albert, Souvenirs de la Cour de justice. 1953-1982, in XXXV Anni. 1952-1987 69, 79 (Alexander Mackenzie Stuart ed., 1987).Google Scholar

¹¹ See, Antoine, Anik, La Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour internationale de Justice, 57 Revue generale de droit international public 210, 261 (1953); further, on inspiration drawn from the ICJ, see Delvaux, Louis, La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier. Expose sommaire et des principes 16 (1956).Google Scholar

¹² On self-government in international courts as a rule of customary international law, see, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Der institutionelle Rahmen: Status, Ausstattung und Personalhoheit internationaler Gerichte. Der IGH, der Internationale Strafgerichtshof und das Jugoslawien-Tribunal im Vergleich, 30 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 107, 117 (2003).Google Scholar

¹³ See, Riese, Otto, Erfahrungen aus der Praxis des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, Deutsche Richterzeitung 270, 271 (1958); for an interesting account of how Otto Riese, the first German judge at the Coal and Steel Court, selected his law clerk, see, Hans Wolfram Daig, Erinnerungen an die Frühzeit des Gerichtshofes, in XXXV Anni. 1952-1987 127, 128 (Alexander Mackenzie Stuart ed., 1987).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Hochstrass, René, Les premiers jours de la Cour, in XXXV Anni. 1952-1987 119, 119 (Alexander Mackenzie Stuart ed., 1987).Google Scholar

¹⁵ A complete list can be found in the report of the Coal and Steel Community's auditor, Rapport du Commissaire aux Comptes Urbain J. Vaes relative au quatrieme exercice financier 20 (deuxième volume, 1 juillet 1955 au 30 juin 1956).Google Scholar

¹⁶ To be sure, the role of international courts’ plenaries in administrative and disciplinary matters differs between courts, see Cartier, Stéphanie and Hoss, Cristina, The Role of Registries and Legal Secretariats in International Judicial Institutions, in The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 711, 717 (Cesare Romano, Karen Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Only if administrative questions directly concerned the office of Advocate General, the Court decided upon their proposal; see Article 25 para 7 Coal and Steel Court Rules of Procedure (RoP).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Article 14 Coal and Steel Court Statute.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Article 12 para 1 Coal and Steel Court RoP.Google Scholar

²⁰ Article 20 Coal and Steel Court RoP.Google Scholar

²¹ Article 14 and 16 Coal and Steel Court Statute.Google Scholar

²² Article 3 Coal and Steel Court Statute.Google Scholar

²³ Article 19 Coal and Steel Court Statute (in case the need was seen for a judge to recuse himself, he could be informed by the President of the Court. In case of conflict, the plenary would decide).Google Scholar

²⁴ On the grounds for disciplinary proceedings see, Jean de Richemont, La Cour de Justice. Code annoté. Guide pratique 15–16 (1954); for Advocates General a different rule applied, they could be deprived of office through unanimous Council decision; see Article 13 para 2 Coal and Steel Court Statute; further, KPE Lasok, The European Court of Justice. Practice and Procedure 19 (2nd ed., 1994).Google Scholar

²⁵ Antoine, supra note 11, at 261.Google Scholar

²⁶ On the conception of international judges as ‘ambassadors for the state', Ruth Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics 60 (2010).Google Scholar

²⁷ Nicole Condorelli-Braun, Commissaires et juges dans les Communautes europeennes 108–109 (1972).Google Scholar

²⁸ The ECJ completed 699 cases in 2017 the General Court 895 cases (Judicial Activity Report 101 and 207) (2017), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-04/_ra_2017_en.pdf.Google Scholar

²⁹ The ECJ currently has 28 judges and 11 Advocates General, the GC 45 judges (1 December 2018).Google Scholar

³⁰ As of 31 December 2017, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_80908/en.Google Scholar

³¹ Court of Justice of the European Union, Management Report 14 (2017); https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-06/rapport_gestion_2017_en-web.pdf.Google Scholar

³² Id., 55.Google Scholar

³³ See already, Grass, supra note 4.Google Scholar

³⁴ Article 9 GC RoP.Google Scholar

³⁵ Article 42 para 1 GC RoP.Google Scholar

³⁶ Article 25 ECJ RoP.Google Scholar

³⁷ Bonichot, Jean-Claude, Le métier de juge à la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, 16 Revue des Affaires Europeennes 531, 535 (2007/08).Google Scholar

³⁸ Art. 3 of the Décision de la Cour de justice du 20 octobre 2015 relative au comité administratif de la Cour (on file with the author).Google Scholar

³⁹ For instance, Procès-verbal de la réunion spéciale du comité administratif du 24 mars 2014 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For instance the hiring process of the Court's ‘Conseiller juridique pour les affaires administratives', see Procès-verbal de la réunion du comité administratif du 6 juillet 2015, at 1 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

⁴¹ On the re-structuring of the Court's communications department, Procès-verbal de la réunion du comité administratif du 5 novembre 2014 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

⁴² Art. 6, supra note 38.Google Scholar

⁴³ Id., Art. 7.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Van der Woude, , supra note 4, at 71.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ According to Article 12 CJEU Statute, officials and other servants are attached to the Court of Justice and responsible to the ECJ's Registrar under the authority of the ECJ President. While, according to Article 52 CJEU Statute, certain officials are directly responsible to the Registrar of the GC under the authority of the President of the GC, they nevertheless remain attached to the ECJ, which is, according to Article 9 ECJ RoP responsible for all CJEU resources. As van der Woude, supra note 4, at 70, highlights, Article 9 para 3 ECJ RoP ('The President shall ensure the proper functioning of the services of the Court.'), suggests, notably in its non-English version, that all resources are attached to the ECJ and the GC does not have own resources.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See then-GC President Bo Vesterdorf's submission to the discussion circle on the Court of Justice in the Convention on the Future of Europe, Oral presentation by Bo Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, to the ‘discussion circle’ on the Court of Justice on 24 February 2003; available at: https://www.cvce.eu/.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Article 9 para 3 ECJ RoP.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Quatremer, Jean, La justice européenne au bord de la crise de nerfs, Libération: Coulisses de Bruxelles (Apr. 26, 2015), http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/2015/04/26/la-justice-europeenne-au-bord-de-la-crise-de-nerfs (relying on an anonymous source from within the Court who describes a concentration of powers with then-President Skouris).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Article 15 para 1 ECJ RoP.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For an example see the alleged attempts by former President Skouris to create an attractive job in the Court's administration for his former chef de cabinet against the opposition of inter alia the Court's Registrar, see Quatremer, Jean, Copinage et clientélisme à la Cour de justice européenne, Libération: Coulisses de Bruxelles (June 8, 2015), http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/2015/06/08/copinage-et-clientelisme-la-cour-de-justice-europeenne.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Article 9 Coal and Steel Court Statute.Google Scholar

⁵² Article 32 Coal and Steel Treaty and Article 4 para 3 Coal and Steel Court Statute; only if the Council agreed by a two-thirds majority, could the judges be authorized to engage in an unpaid or gainful occupation.Google Scholar

⁵³ A most vivid example is, what has been called, the Affaire Rueff. Already during the year 1958, Jacques Rueff, the French Coal and Steel Court judge, had led a French government committee in charge of restructuring public finances. In November 1959 he officially resigned as a judge, to return to Paris to become vice-president of a committee in charge of reforming the French economy. Both the obligation to continue his work as a judge until a successor had been named (Article 5 ECSC Statute) and the duty not to engage in administrative or political activities (Article 4 ECSC Statute) had been ignored. This created a highly uncomfortable situation for the Court. During one year, it had to exclude the youngest of its members from its deliberations, deciding with five judges only, in order to conform with the obligation to sit in unequal numbers. It was not until September 1960 that France reappointed a judge to the Court: surprisingly, and quite embarrassingly for the Court, an unmotivated Jacques Rueff, who stayed on the Court for another two years until he was again urgently needed in Paris; see, Antonin Cohen, Juge et expert. L'Affaire Rueff ou la codification des règles de la circulation internationale, 59 Critique internationale 69 (2013).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Code of Conduct [2007] OJ C223/1.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Code of Conduct for Members and former Members of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2016] OJ C483/1.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ A letter from then-ECJ President Vassilios Skouris to GC President Marc Jaeger was leaked. In this letter Skouris alleged that Jaeger had damaged the CJEU's position by communicating directly with the President of the COREPER on the GC's institutional reform – a prerogative of the ECJ President. Skouris mentions in this letter that the committee under Article 7 of the (2007) Code of Conduct has, in light of these events, decided not to grant additional staff to the GC; see Robinson, Duncan, The 1st rule of ECJ fight club…is about to be broken, Financial Times: Brussels Blog (April 27, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2015/04/27/the-lst-rule-of-ecj-flight-club-is-about-to-be-broken.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ 2014 discharge. Questionnaire to European Court of Justice, at 6 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See, Vassilios Skouris, Höchste Gerichte an ihren Grenzen – Bemerkungen aus der Perspektive des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in Die Ordnung der Freiheit. Festschrift für Christian Starck zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 991, 997 (Rainer Grote et al eds., 2007).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ 2013 discharge questionnaire to the European Court of Justice, at 5 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Id. Google Scholar

⁶¹ Dehousse, supra note 4, at 51-52.Google Scholar

⁶² See, Seytre, Dominique, Pour une liste de juges retardaires?, Le Jeudi, (June 6, 2013), http://jeudi.lu/pour-une-liste-de-juges-retardataires.Google Scholar

⁶³ Most forcefully by Eleanor Sharpston, Making the Court of Justice of the European Union More Productive, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 763 (2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ de Waele, Henri, Not Quite the Bed that Procrustes Built. Dissecting the System for Selecting Judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Selecting Europe's Judges. A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts 24, 49 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Article 255 TFEU, in its present form, goes back to the European Convention preparing the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in the early 2000s, and to the fear of the rise of ‘political nominations’ in particular in light of the upcoming enlargements of the Union. See Barents, René, The Court of Justice in the Draft Constitution, in 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 121, 139 (2004); see also Björnsson, Thorbjörn and Shany, Yuval, The Court of Justice of the European Union, in Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts 292 (Yuval Shany ed., 2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ For the current composition of the Panel, see Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2017/2262 of 4 December 2017 appointing the members of the panel provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Articles 253 and 254 TFEU.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ In detail, de Waele, supra note 64, at 35-39.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Alemanno, Alberto, How Transparent is Transparent Enough? Balancing Access to Information Against Privacy, in Selecting Europe's Judges. A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts, supra note 64, 202, at 204 ('some embryonic form of unintended judicial self-government'); in this sense, see also Dumbrovský, Tomas, Petkova, Bilyana & Van der Sluis, Marvin, Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States, 51 Common Market Law Review 455, 481–482 (2014) (speaking of the potential for a ‘subtle move’ in the direction of judicial self-government).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Article 255 para 2 TFEU.Google Scholar

⁷¹ As regards the first panel proposed by then-President Skouris, see Council of the European Union, Recommendation concerning the composition of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU, Doc 16858/13 JUR 600 INST 638 COUR 92 + ADD (December 4, 2013), and the approval without discussion as an A-item by the Council of the EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision appointing the members of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU = Adoption, Doc. 16858/13 JUR 600 INST 638 COUR 92 + ADD 1 (January 22, 2014).Google Scholar

⁷² Karpenstein, Ulrich, Artikel 255 AEUV, in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, margin number 11-12 (Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 2017). Moreover, according to Article 255 TFEU, the ECJ President has also proposed the operating rules of the Panel adopted in 2010. With only cosmetic linguistic changes by the Council they had been approved. For the ECJ President's proposal see, Council of the European Union, Recommendation relating to the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU, Doc. 5195/10 JUR 5 INST 2 COUR 1 (January 11, 2010); for the Council's final decision, Council Decision 2010/124/EU relating to the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. L50/18, Annex (2010).Google Scholar

⁷³ Bobek, Michal, Epilogue. Searching for the European Hercules, in Selecting Europe's Judges. A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts 282 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Fifth Activity report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 28 February 2018, at 15.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Id., at 14.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ From the vast literature on the topic see only Anthony Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice (2006); Alter, Karen, The European Court's Political Power (2009).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The European Court of Justice is the most trusted of all institutions of government assessed in Eurobarometer surveys; see Kelemen, R. Daniel, The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union, 19 Journal of European Public Policy 43 (2012).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See Hancisse, Louis, Amanda McMenamin, Mark Perera & Ronny Patz, The European Union Integrity System 125 (2014).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See, Kosař, , supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Caldeira, Gregory A. & Gibson, James L., The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support, 89 American Political Science Review 356 (1995); Gibson, James L. and Caldeira, Gregory A., Changes in the Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice, 28 British Journal of Political Science 63 (1998).Google Scholar

⁸¹ Caldeira & Gibson, The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support, supra note 80, at 365.Google Scholar

⁸² Voeten, Eric, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 411, 416 (2013).Google Scholar

⁸³ See, for instance, Robinson, supra note 56. On a further conflict on the drafting of the CJEU's Code of Conduct, where the GC felt marginalized, see Seytre, Dominique, Les juges et le syndrome “Mirza”, Le Jeudi (December 8, 2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Robinson, supra note 56.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Dehousse, supra note 4.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ For the whole story, see Alemanno, Alberto & Pech, Laurent, Thinking Justice Outside the Docket: A Critical Assessment of the Reform of the EU's Court System, 54 Common Market Law Review 129 (2017).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See Barents, supra note 65, at 139.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ [Cosmopolitan Patriotism], To (June 6, 2010), http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=335911.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Chief Justice fails in bid for European Court job, Times of Malta (March 3, 2016) https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160303/local/chief-justice-fails-in-bid-for-european-court-job.604431.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Stefan Strömberg anses ej lämplig som EU-domare [Stefan Strömberg is not considered suitable as EU judge], Realtid.se (August 3, 2012); http://www.realtid.se/stefan-stromberg-anses-ej-lamplig-som-eu-domare.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Regierung schlägt Grazer Professor Kumin als EuGH-Richter vor [Government proposes Professor Kumin from Graz as ECJ judge], Die Presse (Nov. 12, 2018); https://diepresse.com/home/ausland/eu/5528760/Regierung-schlaegt-Grazer-Professor-Kumin-als-EuGHRichter-vor.Google Scholar

⁹² Sweet, Alec Stone, The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance, in 5 Living Reviews in European Governance 8 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹³ See for instance, Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter, Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 International Organization 41 (1993); Larsson, Olof, Naurin, Daniel, Derlén, Mattias & Lindholm, Johan, Speaking law to power: the strategic use of precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 50 Comparative Political Studies 879, 884–886 (2017).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ On trust as a key factor for the cooperation of domestic judges with the Court, see Mayoral, Juan A., In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the Judicial Construction of Europe, 55 Journal of Common Market Studies 551 (2017).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Bobek, Michal, Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the Eyes of National Courts, in Judging Europe's Judges. The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice 197, 218 (Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen & Gert Straetmans eds., 2013).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See, Çall, Başak & Cunningham, Stewart, Judicial Self Government and the sui generis case of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 German L.J. (2018).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See for instance, Karpenstein, supra note 72; further, Dominique Ritleng, The Independence and Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice, in Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union 83, 100 (Dominique Ritleng ed., 2016).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Bobek, supra note 73, at 303. On the current Panel sit for instance Carlos Lesmes Serrano, President of the Spanish Supreme Court; Voßkuhle, Andreas, President of the German Federal Constitutional Court; and Wyrzykowski, Mirosław, a former judge at the Polish Constitutional Court.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See Hancisse, McMenamin, Perera & Patz, supra note 78, at 125.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Article 253 paragraphs 1 and 4 and Article 254 paragraph 2 TFEU.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Malenovsky, Jiří, Les éléments constitutifs du mandat des juges de la Cour de justice à l'épreuve du temps: l'iceberg commence à fondre, 4 Il Diritto dell'Unione Europea 801, 817–823 (2011); from the early years, Hans-Ulrich Bächle, Die Rechtsstellung der Richter am Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 129 (1961).Google Scholar

¹⁰² See, for instance, Azizi, Josef, Unveiling the EU Courts’ Internal Decision-Making Process: A Case for Dissenting Opinions? 12 ERA Forum 49 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See, above, Part B. II.2.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Article 3 para 1 subpara 3 and Article 4 para 1 Décision du 17 février 2009 portant adoption de règles de bonne conduite des référendaires (on file with the author).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Vademecum: Unité de Presse et de l'Information (June 2015), (on file with the author) at 16.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Id., at 13.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See, Kosař, supra note 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See, Çalı & Cunningham, supra note 96.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ In detail, Alberto Alemanno & Oana Stefan, Openness at the Court of Justice of the European Union: Toppling a Taboo 51 Common Market Law Review 97, 108–113 (2014).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ The procedure for access to documents has been concretized in a decision, which sets out the steps for the application process and regulates review and appeal procedures in case access to documents is denied; see the Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 October 2016 concerning public access to documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (2016/C 445/03).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Alemanno & Stefan, supra note 109, at 113.Google Scholar

¹¹² This article, being based on a number of documents that have been received through the CJEU's transparency regime, is good proof of this.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Alemanno & Stefan, supra note 109, at 113-116.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ For the first time, during the 2014 budgetary discharge procedure, the Court revealed to the European Parliament a list of 158 outside activities of its members. However, it was not mentioned which CJEU members took part in the individual events, see CJEU, Décharge 2014. Questionnaire adressé à la Cour de justice. Complément de réponse aux questions n° 9 et 10: Liste des activités exercées par les Membres des trois juridictions ayant eu un impact sur le budget de l'Union européenne; for the year 2017 a list of outside activities linking CJEU members names to the events has been published by the Court online; see https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-02/tra-doc-en-div-c-0000-2018-201800885-05_01.pdf.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ For the reasons given by the Council and the critque see, Anastasia Eriksson, Mingzhu Li, Omar Shalaby, Alberto Alemanno & Paige Morrow, Transparent Selection of Judges for EU Courts: Complaint to the European Ombudsman, HEC Paris Research Paper No. LAW-2017-1239.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ On how to strike the balance, see Alemanno, supra note 69.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See supra note 72.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ See, notably, Eriksson, Li, Shalaby, Alemanno & Morrow, supra note 115.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ See supra note 56.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Dehousse, supra note 4, at 67.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Quatremer, Jean, ‘Le superjuge frôle le hors-jeu', Libération (6/7 June 2015) p. 16.Google Scholar

¹²² Dehousse, supra note 4, at 65.Google Scholar

¹²³ Executive Board Members of the European Central Bank, for instance, publish their diaries, with a lag of three months, including appointments with external parties; see, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/calendars-of-the-EB-members/html/index.en.html.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ See Hancisse, McMenamin, Perera & Patz, supra note 78, at 129.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See Article 6 of the Court's Statute.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Between 2004 and 2013 the immunity of a CJEU judge or Advocate General has been lifted ten times, only one included a request by a third party; Hancisse, McMenamin, Perera & Patz, supra note 78, at 129.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ 2012 discharge questionnaire to the European Court of Justice, (on file with the author) at 4; for the competences of OLAF as regards the CJEU and the modalities of their cooperation see, Décision de la Cour du 12 juillet 2011 portant modification de la décision du 26 octobre 1999 relative aux conditions et modalités des enquětes internes en matière de lutte contre la fraude, la corruption et toute activité illégale préjudiciable aux intérěts des Communautés.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ In detail, Christoph Krenn, The European Court of Justice's Financial Accountability. How the European Parliament Incites and Monitors Judicial Reform through the Budgetary Process, 13 European Constitutional Law Review, 253 (2017).Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Formally, according to Article 319 TFEU, discharge is granted to the Commission for the implementation of the budget. In practice, however, the European Parliament grants individual discharge to those in charge of implementing the budget within the specific institution. The Registrar is, under the supervision of the ECJ's president, responsible for the implementation of the CJEU's budget.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Theato, Diemut, Die Haushaltskontrolle durch das EP und sein Beitrag zur Entwicklung eines europäischen Sanktionsrechts, in Europäische Demokratie 111 (Josef Drexl ed., 1999). In case of disapproval it does not lead to a budgetary impasse for the Court, see, Siegfried Magiera, Artikel 319 AEUV, in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, supra note 72, at margin number 9.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Art. 166 para. 1 of the 2012 Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2012] OJ L298/1.Google Scholar

¹³² As regards the CJEU this was threatened by the Parliament in its 2004 discharge resolution, see [2004] OJ L330/141, point 15, regarding the non-official car use by members of the court and the system of salary weightings.Google Scholar

¹³³ European Parliament, Discharge decision for the financial year 2000, [2002] OJ L158/66, para. 19.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ European Court of Auditors, Special Report no 5/2000, [2000] OJ C109.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ European Parliament, Discharge decision for the financial year 2002, [2004] OJ L330/140, paras. 5-15.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ European Parliament decision of 18 April 2018 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2016, Section IV – Court of Justice (2017/2139(DEC), para 37.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ 2013 discharge. Questionnaire to the European Court of Justice, at 10 (on file with the author).Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Following up the observations or recommendations in the discharge resolution of the European Parliament of 3 April 2014 for the year 2012. Replies given and steps taken by the Court of Justice. ('The Court has made every effort to act upon [the observations/recommendations expressed by the EP] as soon as possible.').Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Already in the early 1980s, in the wake of severe budget cuts, the Parliament blocked attempts by the Council to include the Court among those institutions whose budget should be cut by five percent; see European Parliament, Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgets on Section IV – Court of Justice – of the draft general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1983 (25 October 1982) Document 1-781/82.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See, for instance, the Court's statement that ‘budgetary resources relating to IT functioning and development should be preserved by the budgetary authority, as done thanks to the amendments supported by the European Parliament during last years.’ See, Discharge 2011: questions from M. Kalfin (on file with the author), at 4.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ For an analysis and critique see, Krenn, supra note 128.Google Scholar

¹⁴² See, for instance, supra notes 50 and 56.Google Scholar