Did Leibniz invent or, if you prefer, discover topology with his analysis situs? Yes, urge Nicholas Rescher (1978, p. 70), George MacDonald Ross (1984, p. 29) and Ian Hacking (1984, p. 213). No, urge Hans Freudenthal (1954/1972), Benson Mates (1986, p. 240) and Michael Otte (1989, p. 24). James Alexander (1932/1967, p. 249), drawing a distinction between point set and combinatorial methods, cautiously remarked that combinatorial topology “is more nearly a development of Leibniz's original idea.” Less cautiously, Morris Kline (1972, p. 1163) remarked that “to the extent that he was at all clear, Leibniz envisioned what we now call combinatorial topology.” Louis Couturat (1961, p. 429), Rudolf Carnap (1922, p. 81) and Ernst Cassirer (1950, p. 49) proposed projective geometry as the realization of Leibniz's project. Dennis Martin (1983, p. 5) sees topology as a development from analysis situs. Javier Echeverria (1988, p. 218), reporting on his archival research, argues that Leibniz “successfully introduced very general geometrical notions that boil down to what is known today as topology.” And a good many others, for and against, might be cited.

Le modèle causaliste en théorie de l'action a pour point de départ l'idée que les rationalisations sont des explications causales de l'action, c'est-à-dire que les énoncés à propos des croyances et des pro-attitudes qui ont motivé un agent à accomplir une certaine action expriment les antécédents causaux de cette action. Pour reprendre un des exemples classiques, le meurtre de César par Brutus a été causé par le désir que Brutus avait de prendre le pouvoir et par sa croyance que la seule façon d'y parvenir était d'éliminer César. Bien qu'intuitive, cette position soulève immédiatement un problème du fait que les états intentionnels, en raison de leur contenu propositionnel, ne s'imposent pas d'office comme appartenant au règne des choses physiques et de la causalité. Comment, en effet, des entités d'ordre mental peuvent-elles interagir avec les entités complètement différentes que sont les événements physiques? Et même, plus largement, comment un événement mental peut-il avoir une quelconque efficace causale sur un événement physique ou sur un autre événement mental? Une réponse bien connue à cette difficulté est le monisme anomal de Davidson, selon lequel il n'y a pas d'obstacle à ce que le mental soit en relation causale avec le physique puisque les occurrences d'événements mentaux sont identiques à des occurrences d'événements physiques. Toutefois cette approche, qui, comme bien d'autres, mise sur une stratégie matérialiste pour ne pas isoler le mental du physique, en a conduit plus d'un à douter de l'indispensabilité du mental.

This substantial study appears in a series called The Arguments of the Philosophers. If Professor Skorupski's admirable work on Mill is typical, it will be a remarkable series. Both as a work of scholarship and as a contribution to philosophy in its own right, this is an outstanding work, well worth reading by the general philosopher and not just by Mill devotees.

J'appelle empiriques ou a posteriori les probabilités déterminées par l'application de la théorie mathématique des probabilités à un domaine empirique, principalement la physique. La logique inductive ou la logique probabilitaire, les probabilités conditionnelles, etc. sont exclues de mon propos.

La parution d'un ouvrage entièrement consacré à la théorie kantienne du sublime mérite d'être saluée avec un certain enthousiasme, a fortiori lorsqu'il provient de la tradition anglo-saxonne, où la question du sublime est généralement considérée comme une «erreur» dont la théorie esthétique de Kant gagnerait à être expurgée. Paul Crowther remarque d'entrée de jeu que le regain d'intérêt pour l'esthétique de Kant qui s'est fait sentir dans le monde anglo-saxon depuis les années soixante-dix s'est concentré presque exclusivement sur les questions de la beauté et de l'art, au détriment du sublime. Paul Guyer avait prétendu fixer les raisons de cet ostracisme: d'abord, le sentiment du sublime est selon lui inconciliable avec l'explication fondamentale que donne Kant de la «réponse esthétique» en général en termes d'harmonie de l'imagination et de l'entendement; ensuite, la discussion du sublime minimiserait l'importance de 1'intersubjectivité esthétique, qui constitue selon lui l'essentiel de la théorie esthétique kantienne comprise comme une théorie du «goût»; et finalement, la discussion kantienne du sublime ne posséderait plus qu'un intérêt historique, qui ne saurait rencontrer nos sensibilités esthétiques modernes, tandis que nous aurions au contraire beaucoup à apprendre de la discussion des jugements sur la beauté (1979, p. 399 sq.). Or, c'est précisément d'une nouvelle sensibilité à l'endroit du sublime, qui se ferait sentir depuis les années quatre-vingt, que se réclame Crowther pour justifier son entreprise théorique (p. 2).

Martha Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness is an ambitious, imaginative and wide-ranging study (from classical antiquity to contemporary moral theory), one which has understandably received considerable attention. It comprises studies of the five authors that are arguably the greatest interpretive thinkers of classical antiquity whose works have come down to us: Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Plato and Aristotle. Nussbaum's project is to contrast what might be called the rational and pluralistic (the anachronism ‘existential’ would be appropriate) approaches to life and happiness.

The strong intuition that the facts concerning the subjectivity of consciousness are simply beyond the grasp of objective science is the highest barrier to an intuitively convincing materialism in the philosophy of mind. We are steeped in a tradition which has it that there is, to state it from the first-person point of view, an epistemic difference in principle between my introspectible experience, which only I can apprehend and know, and the things which everyone can apprehend and which form the domain of the natural sciences. This contrast is sometimes cast as that between the subjective stuff of first-person introspectible consciousness and the objective stuff of the natural sciences. In this essay, I will try to budge the view of the subjective-objective distinction which underlies this tradition from its position as tacit dogma.

L'intentionnalité pose aux philosophes qui se réclament du matérialisme ou du physicalisme deux problèmes complémentaires qui sont les deux faces d'une même médaille. Premièrement, peut-on naturaliser l'intentionnalité? Deuxièmement, les propriétés intentionnelles des représentations sont-elles causalement efficaces? Un moteur peut-il être sémantique?

Those familiar with Paul Churchland's earlier work will expect A Neuro-computational Perspective to be lively, provocative and interesting. They will not be disappointed. Churchland is best known for his sceptical view of belief-desire psychology. He suspects this theory is hopelessly false. This welcome collection of his essays includes this work but also his papers on the subjective aspects of the mind and his more recent adventures in philosophy of science. Three themes unify the collection: an anti-sententialist view of cognition, an emphasis on the plasticity of the human mind and a strong endorsement of connectionist models of human cognitive processes.

Les Études sur Parménide viennent s'ajouter à cette liste déjà impressionnante d'ouvrages qui, dans la dernière décennie, ont été consacrés au texte et a l'interprétation du Poème de Parménide. Celui-ci contient les études issues du Centre de Recherches sur la Pensée Antique ou Centre L. Robin de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV) que dirigeait le professeur P. Aubenque. Les spécialistes de Parménide de la nouvelle génération ne manqueront pas d'instruments de travail pour leur lecture du Poème. Mais ils risquent du même coup de pénétrer dans un véritable labyrinthe d'interprétations d'où ils auront vraisemblablement plus de difficultés à sortir que leurs devanciers. La somme de connaissances accumulées autour des quelques cent soixante vers de ce Poème au niveau des manuscrits, de la langue grecque et de la littérature de l'époque est considerable, la diversité des lectures codicologiques, philologiques et philosophiques qui touché chaque vers du Poème, pour ne pas dire chaque mot, est déroutantc puisque les arguments qui fondent chacune de ces lectures ne manquent pas de vraisemblance.

The central tenet in the ontology Sartre describes and seeks to defend in Being and Nothingness is that being divides into the for-itself and the in-itself. Self-consciousness characterizes being-for-itself and distinguishes it from being-in-itself. What it means for a being to exist for itself is that it is self-conscious. How Sartre characterizes self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness is, however, a question that remains to be asked. There is no simple answer to this question. For Sartre, there are really several levels of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness of consciousness at the pre-reflective level, at the level of reflection (both pure and impure) and at the level of being-for-others. There is a profound difference between the self-consciousness of being-for-others and impure reflection, on the one hand, and the self-consciousness of reflection and pre-reflective consciousness, on the other. With being-for-others and impure reflection, self-consciousness involves the attempt to grasp the self as an object for consciousness. Although the nature of this attempt and the reasons for its ultimate failure differ at each level, these levels are bound together by a common sense of self-consciousness as a consciousness of the self as an object.

Among major contractarian theorists, David Gauthier has the most ambitious philosophical aims. John Rawls has recently made clear that his theory of justice is not intended to provide a timeless and culturally invariant account of justice derived from the theory of rational choice. Yet Gauthier, in his rightly acclaimed and widely influential writings, attempts to provide just such an account of morality and distributive justice. With this new publication of a collection of his most important articles from the past two decades following, by four years, the appearance of his systematic treatise on ethics (Morals by Agreement) we are now in a good position to assess Gauthier's moral theory.

It is sometimes thought that it is part of the notion of morality that moral norms are backed up by sanctions of some special sort. This view is sometimes explicitly argued for, as by T. L. S. Sprigge, and sometimes appears in the background of discussions that are centered around other issues, as in Narveson's The Libertarian Idea. The aim of this paper is to show that difficulties in attempts to analyze the notion of morality by appealing to moral sanctions go much deeper than is usually realized.

We all know that there are many different kinds of “thing”; and what we mean, when we say something to that effect, is usually that things behave differently from one another, or react differently in different circumstances. Among the things to which these generalizations apply, we normally count both ourselves and other people. It was natural enough, therefore, for the philosophers to develop a theory of human nature as made up of a variety of faculties and powers (or “passions”). For this provides a convenient way of classifying and comparing our behaviours and reactions.

The book under review consists of a “Problems” section, with chapters entitled “Ontology,” “Thought” and “Language”; and a “Proposals” section, with like-titled chapters. The first section is a survey; as might be expected of one of 126 pages, compression is the watchword. The reviewer felt that it did not live up to dust jacket copy, heralding a book “easily accessible to undergraduates.”

Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe is the most significant event in Anglo-American aesthetics in many a year, and joins a small pantheon of landmark books such as Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art, Richard Wollheim's Art and Its Objects and Arthur Danto's Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Walton's aim is to provide a comprehensive account of the representational arts—literature, drama, cinema, painting, drawing, sculpture—from both the generative and the receptive points of view. That is to say, he attempts to explain how representations are fashioned, what their representational status consists in, how representations are apprehended and what the experience of them characteristically involves. Inthese aims he is to my mind enormously, if not completely, successful.

We are a species addicted to conversation. In a remarkable book, Allan Gibbard argues that conversation is “far more than a carrier of information. In talk we work out not only what to believe about things and events and people, but how to live. We work out how to feel about things in our lives, and in the lives of others” (pp. 3–4). In discussion we arrive at the norms that govern our lives. We determine thus what is to count as morally right or permissible, or as rational, or simply what it makes sense to do or feel. The importance of conversation to our normative life is increasingly evident as Gibbard's tale unfolds.

The apparently limitless philosophical terrain marked out by the debate over the relation between science and values is constructively revisited in Helen Longino's Science as Social Knowledge. This project is motivated by the view that the ideal of value neutrality places unrealistic constraints on science. Longino seeks to demonstrate that even “good science” embodies social and political interests and values because it is, irreducibly, a social activity. Her strategy is to weave a position which can make sense of both ideology and evidence in the practice of science; her underlying philosophical critique is that the standard impasse between positivism and wholism is structured by an individualist conception of science. In the development of her analysis, she examines and reworks the concepts of evidence, reasoning and objectivity to accommodate her understanding of the social practices which constitute inquiry. She then appeals to the highly charged field of research on the biological bases of alleged sex differences in temperament, behaviour and cognition, to illustrate concretely how her analysis makes sense of a variety of interactions between scientific inquiry and socio-cultural values in contemporary science. Longino thus provides an opening for modes of inquiry, such as feminist science, which are self-consciously shaped by specified socio-political interests and values; she argues that, far from contaminating science, such projects can be more objective than that mode of inquiry practised under the standard myth of asocial, acultural, apolitical objectivity characteristic of modern epistemologies.

Mane Hajdin advances a not unfamiliar criticism of a certain type of analysis of the notion of morals, namely, one holding that “it is part of the notion of morality that moral norms are backed up by sanctions of some special sort,” and he lists a work of my own as exemplifying this type of analysis. Since I am accustomed to applying a generally similar criticism to various theories, most notably to unreconstructed Stevensonian emotivism, I should like to think that my own theory is not subject to it. Though not altogether new, it is an important criticism, and Hajdin advances it in a particularly clear and elegant way. If we cannot answer him acceptably, things look bleak for proponents of the general line in question. So let's see.

To approach the philosophical anthropology (p. 4) of Donald Davidson is to get ready for an unusually high number of laps around the hermeneutic circle. Apparently a problem-oriented philosopher, Davidson presents his views in a continuing series of dense, tightly focussed papers on narrowly circumscribed topics. The lines of the big picture are mostly implicit. Yet it is the scope and the power of this picture that has made Davidson one of the most significant philosophers of this century. Naturally, this makes Davidson's work an extremely tempting—and extremely treacherous—target for the exegete with synthesizing tendencies. Until now, the sense of danger seems to have won out; secondary expositions have largely confined themselves to particular aspects of his thought. For those seeking to appreciate the cohesion and comprehensiveness of Davidson's vision, there has been no alternative but, as Ted Honderich says, to “struggle and learn,” working their way through Davidson's papers, continually calibrating and recalibrating interpretations of Davidson's detailed philosophical proposals with the emerging pattern of their interrelationships.