The neo-Kantian transcendentalist reading of the epistemic status of logical axioms in Frege argues that he is committed to the neo-Kantian idea that we are epistemically justified in accepting logical axioms because accepting them is necessary for achieving epistemically crucial goals. However, I show that Frege hesitates to be fully committed to neo-Kantian transcendentalism because he struggles to accept the idea that such a teleological reason can constitute an epistemic warrant. This interpretation shows some crucial aspects of his philosophy of logic, such as his understanding of the relationship between the simplicity and the sufficiency of logical systems.

I defend a referential anti-realist solution to the problem of intentional identity. I develop Nathan Salmon's referential realist solution to the problem — according to which mythical objects exist and we can refer to them by using mythical-object names — and consider David Braun's objections to it. I argue that Salmon's solution yields the real identity, rather than the intentional identity, of the objects of multiple subjects’ thoughts. And I develop a referential anti-realist variant of Salmon's view — according to which mythical objects do not exist nor are they otherwise real but we can nevertheless refer to them — which avoids this worry.

Discussions of George Berkeley often dismiss his Notebooks remarks that (1) bodies are powers that cause perceivers to have thoughts, and (2) bodies exist even when they are not perceived. I have previously noted these claims but have not explained how bodies are infinitely linked as thoughts (vs. ideas), and Melissa Frankel treats bodies as archetypes perceived individually by God but does not explain how they are individuated. I argue that because bodies identify objects only for finite minds, they are derivative powers by which individuated objects are related to one another infinitely.

Objectivist naturalists about life's meaning regard it as implicating no world but the natural one, and yet as deriving from more than just subjective attitudes or interests. Such naturalists must obviously deny prominent religious conceptions of meaning. But must they further deny that it can be found in religious pursuits? In this article, I defend a negative answer by arguing that, contrary to a prima facie plausible consideration in support of a positive answer, and by many objectivist naturalists’ own lights, the meaning of life can be found in pursuits predicated on false belief.

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one's judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman's perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist.

I argue that the use of elected political representatives undermines the political equality of citizens. Having elected representatives politically stand-in for individual constituents makes ordinary citizens the political inferiors of their representatives. This in turn creates democratically problematic social inequality between elected politicians and their constituents. I then offer an alternative to representative politicians that does not face the avatar of the people problem: representative mini-publics. Through these bodies, we can achieve a representative system without a class of political elites, where citizens share the responsibilities and powers of government as equals.

Thomas Taylor's parody of Mary Wollstonecraft's support for rights of women and humans raises a question: does his satire unwittingly propose a defence of animal rights found in Wollstonecraft's arguments? While Wollstonecraft's later works do not mention animal rights, her early educational writings offer arguments on animal ethics. These works explore the value of animals from moral, theological, and consequentialist perspectives, emphasizing both their instrumental and inherent value. This article argues that Wollstonecraft's moral psychology and theology highlight a benevolent attitude towards animals, underscoring their value beyond their utility.

Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its name. And this account offers the benefit of the bundle theory, avoiding the issue of bearers of fictional names, while also explaining why a fictional character is more than just a collection of predicates.

David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism.

Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood.

This article deals with the relevance of video art and filmic techniques for the phenomenological method by thematizing how slow-motion scenes can be used in the analysis of gestures. Drawing on Edmund Husserl's theory of image consciousness, I argue that while, for the empirical researcher, slow motion is a non-analogizing moment that helps the researcher observe the positional image subject, for the phenomenologist, it depicts a different, neutralized image subject that serves as an initial example. This approach leads to further insights revealing a specific form of disappointment of our passively constituted patterns of anticipation concerning the pace of gestural interaction.

This article explores Spinoza's distinctive contribution to the eudaimonistic tradition, which considers happiness (eudaimonia) to be the highest good. Most (if not all) ancient eudaimonists endorse some sort of hierarchy between mind and body, where one is always dependent on, or subordinate to, the other. In particular, many of them endorse ethical intellectualism, where mental things are considered more valuable than bodily ones. I argue that Spinoza, in contrast, considers mind and body ontologically and ethically identical and equal, thereby bringing something new to this ethical tradition.

In this article, we re-examine Pascal's Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal's Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there are many other symmetric, non-salient rewards that one may receive if one chooses otherwise.

Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz's views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz's view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.

The moral problem of authority can be expressed as follows: how can authority, and the deference it entails, be compatible with freedom and rationality? The pluralist approach separates political obligation from authority. For pluralists, authority is both unjustifiable and unnecessary, and so legitimate political obligation, including the duty to obey the law, does not entail deference. I argue that it is possible to retain the pluralist commitment to plural grounds of legitimacy, while rebutting the pluralist objections to authority. As a result, whenever authority does have legitimacy, the moral question of authority will demand an answer.

In this article, I defend the contemporary significance of Hegel's thought on subjectivity and dialectic by involving Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Hans-Georg Gadamer in a dialogue, and then, by clarifying the characteristics of spirit and concept. Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialectic face many criticisms. One such critic is Gadamer; however, Gadamer's philosophy is, in fact, quite close to Hegel's. I take the Hegel-Gadamer relationship as one illustration of Hegel's relevance and influence. I then further demonstrate Hegel's contemporary importance by analyzing the characteristics of spirit and concept. Finally, I propose that Hegel's absolute spirit and concept remain significant.

Most objections against Henry Thoreau aim at his “unfriendly” provocations. In this article, I argue that we need to situate his exhortative style in the context of practicing parrhesia or the bold expression of truth in the Socratic tradition of philosophy. Philosophical parrhesia can be defined as the practice of speaking the truth with an eye to bringing home the realization that one must change one's life. The transformation Thoreau has in mind is hinged upon acquiring the practical knowledge of cultivating the senses through what he calls “excursion.” This, I argue, is his key contribution to the said tradition.

Success semantics holds, roughly, that what it is for a state of an agent to be a belief that P is for it to be disposed to combine with her desires to cause behaviour that would fulfill those desires if P. J. T. Whyte supplements this with an account of the contents of an agent's “basic desires” to provide an attractive naturalistic theory of mental content. We argue that Whyte's strategy can avoid the objections raised against it by restricting “basic desires” to sensory inclinations that cause us to do things independently of our beliefs about their contents.