The neo-Kantian transcendentalist reading of the epistemic status of logical axioms in Frege argues that he is committed to the neo-Kantian idea that we are epistemically justified in accepting logical axioms because accepting them is necessary for achieving epistemically crucial goals. However, I show that Frege hesitates to be fully committed to neo-Kantian transcendentalism because he struggles to accept the idea that such a teleological reason can constitute an epistemic warrant. This interpretation shows some crucial aspects of his philosophy of logic, such as his understanding of the relationship between the simplicity and the sufficiency of logical systems.

Cet article vise à élucider la nature de l'enquête. Je présente tout d'abord les desiderata communs à toute théorie de l'enquête. Je catégorise ensuite l'enquête comme un processus structuré en me concentrant sur ses composantes essentielles : des attitudes de questionnement guidant des actions. Enfin, je me penche sur l'objection récente selon laquelle les attitudes de questionnement ne sont pas nécessaires à l'enquête. Je défends la thèse selon laquelle l'enquête est un processus structuré essentiellement constitué d'attitudes de questionnement ayant deux rôles fonctionnels précis, soit d'initier et de guider le déploiement de capacités cognitives en vue d'un but épistémique.

I raise some questions about Jeremy Fantl's The Limitations of the Open Mind. I ask what type of applied epistemology Fantl's book represents, whether there might be a better conception of open-mindedness than the one he embraces, and whether he is correct that someone's being an amateur makes it easier for their knowledge to survive the dismissal of relevant counterarguments.

This article was written before Andrea Robin Skinner, daughter of Alice Munro, wrote an essay in the Toronto Star on July 7, 2024, describing her mother's silence in the face of her abuse at the hands of Munro's husband/Skinner's stepfather, Gerald Fremlin. I wish to honour Skinner's story and her courage in coming forward, as well as her wish that “… this story, my story, to become part of the stories people tell about my mother.” I, like so many others, will continue to grapple with Munro's writing and her reflections on intimate human relationships — as well as her literary legacy — following these revelations.

I introduce the book symposium on Jeremy Fantl's The Limitations of the Open Mind. The symposium began as a session at the 2023 American Philosophical Association meeting in Montreal; it features replies to Fantl's book by Nathan Ballantyne and Miriam Schleifer McCormick with replies to the replies by Fantl.

I survey my career in philosophy, which encompasses 44 years of teaching in Halifax, but begins in London, England with a thesis on self-deception. I describe a practice of using works of literature as a guide to conceptual analysis, and pause in Vienna to translate On Last Things (Weininger, 2001). A line of Wittgenstein's is the basis for reflections on the concept of a Last Judgement. I discuss in some detail a paper of mine for the Atlantic Region Philosophers’ Association in 2018, “One Last Thing,” which takes as its basis The Sense of an Ending, a novel by Julian Barnes. I conclude with some claims about Wittgenstein's relation to religion. I add an Appendix, in which I comment briefly on each of the other articles that make up this symposium.

In this article, I summarize the main takeaways from The Limitations of the Open Mind and reply to concerns raised by Miriam Schleifer McCormick and Nathan Ballantyne. In reply to McCormick, I emphasize potential difficulties involved in helping people change their minds while representing yourself as taking an “objective stance” toward them. In reply to Ballantyne, I clarify my reasons for thinking that open-mindedness is a matter of being willing to change your mind and that amateurs can in some ways and in some situations be more immune to misleading arguments than experts can.

This article is inspired by two of Steven Burns's many philosophical interests — self-deception and Wittgenstein — as well as by a wariness that we share of the analytic-continental divide in contemporary philosophy. I argue here that, despite obvious differences of temperament and concern, Sartre and Wittgenstein share a scepticism about the “epistemic model” of first-person authority. This shared scepticism emerges in a striking way in their challenges to the idea that psychological phenomena should be understood on the model of objects in physical space. Wittgenstein's scepticism is more thorough-going, but emphasizing the similarity allows us to see Sartre as making an important contribution to our understanding of first-person authority, even if we are wary of the voluntarism of his approach.

In this commentary on Jeremy Fantl's The Limitations of the Open Mind, I focus mainly on the book's second half and argue against Fantl's view that you should rarely engage closed-mindedly with those putting forth claims that you know are false and arguments that you know are misleading. I argue that this kind of engagement can be fruitfully exercised without problematic deception. If we are attuned to the social dimension of epistemology, and we see that false and potentially pernicious beliefs are spreading, we have good reason to engage with at least some of these believers with the aim of altering their epistemic attitudes, and to allow for more collective knowledge.

The articles in this volume celebrate the work of Steven Burns. Versions of the articles were presented originally at two sessions organized in Burns's honour at the 2022 meeting of the Atlantic Regional Philosophers’ Association (ARPA), held at Dalhousie University in Halifax. This introduction presents a brief academic biography and summarizes each of the contributions. The articles, by Michael Hymers, Robbie Moser and Darren Bifford, Alice MacLachlan, Jason Holt, and Warren Heiti, address perennial themes in philosophy, such as self-knowledge, attention, friendship, interpretation, and judgement. The collection concludes with some last words by Burns himself.

I defend a referential anti-realist solution to the problem of intentional identity. I develop Nathan Salmon's referential realist solution to the problem — according to which mythical objects exist and we can refer to them by using mythical-object names — and consider David Braun's objections to it. I argue that Salmon's solution yields the real identity, rather than the intentional identity, of the objects of multiple subjects’ thoughts. And I develop a referential anti-realist variant of Salmon's view — according to which mythical objects do not exist nor are they otherwise real but we can nevertheless refer to them — which avoids this worry.

One kind of good listener aspires to be sensitive to the testimony of injustice. Under conditions of oppression, this testimony is silenced. One cause of the silencing is that a dominant rights-based model of distributive justice interferes with our appreciation of a needs-based model of radically egalitarian justice. Another cause is that ambient prejudices threaten to impair the listener. A good listener is not only an individual but also a social animal, one who needs to engage with others in a dialectic of attention in order to undo their own prejudices.

Discussions of George Berkeley often dismiss his Notebooks remarks that (1) bodies are powers that cause perceivers to have thoughts, and (2) bodies exist even when they are not perceived. I have previously noted these claims but have not explained how bodies are infinitely linked as thoughts (vs. ideas), and Melissa Frankel treats bodies as archetypes perceived individually by God but does not explain how they are individuated. I argue that because bodies identify objects only for finite minds, they are derivative powers by which individuated objects are related to one another infinitely.

Objectivist naturalists about life's meaning regard it as implicating no world but the natural one, and yet as deriving from more than just subjective attitudes or interests. Such naturalists must obviously deny prominent religious conceptions of meaning. But must they further deny that it can be found in religious pursuits? In this article, I defend a negative answer by arguing that, contrary to a prima facie plausible consideration in support of a positive answer, and by many objectivist naturalists’ own lights, the meaning of life can be found in pursuits predicated on false belief.

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one's judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman's perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist.

Gilles Deleuze est, parmi les penseurs français contemporains, celui ayant démontré la plus grande sensibilité à l’égard de la culture québécoise en intégrant quelques-unes de ses forces révolutionnaires dans son œuvre. C'est ce qu'illustre la première partie de l'article en faisant référence à des figures culturelles marquantes discutées par Deleuze : Jack Kérouac, Pierre Perrault, Michèle Lalonde, Norman McLaren et Alexis le Trotteur. L'article explore ensuite la réception de Deleuze au Québec dans et à l'extérieur des milieux universitaires en montrant que la pensée deleuzienne a pris part à la contre-culture avant d'acquérir une visibilité au sein des départements de philosophie.

I argue that the use of elected political representatives undermines the political equality of citizens. Having elected representatives politically stand-in for individual constituents makes ordinary citizens the political inferiors of their representatives. This in turn creates democratically problematic social inequality between elected politicians and their constituents. I then offer an alternative to representative politicians that does not face the avatar of the people problem: representative mini-publics. Through these bodies, we can achieve a representative system without a class of political elites, where citizens share the responsibilities and powers of government as equals.

Thomas Taylor's parody of Mary Wollstonecraft's support for rights of women and humans raises a question: does his satire unwittingly propose a defence of animal rights found in Wollstonecraft's arguments? While Wollstonecraft's later works do not mention animal rights, her early educational writings offer arguments on animal ethics. These works explore the value of animals from moral, theological, and consequentialist perspectives, emphasizing both their instrumental and inherent value. This article argues that Wollstonecraft's moral psychology and theology highlight a benevolent attitude towards animals, underscoring their value beyond their utility.

Afin d'encourager la réflexion sur l'impact de la résistance interne dans la théorie du mouvement au XIVe siècle, je propose d'examiner ici l’évolution du concept chez l'universitaire parisien Nicole Oresme. Dans sa Physique, le penseur présente une position qui ne paraît pas tout à fait aboutie et qui soulève quelques questions en lien avec les qualités motrices des différents éléments constituant les mobiles. Cette situation devient d'autant plus évidente lorsque sa position change, plus tard, dans ses questions sur le traité Du ciel. Oresme semble alors encore moins enclin à accepter l'idée d'une résistance interne dans le mouvement.

Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality adopts a provocative philosophical methodology: centring the experiences of victims of discrimination, and the basic contours of anti-discrimination law, in developing an account of wrongful discrimination. If, however, we take seriously sceptical accounts of law developed within feminist and critical race scholarship, we begin to see a tension within Moreau's methodological dyad: if victims of discrimination often experience discrimination law as hostile and disbelieving, how can both be treated as authoritative? This contribution will explore this tension as it emerges in Faces of Inequality, in light of Mari Matsuda's theory of “multiple consciousness.”