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The nature of obligation's special force

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

David Olbrich Open the ORCID record for David Olbrich [Opens in a new window]
David Olbrich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University College London, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

Tomasello's characterization of obligation as demanding and coercive is not an implication of the centrality of collaborative commitment. Not only is this characterization contentious, it appears to be falsified in some cases of personal conviction. The theory would be strengthened if the nature of obligation's force and collaborative commitment were directly linked, possibly through Tomasello's notions of identity and identification.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e80
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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