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The divided we and multiple obligations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Bradley Franks Open the ORCID record for Bradley Franks [Opens in a new window]  and
Andrew Stewart
Bradley Franks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AEUnited Kingdom. [email protected]@lse.ac.ukhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/PBS/People/Professor-Bradley-Frankshttp://www.lse.ac.uk/PBS/People/Andy-Stewart
Andrew Stewart
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AEUnited Kingdom. [email protected]@lse.ac.ukhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/PBS/People/Professor-Bradley-Frankshttp://www.lse.ac.uk/PBS/People/Andy-Stewart
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Abstract

Tomasello's account of the origins and nature of moral obligation rightly emphasises the key roles of social relations and a cooperative sense of “we.” However, we suggest that it overlooks the complexity of those social relations and the resulting prevalence of a divided “we” in moral social groups. We argue that the social identity dynamics that arise can lead to competing obligations in a single group, and this has implications for the evolution of obligation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e70
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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