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This chapter introduces the quantitative and qualitative studies of clergy, citizens, and legislators to be analyzed in subsequent chapters. In addition to several national-level surveys, the book incorporates a rich in-depth case study of religious politics in the city of Juiz de Fora, a medium-sized city in Brazil’s Southeast region. This city is broadly representative of the country in key religious and political trends. The Juiz de Fora studies include a neighborhood-based survey of the 2008 local election; a congregation-based study of the 2014 presidential campaign; and 2017 reinterviews of clergy interviewed in 2014. The book also incorporates survey experimental studies of both clergy and citizens.
Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, and unintentionally stimulated by the reform efforts of the Alliance for Progress, a wide-ranging, deep process of radicalization affected numerous Latin American countries during the 1960s and early 1970s. Using cognitive shortcuts and drawing facile inferences from Castro's success, many leftist and populist forces came to believe that profound transformations were now feasible in their country. Drawing similar inferences and therefore regarding the established order as fragile, elites and other conservative sectors were stricken with fear of "Communism." Leftwing agitation therefore provoked a rightwing backlash that imposed reactionary authoritarianism to forestall the perceived menace of revolution. As leftwing challengers started to create paramilitary formations and the military therefore saw a threat to its monopoly over organized coercion, the armed forces took the lead in these coups and consolidated dictatorial power afterwards. Driven by intense loss aversion, conservative sectors employed all the resources at their disposal to defeat the radical left. Consequently, determined counter-revolution overpowered revolutionary initiatives.
This chapter examines the religious and political views and speech of clergy. First, Catholic, evangelical, and Pentecostal clergy differ in the policy issues they prioritize in preaching. Evangelical and Pentecostal religious leaders are much more likely than Catholics to emphasize conservative religious teachings such as God’s wrath, the need to avoid sin, the need for chastity, and the “sin of homosexuality.” By contrast, Catholic leaders talk more frequently than evangelicals and Pentecostals about left-leaning issues, including ministry to the poor, racism, and the environment. In experimental studies, when Catholic religious leaders are primed to think about the threat of losing members, they further deemphasize conservative teachings. However, clerics’ choice of what to talk about is also driven by their core religious beliefs and religious traditions. Second, Catholics also differ from Pentecostals and evangelicals in attitudes toward the political process—that is, toward how political decisions should be made. While democracy is universally held in high regard in the abstract, Catholic leaders are more supportive than evangelicals and Pentecostals of diversity in opinions, both within their congregations and in society at large. Third, Pentecostals and evangelicals perceive much greater levels of state bias toward their groups than do Catholics.
The introductory chapter explains the puzzle of autocratic reverse waves that un-do liberal democratic progress. As an explanation, the book highlights the reactionary backlash to revolutionary challenges. As left-wingers inspired by a "successful" revolution try to spread radical change across countries, fearful right-wingers try with all means to block these efforts. Radical diffusion thus provokes reactionary counter-diffusion. Both the hopes of the left and the fears of the right are exaggerated, however, because cognitive heuristics that humans commonly employ suggest distorted, problematic inferences. With this argument, the book contributes to the debate about the nature of rationality, which recent theories of democratic breakdown have renewed. To substantiate its arguments, the book uses comparative-historical analysis based on a wealth of primary documents and secondary literature. A summary of the following chapters concludes this introduction
As Brazilian democracy faces a crisis of legitimacy, political divisions grow among Catholic, evangelical, and non-religious citizens. What has caused religious polarization in Brazilian politics? Does religious politics shore up or undermine democracy? Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God uses engaging anecdotes and draws on a wealth of data from surveys and survey experiments with clergy, citizens, and legislators, to explain the causes and consequences of Brazil's 'culture wars'. Though political parties create culture war conflict in established democracies, in Brazil's weak party system religious leaders instead drive divisions. Clergy leverage legislative and electoral politics strategically to promote their own theological goals and to help their religious groups compete. In the process, they often lead politicians and congregants. Ultimately, religious politics pushes Brazilian politics rightward and further fragments parties. Yet Religion and Brazilian Democracy also demonstrates that clergy-led politics stabilizes Brazilian democracy and enhances representation.
Why did so many Latin American leftists believe they could replicate the Cuban Revolution in their own countries, and why did so many rightists fear the spread of Communism? Cognitive-psychological insights about people's distorted inferences and skewed interest calculations explain why the left held exaggerated hopes and why the right experienced excessive dread. The resulting polarization provoked a powerful backlash in which the right uniformly defeated the left. To forestall the feared spread of revolution, the military in many countries imposed authoritarian regimes and brutally suppressed left-wingers. Overly worried about the advance of Cuban-inspired radicalism as well, the United States condoned and supported the installation of dictatorship, but Latin American elites took the main initiative in these regressive regime changes. With a large number of primary and secondary sources, this book documents how the misperceptions on both sides of the ideological divide thus played a crucial role in the frequent destruction of democracy.
Chapter 6 argues that bureaucrats helped new civic AIDS organizations develop the capacity and the incentives for political advocacy not through their direct efforts but by supporting bottom-up efforts at coalition-building. The older generation of pre-existing AIDS advocacy groups imbued the new generation of civic AIDS organizations with the capacity and the incentives for advocacy by building out the structure of the AIDS movement into a national federation of independent advocacy organization, and by engaging new grassroots AIDS organizations to participate in it. Yet federal bureaucrats also played an important role by helping to foster such coalition-building--providing them with the financial resources that allowed them to do so. By paying for space, food, lodging, and transportation, national bureaucrats provided critical assistance in helping AIDS associations overcome otherwise insurmountable costs to the development of formal, institutionalized structures for nationwide coordination.
The concluding chapter to this book further explores the broad theoretical implications of this Brazil-focused study for our approach to understanding state-society relations in Latin America. First, I show how the case explored in the book offers new insight into the broader effects of democratization and neoliberal reform on state-society relations. In contrast to the view from traditional approaches that highlight the demise of corporatism, I argue that corporatism did not disappear but instead shifted—to different sectors of the state, and to different segments of society. Second, and by extension, I introduce a new model of state-society relations, what I call civic corporatism. Third, I explore broader questions related to the role of NGOs in international development. Fourth, I provide a series of case studies beyond Brazilian AIDS policy to explore the generalizability of the argument. I conclude by offering a broad new perspective on the relationship between democracy and the state.