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17183 results in Latin American government, politics and policy

Page 304 of 860

  • 2 - Clergy, Congregants, and Religious Politicians

  • from Part I - Introduction
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 26-45

  • Summary

    This chapter further develops the argument of the book. It begins by considering two prominent explanations for why the culture wars arise in some settings but not others: the intervention of international actors, and the behavior of partisan elites. Neither approach provides much purchase to explain the Brazilian case. By contrast, a clergy-driven explanation better fits not only Brazil, but also other cases in the developing world. In the clergy-driven culture wars, clergy hold sincere political views, yet their behavior is also shaped by the need for “souls” and “money”—the imperative to keep members in the pews and to gather resources. On the one hand, the danger of alienating congregants sometimes leads clergy to self-censor; this restraint reduces clergy political influence, and ultimately dampens political polarization among citizens. On the other hand, the need to gather monetary resources sometimes stimulates clergy activism targeting the state, since the Brazilian state both directly controls resources and regulates churches’ other growth-oriented activities. As a result, particularly in evangelical congregations, clergy select and campaign for in-group politicians. The fact that clergy both select candidates and serve as brokers between candidates and congregants privileges the interests of clergy over those of congregants.

  • 7 - Horizontal Diffusion and Vertical Promotion in the Autocratic Wave

  • from Part II - Revolution and the Reactionary Backlash in Latin America
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 174-210

  • Summary

    This chapter examines the role that the horizontal diffusion of a new regime model and vertical imposition by great power US played in the Latin American coup wave. Brazil's overthrow of democracy in 1964 served as a model for other Latin American militaries, which sought to emulate the new type of development-oriented, institutionalized authoritarianism. Moreover, superpower US supported the spread of reactionary autocracy, fearing the proliferation of Communism during the COld War. But contrary to many early observers, the US was far from being the prime mover in the coup wave, as the recent declassification of documents confirms. Instead, Latin American elites had ample reasons to combat the perceived threat of Communism on their own and would most likely have ousted left-populist governments even without US involvement. In opposing Cuba-inspired left-wingers in Latin America, US officials were swayed by the same cognitive shortcuts that instilled excessive fear in Latin America's conservative sectors.

  • 8 - Reactionary Waves across History

  • from Part III - Comparative Perspectives and Theoretical Conclusions
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 213-242

  • Summary

    This chapter assesses the broader validity of the book's theoretical argument by analyzing the massive reverse wave of the interwar years and four processes of authoritarian hardening across history. In all of these episodes in which liberal democracy fell to autocracy, or in which existing autocratic regimes turned more repressive and "closed," revolutionary challenges prompted these political regressions. The advance of authoritarianism and fascism during the 1920s and 1930s constituted a widespread reactionary backlash to the Russian Revolution of 1917. In a similar vein, the French Revolution of 1789 set in motion a repressive turn in Europe, and the Revolutions of 1848 provoked a wave of counterrevolution. The Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 had a similarly regressive effect across the Middle East, even years after the triggering events. And the color revolutions in the post-Communist world prompted the hardening of autocracy in Putin's Russia and in other Eurasian countries.

  • 4 - Diffusion Effects of the Cuban Revolution

  • from Part II - Revolution and the Reactionary Backlash in Latin America
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 75-110

  • Summary

    This chapter examines the first process of revolutionary diffusion and reactionary counter-diffusion unleashed by the Cuban Revolution. Because Castro's success inspired excessive hopes due to cognitive shortcuts, leftwing extremists across Latin America tried to replicate the armed conquest of power by initiating guerrilla movements. Ill-planned, these insurgencies were uniformly defeated by incumbent governments, which feared a replication of Castro's success and therefore unleashed their militaries. Repressive counter-insurgency caused human rights violations, but did not destroy democracy. Many governments also sought to forestall the spread of Communism with social and democratic reforms, which the US supported through the Alliance for Progress. Political regime outcomes depended on the fate of these reforms. In Venezuela and Colombia, reasonably effective reforms stabilized democracy. In Peru and Bolivia, democratic checks and balances hindered reform -- and the military eventually overthrew democracy to impose reform. In Brazil, Chile, and other SOuthern Cone countries, reform efforts paradoxically stimulated radicalization, which then provoked reactionary military coups

  • 6 - The Imposition of Institutional Authoritarianism

  • from Part II - Revolution and the Reactionary Backlash in Latin America
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 131-173

  • Summary

    To document the backlash unleashed by the Cuban Revolution, this chapter examines the overthrow of democracy in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. In Brazil during the early 1960s, populist president Joao Goulart promoted "basic reforms" and cooperated with leftist forces radicalized by the Cuban Revolution. Fearful of this advance of radicalism, conservative forces opposed Goulart. The military, fearful about leftwing challenges to its institutional hierarchy and discipline, deposed him in 1964. In Argentina, the populist movement of Peronism experienced Cuba-inspired radicalism during the late 1960s, which culminated in massive urban terrorism in the 1970s. A sequence of increasingly harsh and autocratic military regimes sought to combat the left-populist threat. In Chile, the Salvador Allende government, sustained by two Marxist parties, won the 1970 election and initiated a determined "march into socialism." After numerous enterprise nationalizations and radical land reforms, which helped throw the economy into chaos and to fuel political polarization, the military removed Allende by force, imposed a long-term dictatorship, and committed many human rights violations.

  • 9 - The Representational Triangle

  • from Part IV - Representation
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 149-161

  • Summary

    How have Brazil’s clergy-driven culture wars shaped representative democracy? First, the rapid entry of evangelicals into electoral politics has dramatically expand the political power of evangelical clergy. Evangelical clergy have become both opinion leaders and electoral brokers, while evangelical elected officials provide a receptive ear for their co-religionists’ demands. Second, evangelical legislators improve representation of citizens’ policy views on some issues, including abortion, same-sex marriage, and policies toward evangelical churches. However, they diverge from the interests of both evangelical citizens and the population as a whole on the economy and race. The racial conservatism of evangelical legislators is particularly notable. Third, church-based politics provides many church-goers with personal ties to the political world that they would otherwise lack. These ties help citizens express their policy views and request personal help when needed, yet they may also foster clientelism within evangelical congregations. Fourth, the evangelical style of campaigning exacerbates party fragmentation, as evangelical clergy have incentives for disunity.

  • 9 - Conclusion: Theoretical Reflections

  • from Part III - Comparative Perspectives and Theoretical Conclusions
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 243-264

  • Summary

    Interpreted via cognitive shortcuts, the Cuban Revolution instilled excessive hopes of proliferating revolution among leftists, and corresponding fears among rightists. Leftist efforts to replicate Castro's success therefore prompted a rightist backlash that sought to block radicalism through the imposition of authoritarianism. In general theoretical terms, the backlash dynamic was fueled by fundamental mechanisms of bounded rationality, especially cognitive heuristics and asymmetrical loss aversion. Thus, political actors commonly diverged from the postulates of standard rationality. Misperceptions and skewed choices lay at the root of Latin America's political regression, including leftwing violence and the massive human rights violation committed by right-wingers. Because nowadays, there is no broad revolutionary challenge; and because conservative forces are therefore not stricken with fear, a similar backlash is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the recent setbacks for democracy in the world will probably not add up to a significant reverse wave like the political regression that Latin America experienced during the 1960s and 1970s.

  • 2 - The Difficulty of Accounting for Reverse Waves

  • from Part I - Theoretical Considerations
  • Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book:
    Revolution and Reaction
    Published online:
    14 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 26-42

  • Summary

    Established theories have difficulty explaining autocratic reverse waves. Structuralist and institutionalist approaches highlight causal factors that are too specific to capture the wave-like advance of political regression. Common-cause arguments, which postulate a common shock as trigger of reactionary backlash, overlook the complexity of Latin America's reverse wave with its jumble of demonstration and deterrent effects. As regards diffusion approaches, theories that stress vertical regime promotion by great powers fail to convince: The US did not "impose" authoritarianism; instead, domestic actors took the main initiative in overthrowing democracy. Normative arguments are unpersuasive because dictatorship lacked legitimacy in Latin America during the 1960/70s. And rational learning theories cannot explain why political actors commonly deviated from systematic probability assessments and rational interest calculations: Leftists strongly overestimated the ease of revolutionary transformations, while rightists overrated the fragility of the established order, lived in fear of Communism, and therefore succumbed to intense loss aversion.

  • 5 - What Clergy Do: Encouraging Partisan and Electoral Politics

  • from Part II - What Clergy Think, Say, and Do
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 80-96

  • Summary

    When and why do Brazilian clergy encourage congregants to get involved in politics? This chapter examines what religious leaders say about different forms of participation. Religious leaders talk to congregants about elections in three ways: (a) through ostensibly non-partisan encouragement to go to the polls; (b) by advocating that congregants “carefully consider” candidates, without overt candidate endorsement; and (c) by explicitly supporting candidates for office. The great majority of clergy speech about elections is of the first and second variety, while many evangelical, Pentecostal, and particularly Catholic clergy are wary of overt candidate endorsements. What leads clergy to promote some forms of political participation, but not others? The chapter argues that clergy support for—or resistance to—political participation is motivated by several factors. First, membership pressures sometimes lead clergy to seek political allies that can help them compete against rival groups; yet membership pressures likely more often muffle clergy speech, as clergy are afraid of alienating attendees. Second, three religious and political attitudes motivate religious leaders’ speech: tolerance for democratic dissent; doctrinal conservatism; and the belief that the political system is biased with respect to their group.

  • 10 - Conclusion: Mobilizing the People of God

  • from Part IV - Representation
  • Amy Erica Smith, Iowa State University
  • Book:
    Religion and Brazilian Democracy
    Published online:
    15 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 March 2019, pp 162-175

  • Summary

    The concluding chapter takes a step back to examine relationship between the Brazilian case and religion and politics in Latin America more broadly. It considers the implications for theories of religion and politics in developing democracies. First, the chapter revisits the question of what explains religious groups’ entry into politics and the religious polarization of politics. Examining examples from Costa Rica and Chile, it is clear that demographic diversity—that is, rapid conversion to evangelicalism—is not enough to bring evangelicals into politics. Instead, evangelicals enter politics when they have the motivation, opportunity, and resources to do so. Two types of threats motivate religiously infused politics: actual or threatened liberalization of policies related to sexual and family traditionalism; and perceived threats to the religious ingroup, either from the state or from other religious groups. However, religious politics is also facilitated by the associative protections of liberal democracy, by permissive electoral systems, and by stronger demographic presence. Second, what are the consequences of religious politics for Latin American democracy? The chapter argues that religious groups can partially fulfill many functions of parties, helping to stabilize democracy as religious elites convey their political attitudes and support for democracy to citizens.

Page 304 of 860