Out of four Mediterranean territories, therefore, only one presents Great Britain with any real difficulty, but that one offers a problem so formidable as to endanger reputation, not only in the Mediterranean, but in more than half the countries in the world. In Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, goodwill is something tangible which her money can help buy; in Palestine, it is elusive and unobtainable until her Government is ready to admit that the problem has surpassed the stage at which it can be solved by mere administration, and until she summons the courage to handle a political problem in a political way. In the pass to which Palestine has brought her, unequivocal definition of her intentions seems to be the only means of recapturing the reputation she has already lost. Come what may in the way of recriminations, she will at least occasion a certain respect if she ceases to beat about the bush, and presents the world with a policy which is frankly based upon that soundest and best-understood of all aims – the improvement of her own security.

If, in a time of blindly burning political passions the quiet but clear voice of a thinker and psychologist were heard, then I would wish it were from the spirit of this book, which is no more necessary than now. This book is dedicated to the creators of the coming peace. But especially after reading with inner approval and satisfaction, thankful for the unfortunately so rare psychological insight and objectivity free from political passions, it is barely possible to hope that the book will have the conserving and preserving effect it should have in the interest of a humanity confused by war and its passions.

This chapter reviews the first six years of implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a major Chinese foreign policy initiative introduced in 2013. The authors explain how China’s transition from benefactor to banker, in con- junction with its push for expanded influence on the global stage, led to the adoption of the BRI. They then consider whether and why China might choose to ‘multilateralize’ the BRI. The authors conclude that if Beijing wants to multilateralize the BRI, it will need to either comply with—or help redesign— international development finance rules and standards. At the same time, the establishment of an inclusive and revitalized development finance regime does not rest solely on the shoulders of Beijing. If OECD-DAC and multilateral donors and creditors wish to avert a crisis of confidence and relevance, they will need to rewrite international development finance rules and norms in ways that accommodate Beijing’s interests and more effectively account for the preferences of low-income and middle-income countries.

The first overwhelming impression of the Peoples [sic] Republic of China is of its many people. They are all along the way as one drives in from the airport – on foot carrying loads on their backs, driving carts, pulling carts, driving oil tanks, in pedicarts and motor trucks, on bicycles. They are in the nearby fields, working the ground or constructing buildings beside the road. When one drives through the gap in Peking’s ancient wall, the throng multiplies. And one is struck by the many different kinds of people, different colors of skin, varying sizes and contour of face. The westerner is prone to exclaim, “But they don’t look Chinese!”

Over a quarter of a million West Indians, the overwhelming majority of them from Jamaica, have now settled in Britain in less than a decade. Britain has become, in the mid-1960’s, the center of the largest overseas population of West Indians; numerically relegating to second place, the once superior community of West Indians in the United States. This new situation in Britain, has been inimitably described in the discerning verse of Louise Bennett, noted Jamaican folklorist, as, “Colonization in Reverse.” Immigration statistics, which are approximate estimates compiled by the one time functional West Indian Federation office (Migrant Services Division) in Britain, placed the total number of West Indians entering the United Kingdom as 238,000 persons by the year 1961. Of these, 125,000 were men; 93,000 women; 13,200 were children; and 6,300, unclassified. A breakdown of the islands from which these people came, showed that during the period of 1955–1961, a total of 142,825 were from Jamaica; from Barbadoes, 5,036; from Trinidad and Tobago, 2,282; from British Guiana, 3,470; from Leeward Islands, 3,524; from the Windward Islands, 8,202; and from all other territories, the sum total of 8,732. Distribution of the West Indian population in the United Kingdom indicates that by mid-1962, over 300,000 West Indians were settled in Britain. The yearly immigration and the growth of community settlement illustrates the rate of growth of the West Indian settlement. For example, the emigration of West Indians to the United Kingdom in mid-1955 totalled 24,473 and by 1961, this figure soared to 61,749. Corresponding to the latter, was the fear of family separation due to the then impending Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In the industrial city of Birmingham, by mid-1955, 8,000 West Indians formed the community there, while in mid-1962, this figure stood at 67,000. Similarly in London, where in Brixton the largest settlement of West Indians exist [sic]; the mid-1955 figure of 85,000 had by 1961 grown to 135,000.

There are, layered up against the islands, the beautiful green waves of water and silence. There is the purity of salt in and about the Antilles. There is before my eyes the pretty Place de Pétionville, planted with pines and hibiscus. There is my island, Martinique, and its fresh necklace of clouds puffed up by Mount Pelée. There are the highest plateaus of Haiti, where a horse dies, lightning-struck by the secularly murderous storm at Hinche. Nearby, his master contemplates the country he thought to be solid and expansive. He doesn’t yet know that he is participating in the islands’ lack of equilibrium. But this stroke of terrestrial insanity enlightens his heart: he begins to think about the other Antilles, about their volcanoes, their earthquakes, their hurricanes.

International relations, as a subject of instruction, has flourished more in the United States than elsewhere and more in recent years than ever before. What forces explain its growth and its present shape? How have methods of teaching it been affected by the goals of the teacher, by his relation to research, and by the formal organization of international studies in American colleges and universities? To what extent is the American experience so rooted in uniquely American conditions that it is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere? These questions will be considered in turn.

The problem of the identity and continuity of a State is the problem of its very existence. This is so because it merely represents another aspect of the problem of State extinction. To ask whether a State is identical with a State which has preceded it in time and with which it has enough common features for the question to be asked at all, is to enquire whether one State has died and another has been born in its place, or whether the old State continues its unchanged legal personality.

The fact that social progress is contingent upon international order is the primary reason for socialist interest in Federation; but it is by no means the only one. There are more positive grounds also. Conscious and planned direction of economic life over a wide area, is essential, in the opinion of socialists, in order to achieve the equality and prosperity for which they hunger. They have, therefore, a particular concern with the economic aspects and possibilities of Federation.

The relationship between the developed and the relatively undeveloped areas of the world is now generally recognized as one of the major problems of our time. In the past the strong spilled out over their weaker neighbours, often invigorating those able to survive the ordeal. By these means the backward countries sometimes became, in their turn, the leaders in the march of civilization. Public opinion in the democracies of the west has long ceased to commend these ancient and ruthless processes. The alternative policy of the nineteenth century was the doctrine of laissez faire, every state, as every individual, being left to work out its own salvation. The political complement of laissez faire was the policy of non-annexation, individuals and societies being left to develop in a condition of free competition. But already, before the end of the century, the more thoughtful were beginning to discover that laissez faire provided no real solution because the undeveloped countries could not advance except by contact with those more fully developed. In the nineties the positive conception of trusteeship, first enunciated by Burke, was being advanced by ministers – notably Lord Salisbury and Joseph Chamberlain – and by administrators led by Lord Lugard, in the direction of developing backward areas in the interests at once of their own inhabitants and of the world in general. But just as, formerly, the old annexationist process fell into disrepute, so the philosophy of trusteeship, implying as it did a paternal relationship between advanced and backward peoples, has now been discarded as undemocratic. All states must be treated as equal in status, however unequal in fact. A new method has therefore to be evolved whereby undeveloped areas may be developed without conquest, and without the establishment or continuance of any form of paternal overlordship.

When we talk of “the public” we really mean the persons who compose it. The so-called “public” is merely an illusion, a will o’ the wisp, a vanishing spectre. Mr. Walter Lippmann has called it a “phantom”. Professor Dewey describes it as “not only a ghost, but a ghost which walks and talks and obscures, confuses and misleads governmental action in a disastrous way.”

Our hostess, Mrs. Hutchings, has requested me to speak on Women’s International Association of Aeronautics and on Peace. These two are synonymous, for my objective has been ‘Peace By Air’ since my return to the U.S.A. from Egypt in 1920.

The arguments for and against the doctrine of national self-determination may be summarized as follows. The opponents of the doctrine agree that to legitimatize a title gained by conquest the express consent of the two contracting powers and the tacit assent of the inhabitants are sufficient. Against the method of the plebiscite they advance arguments attacking both the validity of its underlying theory and the expediency of leaving to a vote by universal suffrage a question of such importance as sovereignty. Their first argument is that the cession of sovereignty is outside the domain of international law and is of merely political importance, concerning only the two States involved. This position appears to result from a failure to analyze the threefold aspect of a cession of sovereignty, namely, alienation, transfer and integration. It is true that these three phases are of unequal interest in international law. The first phase, alienation, corresponding to “divesting of title,” is obviously a matter largely of constitutional law, but a matter certainly open to regulation by international law, as it involves national debt, police and, if done during war, questions of neutrality and blockade. The second stage, that of transfer, clearly concerns international law, for it has to do with the relations of two States at least. The third stage, that of integration, is of a mixed character, concerning the municipal or constitutional law of the annexing State and, as it involves a question of title, concerning international law also. The subject of validity of title has long occupied the attention of writers on international law, for, as is well known, discussion of title by conquest, discovery, preemption, occupation and treaty occupy a place in the treatises, and the doctrines have broadened and developed to meet geographical and political exigencies.

The field of international relations has long been occupied with questions around the form and composition of the nation-state and its relation to international orders. The works contained in this section reflect the ways in which the categories of population and nation, and the movement of populations across national borders, were highly contested in international thought throughout the twentieth century. Many are demonstrative of the extent to which earlier generations of thinkers understood the relationship between individual responsibilities and the actions of states in the international arena. These questions were never just academic but grounded in the desire to directly engage with and shape some of the pressing challenges facing the international order in the first half of the twentieth century: problems of racial tensions and discrimination, immigration and perceived population over-crowding, nationalist fervor and conflict.

Imperialism is the political expression of the process of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle over the unspoiled remainder of the non-capitalist world environment. Geographically, this still comprises huge areas of the earth’s surface. However, this remaining field for the expansion of capital appears as an ever-diminishing residue taking into account both the enormous mass of already accumulated capital in the old capitalist countries, which is vying for markets for its surplus product as well as for opportunities to capitalize its surplus value, and the rate at which areas of precapitalist civilization are transformed into capitalist ones – in other words, given the high level of development of the productive forces of capital that has already been achieved. The international behavior of capital on the world stage is shaped accordingly. Imperialism’s force and the violence exerted by it – both in its aggressive action toward the noncapitalist world and in the sharpening antagonisms between the competing capitalist countries – are heightened in tandem with the development of the capitalist countries and the increasingly fierce competition between them to acquire noncapitalist areas. Yet the more violently, forcefully, and thoroughly imperialism brings about the decline of noncapitalist civilizations, the more rapidly it removes the very basis for the accumulation of capital. As much as imperialism is a historical method to prolong the existence of capital, objectively it is at the same time the surest way to bring this existence to the swiftest conclusion. This does not mean that this endpoint has literally to be reached. The tendency toward this terminal point of capitalist development manifests itself in forms that configure the final phase of capitalism as a period of catastrophes.

The proposed Foundation for Instruction in International Affairs would enable Radcliffe College to offer first, advanced instruction to competent graduate students, second, systematic instruction to mature non-collegiate women and, third, lectures open to the public.