The Church has borne too many evil fruits for there not to have been some mistake made at the beginning.

Even before the beginning of the new century a general European war, as an expected event, had been much in men’s minds. The novelist, Theodor Fontane, in 1896 foresaw a war between Germany and England ‘with such great certainty, that it does not matter if it happens now or in a year’s or in ten years’ time. Whose fault it will be’, he wrote, ‘is neither here nor there: it is a matter of historical necessity.’ An English naval officer summed up the mood of the years before 1914: ‘We prepared for war in our professional hours, we talked war, thought war, and hoped for war. For war would be our opportunity, and it was what we had been trained for.’ Universal military service in Germany made this kind of expectancy more widespread there than in England. Young men beginning careers in the public service fitted in a period of service as army officers and valued their association with the army then and subsequently through the reserve or militia, not least because of the high respect accorded in Germany to the army officer. Germany, as other countries, had her stories and novels prompted by popular Darwinism and notions of the survival of the fittest, written to the theme that ‘war with all its evils, calls out and puts to the proof some of the highest and best qualities of men’. In Germany their influence was heightened by the fashionable cult of the ‘great man’. The Emperor himself had avowed his adherence to the doctrine that God revealed Himself in great men and included William I – together with Hamurrabi, Moses, Shakespeare and Goethe – in a list of such men. The cult was stimulated by the harsh doctrine of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) that humanity must work unceasingly for the production of the solitary great man – ‘this and nothing else is its task’ – as well as by the liberal writings of the Swiss, Jakob Burkhardt, or even of Fontane.

“We do not war upon women and children!” This is a commonplace of British rhetoric at the present moment. But it is not true. War is waged by men only, but it is not possible to wage it upon men only. All wars are and must be waged upon women and children as well as upon men. When aviators drop bombs, when guns bombard fortified towns, it is not possible to avoid the women and children who may chance to be in the way. Women have to make good the economic disasters of war; they go short, they work double tides, they pay war taxes and war prices, like men, and out of smaller incomes.

The international community is too often focused on responding to the latest cyber attack instead of addressing the reality of pervasive and persistent cyber conflict. From ransomware against the city government of Baltimore to state-sponsored campaigns targeting electrical grids in Ukraine and the United States, we seem to have relatively little bandwidth left over to ask what we can hope for in terms of “peace” on the Internet, and how to get there. It’s also important to identify the long-term implications for such pervasive cyber insecurity across the public and private sectors, and how they can be curtailed. This edited volume analyzes the history and evolution of cyber peace and reviews recent international efforts aimed at promoting it, providing recommendations for students, practitioners, and policymakers seeking an understanding of the complexity of international law and international relations involved in cyber peace. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

For historical purposes the nineteenth century may be said to have ended in 1914 with the outbreak of the Great War. The New World came into the fight to “redress the balance of the Old,” and at the close of that vast struggle between highly industrialised modern States, a Peace Conference met in Paris to settle the political and economic problems of half a world, much as Vienna of 1815 had settled the affairs of Europe alone.

The most prevalent form of decisionism today is not concerned with domestic politics. It is rather centered on the all-important realm of foreign policy. The realism of the moment is no longer legal, but political. This realism has as its main theme the notion that power is, or at any rate ought to be, the central concept of politics, especially of international politics. Without this notion, it is argued, intellectual disorder and practical failure are bound to occur. Considering the vagueness of such favorite realist conceptions as “power” and the “national interest,” the great professional and popular appeal of this neo-Machiavellian doctrine might seem astonishing. It is only when its negative impulses are understood that realism, as an ideological reaction, becomes comprehensible. For power as the central concept of political thought makes sense, even as an ordering device, only if it is understood as a negation. Power politics is the antithesis of legalistic and moralistic politics.

Fifteen or twenty years ago, the penniless inventors who carried with them plans for construction of steerable balloons or flying machines approached the leaders of the peace movement. Help us to conquer the air, they said, and war will be overcome. The reasons they gave were more or less the following: borders would be obliterated, since neither barriers, nor toll fences, nor fortifications can be erected in the air; traffic, simplified and accelerated tenfold, would bring nations even closer than railroads and steamers already do; through this closeness, hostilities would vanish; and through the general rejoicing that such a wonderful achievement would arouse, people would rise above their petty hatreds and jealousies.

The war, they say, is not going to be won in Saigon, nor on the battlefield, but in the villages and hamlets. This idea, by now trite (it was first discovered in Diem’s time and has been rebaptized under a number of names – New Life Hamlets, Rural Construction, Counter Insurgency, Nation-Building, Revolutionary Development, the Hearts and Minds Program), is the main source of inspiration for the various teams of missionaries, military and civilian, who think they are engaged in a crusade. Not just a crusade against Communism, but something positive. Back in the fifties and early sixties, the war was presented as an investment: the taxpayer was persuaded that if he stopped Communism now in Vietnam, he would not have to keep stopping it in Thailand, Burma, etc. That was the domino theory, which our leading statesmen today, quite comically, are busy repudiating before Congressional committees – suddenly nobody will admit to ever having been an advocate of it. The notion of a costly investment that will save money in the end has a natural appeal to a nation of homeowners, but now the assertion of an American “interest” in Vietnam has begun to look too speculative as the stake increases (“When is it going to pay off?”) and also too squalid as the war daily becomes more savage and destructive. Hence the “other” war, proclaimed by President Johnson in Honolulu, which is simultaneously pictured as a strategy for winning War Number One and as a top priority in itself. Indeed, in Vietnam, there are moments when the “other” war seems to be viewed as the sole reason for the American presence, and it is certainly more congenial to American officials, brimming with public spirit, than the war they are launching from the skies. Americans do not like to be negative, and the “other” war is constructive.

In this chapter we focus on the intended and unintended side effects of Chinese development finance, which we address from two different angles, both at the country level and at subnational scales. In the first part of this chapter, we investigate whether and to what extent Chinese-financed aid and debt affect recipient countries’ propensity for civil conflict and environmental degradation. We then turn to the question of how Chinese-funded projects might affect the quality of governance in recipient countries and regions. China claims to follow a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign governments, which implies that its allocation decisions are made without considering the quality of governance, so that Chinese funds might prop up rogue regimes and delay much-needed governance reforms. The second part of this chapter turns to the popular claim that significant financial support from China impairs the effectiveness of aid from Western donors and lenders. Specifically, we investigate whether the effects of World Bank aid differ in countries or subnational regions that receive large volumes of Chinese support compared to other recipients.

It is sometimes argued that there is no room for a special study of international relations since the whole subject matter is covered elsewhere in economics and politics, of which international relations merely represents the international aspect. This view has a certain superficial attractiveness, but I do not think it is really justified.

It is difficult to discern, at first glance, any important common characteristics in ideologies such as Gandhism and Marxism-Leninism, Kemalism, and Shintoism. If they have anything in common, it seems to be a strong infusion of self-contradiction. But on second glance the diverse characteristics and geographic origins of these ideologies fade into the background. In their very self-contradictions one may detect recurrent patterns.

We are in the world war of Fascism against Democracy. The Italian Dictator’s other term for this war already in swing, is the war of the ‘Dissatisfied Nations’ against the ‘Satisfied Nations.’

When the glowing recital ended, I remained silent for a while. I wanted to be reassured that my feet were still on terra firma – solidly placed on the earth. I had heard so much in a short time that it had acted like heady wine. Such a deluge of dreams was overwhelming. I was disturbed, too, because Marcus was assuming that I, just as much as himself, was prepared to shoulder the herculean responsibilities of working for the uplifting of our race with all the implications of that formidable challenge.

This chapter unpacks the strategic logic of interactions during a crisis involving cyber capable actors. It outlines the limits of coercion with cyber options for nation-states. After proposing a theory of cyber crisis bargaining, we explore evidence for associated propositions from survey experiments linked to crisis simulations and a case study of the US-Iranian militarized dispute in the summer of 2019.

The international community is too often focused on responding to the latest cyber attack instead of addressing the reality of pervasive and persistent cyber conflict. From ransomware against the city government of Baltimore to state-sponsored campaigns targeting electrical grids in Ukraine and the United States, we seem to have relatively little bandwidth left over to ask what we can hope for in terms of “peace” on the Internet, and how to get there. It’s also important to identify the long-term implications for such pervasive cyber insecurity across the public and private sectors, and how they can be curtailed. This edited volume analyzes the history and evolution of cyber peace and reviews recent international efforts aimed at promoting it, providing recommendations for students, practitioners, and policymakers seeking an understanding of the complexity of international law and international relations involved in cyber peace. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The history of Pearl Harbor has an interest exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastrophe that might have been the result of negligence or stupidity or treachery, however lurid. For we have found the roots of this surprise in circumstances that affected honest, dedicated, and intelligent men. The possibility of such surprise at any time lies in the conditions of human perception and stems from uncertainties so basic that they are not likely to be eliminated, though they might be reduced.

By the international mind I mean the mind which accepts as normal international cooperation rather than competition, friendly understanding rather than hostile suspicion. What I mean by the creation of the international mind has been called recently also “moral disarmament.”