Underlying this book is the conviction that a sane nationalism, when it understands itself, points the way to internationalism at its completion. The principle that builds the single State cannot end with the single State. This has been felt, sometimes clearly, more often dimly, by all the best thinkers of Europe. The lesson has been hard; indeed, it has never been learnt, but it ought to be learnt and it could be learnt. Gradually the sense of its need has grown and in that growth lies hope. The survey which follows has been, for reasons of space, confined on the whole to Europe, but the same factors are and always have been at work in all nations.

By January, 1916, when conscription was made law for Great Britain, the Government’s dilemma in Ireland was complete. To force men into active service with an army which they regarded as that of their hereditary enemy was at all times a course full of danger; it was doubly precarious when the men were trained, armed, and resolute to resist. On the other hand, these men, if permitted to remain in Ireland, would give trouble. They were openly preparing for an Insurrection, of which only the date remained in doubt, and James Connolly was asking in The Irish Worker, “Are we not waiting too long?”

The international community is too often focused on responding to the latest cyber attack instead of addressing the reality of pervasive and persistent cyber conflict. From ransomware against the city government of Baltimore to state-sponsored campaigns targeting electrical grids in Ukraine and the United States, we seem to have relatively little bandwidth left over to ask what we can hope for in terms of “peace” on the Internet, and how to get there. It’s also important to identify the long-term implications for such pervasive cyber insecurity across the public and private sectors, and how they can be curtailed. This edited volume analyzes the history and evolution of cyber peace and reviews recent international efforts aimed at promoting it, providing recommendations for students, practitioners, and policymakers seeking an understanding of the complexity of international law and international relations involved in cyber peace. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The atomic bomb which fell on Hiroshima killed 64,000 people within four months and the bomb on Nagasaki 39,000 people. In addition, 72,000 people were injured in Hiroshima and 25,000 in Nagasaki. At Hiroshima four square miles were totally devastated and nine square miles were very badly damaged. […] The morality and wisdom of the use of these bombs will be disputed throughout our lives and for such time as they remain the only ones to be used in warfare.

This chapter investigates the motivations of recipient governments who seek out Chinese development projects. We examine how host country leaders shape the ways that Chinese development finance is allocated across subnational jurisdictions. First, we evaluate whether China’s allocation of aid and debt within countries flows to areas with higher levels of socioeconomic need. Second, we explore whether political leaders manipulate incoming financial flows from China to advance their own political interests. We do so by examining whether and when funds from Beijing favor the home provinces of political leaders. Finally, we compare and contrast the ways in which Chinese and World Bank development projects are subnationally distributed. To do so, we assign latitude and longitude coordinates to the specific locations where China implemented its de- velopment projects.Our findings indicate that Chinese development finance does not go to the geographic areas within recipient countries where it is most needed: much of it ends up in wealthier provinces. In addition, Chinese development projects favor politically privileged jurisdictions: the home provinces of political leaders receive substantially more Chinese development finance in countries with competitive elections, and even more at election time. This is a problem from a development perspective because the average home province of a political leader is significantly wealthier than the rest of the country.

This chapter introduces the central argument of the book: that China’s 21st- century transition from a “benefactor” to a “banker” has had far-reaching im- pacts in low-income and middle-income countries that are not yet widely understood. Beijing’s growing use of debt rather than aid to bankroll big-ticket infrastructure projects has created new opportunities for developing countries to achieve rapid socioeconomic gains, but it has also introduced major risks, including corruption, conflict, and environmental degradation. Some countries are more effective than others at managing these risks and rewards. This chapter “zooms in” on two countries—Sri Lanka and Tanzania—to illustrate the tension between efficacy and safety confronted by developing countries banking on Chinese development finance. It also provides a roadmap for the rest of the book.

Recent events have made it more evident than ever before that there are grave dangers in the lack of regulation and coordination in international finance. The outstanding new development, aimed to assist financial co‐operation, is the Bank for International Settlements. Although it originated in the special problems connected with Reparation, it soon extended its work over a wide field and attacked many urgent questions of money and credit. In fact, it is because the work of the Bank in its early years sheds light on the larger problems of finance that this study has been undertaken.

The teacher of history who is also a believer in what (for want of a better word) we call internationalism, must often have asked himself in despondency why it is that the teaching of history in the past has so often worked against peace and international good feeling. For certainly the devil can quote history to his purpose and Clio has too often been a vivandière in the army of politicians and militarists, instead of a grave and just muse, whose equal gaze surveys the world and whose hands weigh men’s deeds in a balance. The historian is driven to demand of himself whether history is not indeed an unmitigated curse to humanity, keeping alive the memory of old enmities better dead, teaching that because a thing has been therefore it always shall be; a sort of malignant old man of the sea, clinging to our shoulders and preventing us from moving to new and better things. […]

The Act of Emancipation, 1833, was the expression of a determined public opinion in Great Britain. Petition followed petition from the people to the Parliament. Their argument was perhaps exaggerated, but its demand was plain. Liberty! – And the rights of man must be recognized in a slave as in a free society. Fraternity! – And the cruelties of the slave system must be terminated by its abolition.

At Christmas 1888, in Turin, Nietzsche wrote the preface to his main fulmination against Wagner which he called – as well he might – ‘an essay for psychologists, not for Germans’. Crispi was Premier of Italy at the time and was leading the country into quarrels with France and closer friendship with Germany. It was four months before Hitler’s birth. ‘I would have a word to whisper in the ears of the Italians, whom I love … an intelligent people will never make anything but a mésalliance with the Reich.’ We have seen how the Axis which Hitler created and to which Mussolini gave its name fulfilled Nietzsche’s warning.

The dataset introduced in this book includes thousands of Chinese government- financed development projects. This chapter begins to analyze these data at the cross-national level and addresses a basic question: Which types of projects does China finance around the world? We provide a detailed overview of the allocation of Chinese development finance based on key variables such as destination countries, flow types (such as grants, loans, technical assistance, debt forgiveness, or sectors). The dataset enables us to distinguish between Chinese-financed aid and debt, and this distinction reveals that China’s donor-to-banker shift occurred in the 2000s following the implementation of the “Going Out” strategy. More generally, this chapter uses our new dataset to demonstrate the value of separating out aid and debt projects and show how different countries have different experiences receiving Chinese projects. In providing readers with an aerial global view of the “known universe” of China’s international development finance projects since 2000, the chapter also situates China’s development finance in the context of that of other major donors.

The term “positive cyber peace” remains a concept laden with contradictions and ambiguity. A number of ontological tensions challenge the understanding of and, therefore, policy planning for cyber peace. Some advocates of cyber peace define it as a condition while others see it as a practice or set of practices. As a condition, cyber peace is sometimes defined as a kind of peace and at other times as something within cyber space. Distinct modes of ontologizing cyber peace as a set of practices include cyber peace as cyber peacemaking, as maintaining the stability of information technology, and/or as cyber defense actions. Further attention to scholarship about the terms “cyber” and “peace,” to boundary-setting distinctions between cyber peace and other social things, and to the implications of cyber peace metaphors suggest areas for further honing the conceptualization of this important term.

The international community is too often focused on responding to the latest cyber attack instead of addressing the reality of pervasive and persistent cyber conflict. From ransomware against the city government of Baltimore to state-sponsored campaigns targeting electrical grids in Ukraine and the United States, we seem to have relatively little bandwidth left over to ask what we can hope for in terms of “peace” on the Internet, and how to get there. It’s also important to identify the long-term implications for such pervasive cyber insecurity across the public and private sectors, and how they can be curtailed. This edited volume analyzes the history and evolution of cyber peace and reviews recent international efforts aimed at promoting it, providing recommendations for students, practitioners, and policymakers seeking an understanding of the complexity of international law and international relations involved in cyber peace. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

There is a widespread feeling that this is not the moment to talk of a European peace. On the contrary, if we look into the matter more deeply, there are good reasons to believe that the psychological moment is very close. If, in the wisdom that comes upon us, after the event, we see that the United States was dilatory when it might have helped to open the way to end bloodshed and to make a fair and lasting settlement, we shall have cause for deep self-reproach.

“Property is robbery,” said the great French Anarchist Proudhon. Yes, but without risk and danger to the robber. Monopolizing the accumulated efforts of man, property has robbed him of his birthright, and has turned him loose a pauper and an outcast. Property has not even the time-worn excuse that man does not create enough to satisfy all needs. The A B C student of economics knows that the productivity of labor within the last few decades far exceeds normal demand. But what are normal demands to an abnormal institution? The only demand that property recognizes is its own gluttonous appetite for greater wealth, because wealth means power; the power to subdue, to crush, to exploit, the power to enslave, to outrage, to degrade. America is particularly boastful of her great power, her enormous national wealth. Poor America, of what avail is all her wealth, if the individuals comprising the nation are wretchedly poor? If they live in squalor, in filth, in crime, with hope and joy gone, a homeless, soilless army of human prey.