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Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
February 2019
Print publication year:
2019
Online ISBN:
9781108234108

Book description

Speaking to an advisor in 1966 about America's escalation of forces in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara confessed: 'We've made mistakes in Vietnam … I've made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made'. In 'I Made Mistakes', Aurélie Basha i Novosejt provides a fresh and controversial examination of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's decisions during the Vietnam War. Although McNamara is remembered as the architect of the Vietnam War, Novosejt draws on new sources - including the diaries of his advisor and confidant John T. McNaughton - to reveal a man who resisted the war more than most. As Secretary of Defense, he did not want the costs of the war associated with a new international commitment in Vietnam, but he sacrificed these misgivings to instead become the public face of the war out of a sense of loyalty to the President.

Reviews

'Basha’s careful account of McNamara’s Vietnam policies is a terrible indictment not just of the policies but of McNamara’s moral failure in prizing loyalty over lives. How he defined his job dictated his failures. Recommended reading for all future defense secretaries.'

Kori Schake - Deputy Director-General, The International Institute for Strategic Studies

'I didn’t think there could be much more to say about Robert McNamara and the escalation of America’s war in Vietnam, but Aurélie Basha i Novosejt has proven otherwise. In this boldly original book, she forces us to revisit basic assumptions about an important but enigmatic figure. By showing that economic concerns were paramount, by considering counterinsurgency from a different angle, and by emphasizing previously neglected institutional changes within the Pentagon, Basha is able to shed new light on the subject. But even more, by revealing that McNamara opposed the war at its very beginning, even as he was planning its expansion, Basha is able to reveal the ultimate price of loyalty.'

Andrew Preston - University of Cambridge

‘… [a] fine book …’

Dan Hart Source: H-War

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Contents

  • “I Made Mistakes”
    pp i-ii
  • Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations - Series page
    pp iii-iv
  • “I Made Mistakes” - Title page
    pp v-v
  • Robert McNamara’s Vietnam War Policy, 1960–1968
  • Copyright page
    pp vi-vi
  • Dedication
    pp vii-viii
  • Contents
    pp ix-x
  • Figures
    pp xi-xii
  • Acknowledgments
    pp xiii-xiv
  • Abbreviations
    pp xv-xviii
  • Introduction
    pp 1-14
  • 1 - The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1947–1961
    pp 15-36
  • 2 - Civilian Control
    pp 37-56
  • 3 - Continuity and Change
    pp 57-73
  • 4 - Taking Charge of Vietnam Policy
    pp 74-92
  • 5 - When Military Problems Become Economic Problems
    pp 93-119
  • 6 - The Fall of 1963
    pp 120-134
  • 7 - McNamara’s Transition into the Johnson Administration
    pp 135-163
  • 8 - Decisions, Indecisions, Visions and Revisions
    pp 164-185
  • 9 - McNamara in Crisis, 1966–1968
    pp 186-206
  • Conclusion
    pp 207-224
  • Appendix: Cast of Characters
    pp 225-234
  • Endnotes
    pp 235-292
  • Bibliography
    pp 293-316
  • Index
    pp 317-324

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