Der 2. Korintherbrief sucht in seinem ersten Hauptteil (1.15–7.16) die Anstöße aufzuarbeiten, die die Gemeinde im Vorfeld des Briefs an der Ausübung des apostolischen Dienstes durch Paulus genommen hat. Wie die Eröffnung dieses Hauptteils in 1.15–2.2 zu verstehen ist, ist aber in der Forschung umstritten.

Der Aufsatz untersucht die literarische Verortung, den formalen Aufbau und die sprachliche Ausgestaltung des Gedankengangs, um dessen Sinngehalt und Funktion zu klären. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie der Abschnitt einerseits die Modifikation der paulinischen Besuchsabsichten, andererseits das Unterlassen eines angekündigten weiteren Aufenthalts verteidigt. Vor dem Horizont einer grundsätzlichen Reflexion der Basis, Eigenart und Aufgabe des paulinischen Apostolats korrigiert er die negative Wahrnehmung des Paulus auf Seiten der Adressaten und zeigt in drei Schritten auf, dass dieser gerade mit seinen die Gemeinde enttäuschenden Entscheidungen den ihm und seiner Mitarbeiterschaft gegebenen apostolischen Auftrag sachgerecht wahrgenommen hat.

Current recruitment and retention issues within the armed forces draw links with breach of the psychological contract – the dynamics of the employee–employer relationship. Compared with civilian contexts, a military position is unique, however, there is a dearth of conceptual investigation regarding the lived experiences of military personnel, particularly with respect to how such contracts form. This paper combined a phenomenological approach with the critical decision method to investigate the lived experiences informing contract formation and contract trajectory of ex-military personnel. Lived experiences pointed to the formulation of ‘fuzzy’ contracts, impressions from defence force recruitment, specific tipping points around organisational commitment, and large differences between the fidelity of the idealised and actualised self/job. Seven superordinate themes are elicited that trace the formation and trajectory of the contract. A schematised account of findings is developed to provide avenues to investigate how beliefs form in a military contract context and their outcomes.

Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the contrary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying–meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to ‘what is meant’, and not simply to ‘what is said’. Our findings add to the experimental literature showing that the saying–meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of ‘what is meant’.

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.

I outline four conditions on permissible promise-making: the promise must be for a morally permissible end, must not be deceptive, must be in good faith, and must involve a realistic assessment of oneself. I then address whether promises that you are uncertain you can keep can meet these four criteria, with a focus on campaign promises as an illustrative example. I argue that uncertain promises can meet the first two criteria, but that whether they can meet the second two depends on the source of the promisor's uncertainty. External uncertainty stemming from outside factors is unproblematic, but internal uncertainty stemming from the promisor's doubts about her own strength leads to promises that are in bad faith or unrealistic. I conclude that campaign promises are often subject to internal uncertainty and are therefore morally impermissible to make, all else being equal.

The doctrine of legitimate expectations is a developing area of administrative law, and many issues remain outstanding. Promises, practices, and policies generate legitimate expectations, but what is special about them? Why do they and only they generate legitimate expectations? The lack of an obvious answer has led some commentators to claim that the doctrine is ultimately incoherent and should be disaggregated. In this paper, we challenge this claim by arguing, first, that promises, practices, and policies each comprise or make applicable a certain type of rule, and second, that having a legitimate expectation is a matter of such a rule binding a public body to act in some way. This rule-based account gives the doctrine of legitimate expectations both coherence and distinctiveness.