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Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Stephanie Collins  and
Holly Lawford-Smith
Stephanie Collins*
Affiliation:
Politics, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Holly Lawford-Smith
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.

Keywords

Collective obligationcollective responsibilityindividual obligationgroup agencydemandingnesspromiseswrongdoingbenefitbeneficenceassociative obligation
Type
Distinguished Lecture
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , February 2016 , pp. 38 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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