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An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Cary Deck ,
Maroš Servátka  and
Steven Tucker
Cary Deck
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
Maroš Servátka*
Affiliation:
New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Steven Tucker*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton, New Zealand
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goal of this paper was to examine messages under a double-blind payoff procedure to test the alternative explanation that promise keeping is due to external influence and reputational concerns. Employing a 2 × 2 design, we find no evidence that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff procedures. Further, the payoff procedure does not appear to impact aggregate cooperation.

Keywords

AnonymityCooperationExperimentHidden actionLiesMessagesPartnershipPromisesSocial distanceTrust

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C70: General
Type
Manuscript
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 597 - 607
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9353-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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