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Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Matthew R. Longo  and
Manos Tsakiris
Matthew R. Longo
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.bbk.ac.uk/psychology/bodylab/
Manos Tsakiris
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.pc.rhul.ac.uk/sites/lab/
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Abstract

Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied in isolation. Contingency is central for converging first- and second-person approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold first-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective fundamentally involves first-person contributions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 429 - 430
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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