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Second-person neuroscience: Implications for Wittgensteinian and Vygotskyan approaches to psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Kevin Moore*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Science, Parks, Recreation, Tourism and Sport, Faculty of Environment, Society and Design, Lincoln University, Lincoln 7647, Christchurch, New Zealand. [email protected]

Abstract

Interactive approaches to development and social psychology may particularly benefit from the non-dualist features of a second-person neuroscience. In that context, I discuss the compatibility of a second-person neuroscience with a Wittgensteinian analysis of psychological concepts and its connections to a Vygotskyan approach to psychological development.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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