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A mature second-person neuroscience needs a first-person (plural) developmental foundation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Charlie Lewis  and
James Stack
Charlie Lewis
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 YF, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.psych.lancs.ac.uk/people/charlie-lewis
James Stack
Affiliation:
Department of Education, Liverpool Hope University, Hope Park, Liverpool L16 9JD, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

Schilbach et al.'s model assumes that the ability to “experience” minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propose an alternative relational, action-based account, which attempts to grasp how the individual's construction of knowledge develops within interactions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 428 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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