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Historical myths as commitment devices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Stefaan Blancke Open the ORCID record for Stefaan Blancke [Opens in a new window]
Stefaan Blancke*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Tilburg Center for Moral Philosophy, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands [email protected] www.stefaanblancke.com
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*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Sijilmassi et al. claim that historical myths are technologies of recruitment that mimic cues of fitness interdependence. Paradoxically, they also claim that people are vigilant and that these myths might not and do not have to convince others, which raises questions about how these myths become culturally successful. Thinking about historical myths as commitment devices helps overcome this paradox.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e175
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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