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“We are one people”: Group myths also draw cues from self-concept formation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Eli Elster  and
Luke Glowacki Open the ORCID record for Luke Glowacki [Opens in a new window]
Eli Elster
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, UC Davis, Davis, CA, USA [email protected]
Luke Glowacki*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA [email protected]
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Sijilmassi et al. suggest that group myths explaining the shared history of a people succeed and propagate by leveraging cognitive cues from fitness interdependence. We offer an alternative and mutually compatible account rooting the success of group myths in cues from a different cognitive domain: The development of self-concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e177
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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