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Collective selfhood as a psychically necessary illusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Peter Fonagy  and
Chloe Campbell Open the ORCID record for Chloe Campbell [Opens in a new window]
Peter Fonagy
Affiliation:
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK [email protected] https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pals/people/peter-fonagy
Chloe Campbell*
Affiliation:
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London, London, UK [email protected] https://www.ucl.ac.uk/psychoanalysis/people/chloe-campbell
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Drawing on developmental psychopathology and thinking about the we-mode of social cognition, we propose that historical myths – be they on the scale of the family, the nation, or an ethnic group – are an expression and function of our need to join with other minds. As such, historical myths are one cognitive technology used to facilitate social learning, the transmission of culture and the relational mentalizing that underpins social and emotional functioning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e178
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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