How does the structure of the peer review process, which can vary among journals, influence the quality of papers published in a journal? This article studies multiple systems of peer review using computational simulation. I find that, under any of the systems I study, a majority of accepted papers are evaluated by an average reader as not meeting the standards of the journal. Moreover, all systems allow random chance to play a strong role in the acceptance decision. Heterogeneous reviewer and reader standards for scientific quality drive both results. A peer review system with an active editor—that is, one who uses desk rejection before review and does not rely strictly on reviewer votes to make decisions—can mitigate some of these effects.

The gender publication gap puts women at a disadvantage for tenure and promotion, which contributes to the discipline’s leaky pipeline. Several studies published in PS find no evidence of gender bias in the review process and instead suggest that submission pools are distorted by gender. To make a contribution to this important debate, we fielded an original survey to a sample of American Political Science Association members to measure participants’ perceptions of political science journals. Results reveal that the gender submission gap is accompanied by a gender perception gap at some but not all political science journals we study. Women report that they are more likely to submit to and get published in some journals, whereas men report as such with regard to other journals. Importantly, these gaps are observed even among scholars with the same methodological (i.e., quantitative or qualitative) approach.

This paper explores the relationship between economics and politics in the creation of democracy. The first section examines the shaping influence of the revenue imperative; the second, of end-game bargaining between retreating despots and insurgent democrats; and the third, of human capital. The paper is informal in argument and playful in spirit. It is designed to stimulate and provoke rather than to educate and inform.

I do, however, seek to maintain a consistent set-up for the analysis: On one side stands a sovereign—in an earlier period, most likely a monarch; in the present typically a political party. The sovereign maintains a monopoly over the formulation of public policy and possesses the power to extract resources from the economy. On the other side stand the citizens. They own the factors of production: land, labor, and capital. They care about public policy, but they cannot make it. However, the decisions they do make influence the level of economic resources that can effectively be mobilized by the sovereign.

Congressional election forecasting has experienced steady growth. Currently fashionable models stress prediction over explanation. The independent variables do not offer a substantive account of the election outcome. Instead, these variables are tracking variables—that is, indicators that may trace the result but fail to explain it. The outstanding example is the generic ballot measure, which asks respondents for whom they plan to vote in the upcoming congressional race. While this variable correlates highly with presidential party House seat share, it is bereft of substance. The generic ballot measure is the archetypical tracking variable, and it holds pride of place in the Abramowitz (2010) model. Other examples of such tracking variables are exposed seats or lagged seats, features of the Campbell (2010) model. The difficulty with such tracking models is twofold. First, they are not based on a theory of the congressional vote. Second, because they are predictive models, they offer a suboptimal forecasting instrument when compared to models specified according to strong theory.

In this article, I examine how 9/11 and the subsequent efforts to combat terrorism have affected what people know about politics. My analysis suggests three main differences between knowledge before and after 9/11. First, knowledge of 9/11 and the “war on terrorism” shot up to uncommonly high levels, just as common sense and our theories would predict. The second point is less intuitive: Heightened interest spread to issues not directly related to the terrorist attacks and appears to have increased knowledge of politics more broadly. Finally, a comparison between knowledge related to 9/11 and general political knowledge reveals that some of the usual obstacles to learning did not matter in the aftermath of 9/11. A low sense of civic duty, lack of faith in government responsiveness, and a full-time job all kept people from getting informed about politics in general, but not from learning about the terrorist attacks and the war on terrorism.

Proponents of direct legislation maintain that the initiative and popular referendum empower ordinary citizens to set the agenda of politics. Some argue it shifts “ultimate authority from representatives in state legislatures, city councils, and even Congress to the people themselves” (Schmidt 1989, vii). Such elections, so the argument goes, produce greater voter interest in elections and higher voter turnout. Those in favor of the process also contend that it is an important check on special interests which exert too much control over elected politicians (Magleby 1984, chap. 2; Cronin 1989).

Critics of direct democracy raise concerns about the quality of deliberation voters give to issues. Voters can be confused by ballot question wording or respond negatively to the length of the ballots. Moreover, because voters lack the simplifying devices of partisanship and candidate appeal, they may be more susceptible to the manipulations of campaign consultants.

How well do these longstanding arguments for and against direct legislation reflect our actual experience with the process in the 1990s? Arguments for direct democracy depend largely on how the process is conducted. If the process can be manipulated by special interests or relies on questionable tactics, then many of the advantages claimed for the process disappear. In this article, we argue that political consultants play a significant role in the conduct of direct democracy. These consultants normally work directly for organized interests without the constraints imposed by candidates or parties.

As undergraduate students increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary method for gathering sources, they often overlook the rich and varied resources available to them in library collections. Furthermore, students often lack the sophistication to effectively seek out and use information, an ability generally referred to as information literacy. Political scientists and librarians at one institution sought to address the gap in student information literacy skills by creating and implementing a semester-long library lab component integrated into the required research methods course within the political science department. This article presents the steps taken to implement the lab component, including the student learning outcomes we sought to address. We also focus on the measures we used to assess the impact of the lab component. Students who participated in the lab component demonstrate markedly improved information literacy skills compared to those who did not.

This article is about a simple two-variable equation forecasting presidential election outcomes and a three-variable equation forecasting seat change in House elections. Over the past two decades a cottage industry of political forecasting has developed (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992; Campbell and Garand 2000). At the 1994 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, several participants offered their forecasts of the upcoming midterm House elections. Unfortunately, not one of the forecasters was within 20 seats of the actual outcome. If, however, these forecasts had been pooled, as Gaddie (1997) points out, then they would have come remarkably close to the actual seat change that occurred. Moving forward, at the 1996 APSA Annual Meeting the collection of forecasters did a much better job with that year's presidential election. The forecasters also got the overall popular vote outcome correct at the 2000 APSA Annual Meeting for that year's presidential election. We all forecasted a victory for Al Gore, with James Campbell coming the closest to the actual total (50.2%) at 52.8%. At the panel at the 2004 APSA Annual Meeting almost every forecaster predicted the actual outcome correctly. Forecasting elections holds us accountable—we cannot go back and change our forecast for an election after it has occurred. Moreover, if we stick with one forecast, it easy to judge the overall accuracy of our equations.

Assessing the current condition of editorial cartooning invites engagement in a number of potential perspectives: Cartoons may be positioned as journalism, artistic expression, entertaining satire, and political and historical record. A rhetorical perspective examines cartoons as expressions of political discourse positioned within the wider culture that defines, constructs, and frames larger social ideologies as a backdrop to events of the day. Cartoonists accomplish this task not only by devising explicit messages about their subjects, but in the implicit expression of societal norms and values in the conceptual lenses and commonplaces they employ. This essay considers the conceptual lens of gender as it has been used by cartoonists in recent years to frame politicians, and the implications of that framing.

All too often, women of color in higher education have headed the warnings of “publish or perish,” accentuating the centrality of research and publications to their academic careers. However, for the preponderance of women of color, this single-minded attention to research often obscures another aspect to their work that occupies more attention, demands greater time, and yields more satisfying results: teaching and service. For the majority of women of color who are not at research-centered universities, teaching and service occupy the greatest amount of time but can also carry the greatest risks.Previous iterations of this paper have benefited from the feedback and discussion among colleagues present at the 2006 APSA Teaching and Learning Conference and the 2005 APSA panel on Women of Color in the Classroom. In particular, I want to acknowledge the gracious insights of Janni Aragon, Jane Bayes, Cristina Beltran, Ange-Marie Hancock, Mary Hawkesworth, Julia Jordan-Zachery, Lily Ling, and many others who have shared their stores and struggles.

The public health crisis of COVID-19 has compounded preexisting crises of democratic stability and effective governance, spurring debate about the ability of developed democracies to respond effectively to emergencies confronting their citizens. These crises, much discussed in recent political science, are joined by a further crisis which complicates and reinforces them: A migration crisis. Widespread travel and immigration restrictions instigated the largest and fastest decline in global human mobility in modern history, and COVID-19 may fundamentally change immigration over the longer term.

The migration crisis heightens three crucial and preexisting concerns within immigration policy: the role of visa design; the status of undocumented migrants and other migrants without recourse to public funds; and the interaction of immigration and the labor market policy. It could reinforce a rising tide of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, protectionist sentiment within labor-market policy debates, and a K-shaped recovery in migration patterns.

In an age of diminished resources for higher education, the ranking of programs takes on special significance, particularly for programs that rate poorly in the eyes of their peers. Before cost-conscious administrators use the apparent precision of the National Research Council's 1995 ratings to justify rewarding highly rated programs, and penalizing those that fared less well, an analysis of the factors that contribute to ratings success—particularly department size—draws attention to the importance of factors that lie outside the range of departmental control.

Our motivation is only partly ‘academic’. As members of a faculty that rated poorly in this exercise (UB political science ranked 72nd out of the 98 programs surveyed on faculty quality and tied for 48th on “effectiveness”), we have a special interest in reminding our colleagues, and especially our administrators, that our less-than-stellar performance reflects a variety of considerations, only some of which are our “fault.”

Rating academic departments as the NRC has done by relying on peer perceptions (nearly 8,000 graduate-faculty members participated in the ratings survey) involves tapping into a complex set of social processes that are not easily measured. However, we contend that the outcome of this process can be modeled successfully and parsimoniously with a six-variable model of the “determinants of ratings success.” We estimate the parameters of this six-variable model in this article, and show that the most statistically robust and important predictor of ratings success—department size—reflects a characteristic of departments that is beyond their control, and has no direct bearing on the quality of the members of the departments concerned, while a second important indicator—the proportion of full professors—is at least in part similarly beyond departmental control. Our confidence that this model taps central features in the ratings game is enhanced by the consistency of its performance in explaining the ratings of other social science departments.

If a picture is worth a thousand words, then 1988 presidential nominating politics was a gold mine for editorial cartoonists. Exaggeration and distortion are the cartoonist's stock-in-trade, Colin Seymour-Ure (1986, 168) tells us, and—with Gary Hart's dalliance, Joseph Biden's plagiarism, Pat Robertson's direct line to God, Robert Dole's tantrums, Jesse Jackson's ego, and George Bush's image problems—there was much to exaggerate and distort in the 1988 races.

Like other journalists, editorial cartoonists follow and interpret campaigns for the public. Like columnists, cartoonists openly praise or condemn candidates and campaigns. But the power of pictures sets cartoonists apart from other editorialists. According to Doug MaHette of the Atlanta Constitution, the fundamentals of cartooning are distortion, hyperbole, and subjectivity. Cartoons, he writes (1988, 158), “distort and reflect reality like fun-house mirrors.” Seymour-Ure (1986, 170) agrees: “The comments and insults conveyed by the graphic imagery of a cartoon have a crudity and offensiveness that might well be unacceptable if spelt out in words.”

As long as editorial cartoonists have caricatured politicians, politicians have feared for their public images. Thomas Nast helped topple Boss Tweed in the 1870s by repeatedly drawing him and his ring as corrupt. “Stop them damn pictures!” Tweed reportedly roared after an especially tough Nast cartoon appeared in 1871. Vice President Bush may have harbored similar resentment when he recently complained about Gary Trudeau's representations of him in “Doonesbury.” A particularly painful stab of the Trudeau pen was placing Bush's manhood in a blind trust.

This research offers a post-mortem on political advertising in 2018, providing important context for 2018’s “blue wave.” In a majority of US House of Representatives races, there were more pro-Democratic than pro-Republican ads, including in the most competitive contests. The one theme that united pro-Democratic advertising was health care, which was mentioned in nearly three of every five Democratic ads in the fall campaign. Contrary to the narrative that television is declining, a record number of television ads aired in the 2018 midterms, whereas digital spending still constituted a small percentage of overall advertising spending for most candidate campaigns. Finally, there was a healthy volume of outside-group spending in 2018, with “dark-money” groups increasing their involvement—especially in support of Democratic candidates.

“I'm extremely excited to have a prescene [sic] on the Web.”

The perpetual greeting from the campaign home page of Senator Carl Levin (1996) shows that as with the adoption of any new technology, Internet use by political candidates will undergo some early rough spots. The early stages of a technology also tend to prompt divergent claims about the merits of the new technology. Thus, while political scientist David Canon has praised campaign sites as a “positive development” for allowing the transmission of extensive information, Ted Becker, another political scientist, has been highly critical of the sites calling them “cyberfluff” (Skiba 1995). By systematically studying the content of 1996 Senate candidate home pages, this article offers some hope for reconciling the divergent claims about Internet campaigning.

Researchers often want to increase the broader societal impact of their work. One way to do that is to discuss research findings directly with practitioners. Yet, such interactions are voluntary and do not regularly arise, which raises a key demand question: Under what conditions do practitioners want to connect with researchers? This article shows that relational considerations affect these decisions—that is, what practitioners expect the interaction will be like. I partnered with a US-based civic association to conduct a field experiment. I find that group leaders in this association are more likely to speak with researchers after learning that the researchers will (1) efficiently share information during the interaction, and (2) value practitioners’ knowledge. The results provide actionable guidance for how researchers should approach practitioners and also demonstrate one powerful way that social science evidence can inform efforts to bridge research and practice.