The “Seats in Trouble” forecasting model predicted in mid-August that Republicans would gain a landslide number of seats in the 2010 elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, and that this number would be sufficiently large to restore their majority control of the House, which was lost in the 2006 midterms. Republicans were predicted to gain approximately 51 or 52 seats, about the magnitude of their 1994 midterm victory and the largest seat change since the Truman-Dewey election of 1948. As predicted, on Election Day, Republicans won a landslide number of seats, enough to give them a substantial House majority.

Based on information available in July, we predicted that the Republicans would receive 52.9% of the total House vote and end up holding 229 seats, gaining control from the Democrats in the process (Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien 2010b). Our national vote forecast proved to be nearly correct, undershooting the actual Republican share (53.8%) by slightly less than one percentage point. Our seat forecast was a little less accurate. Although we did foresee the House changing hands, we did not predict such a large Republican windfall in seats—we forecast a “mere” swing of 50 seats, which was short of the actual outcome by about 13 seats. The Republican seat total of 242, however, was well within the 95% confidence interval (199 to 259).

In our recent article forecasting the 2010 U.S. congressional elections, we argue for a model based on theory rather than tracking (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2010). A sound theoretical explanation of vote choice in House races should, ceteris paribus, predict better than a simple dependence on variables that proxy the vote, such as the generic ballot question. We posited a simple but classical explanation of the 2010 House vote—the referendum model—in which voters punish or reward the party in power according to its performance in office and the time available for that performance. In words, the model reads: House Seat Change = f(Economy, Popularity, Midterm). A measurement of these variables, at lags appropriate for forecasting, yields the estimates (OLS) of model 1, shown in column 1 of table 1. Model 1 gives a forecast of −22 seats for the Democrats in 2010, when, in fact, they scored about −60 seats. The model 1 forecast appears “wrong” in two senses. First, substantively, it fails to predict the Republican takeover of the House. Second, scientifically, it is off by over two standard errors of estimate (i.e., 38/17 > 2.0). Why did the model get it wrong this time, when the forecast was off by only one seat in the last midterm in 2006? To answer this question, the specifications of the model need consideration. Such consideration signals the scientific value of the forecasting exercise in providing a systematic trial-and-error method for model improvement.

A bare-bones, “economic performance” model of the number of seats won by the president's party in U.S. House of Representatives elections, estimated over the 1914–2008 period, yielded a point forecast of 227 seats for the Democrats, a net loss of 30 seats relative to what the party held at the start of the 111th Congress (if estimated with midterm elections only; 27 seats, if estimated with all elections). However, there was a great deal of uncertainty around that number, to the degree that there was “one chance in three or four that the Democrats [would] lose at least 40 seats,” enough to deprive them of a majority (Cuzán 2010a). Moreover, “the historical distribution of incumbent midterm losses” since 1914 suggested “that the odds of such an outcome occurring [were] around two in five,” so that “although the model forecasts lean against it, a change in party control cannot be dismissed tout court” (Cuzán 2010a, 640–41).

This brief note reports the accuracy of my two forecasts for the 2010 state legislative elections, one made on July 22 and reported in the October 2010 issue of this journal (the “PS model”; Klarner 2010a), and the other made on September 18 and reported in the October issue of Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics (i.e., the “Forum model”; Klarner 2010b). Both models used presidential approval, the state of the economy, and midterm loss as national-level predictor variables, while the later forecast also used Gallup's generic ballot question asking respondents which party they would vote for in the upcoming U.S. House election. The PS model predicted the Republicans would pick up 11 chambers, while the Forum model forecast a 15-chamber pickup. In actuality, the Republicans picked up 21 chambers, in contrast to the average 3.2-net chamber shift in party control toward one party or the other from 1962 to 2008. While both forecasts understated the extent of the Republican wave, the July forecast especially did. Overall, the Forum forecast did a good job of predicting the Republican wave, calling about three-fourths of its magnitude.

The American president is not Aristotle's unmoved mover, but there have been episodes such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in which it was up to the chief executive to take actions of incalculable importance. It should therefore be no surprise that there is intense interest in understanding the qualities that each new chief executive brings to his (or, at some point, her) responsibilities. In what follows, I attempt to provide insight into the qualities that Barack Obama brings to his presidency by reviewing his formative years, pre-presidential years, and presidency as of November 2010. I conclude by discussing his strengths and weaknesses in the realms of public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence (Greenstein 2009a; Greenstein 2009b; see also Barnes 2010).

On July 2, 2010, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal signed into law a bill that reduced the act of soliciting a “crime against nature” for compensation from a felony to a misdemeanor. A felony conviction had meant a fine of up to $2,000, imprisonment for up to five years (“with or without hard labor”), or both. Because of the change in the crime's classification to a misdemeanor, those convicted of a first offense now face lesser penalties: a fine of up to $500, six months in jail, or both. Thus, the penalty for a first conviction for solicitation of “unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the same sex or opposite sex or with an animal” for pay is the same as the penalty for a first conviction for prostitution not deemed “unnatural.” (Regular prostitution is defined in the Louisiana criminal code as “indiscriminate sexual intercourse with others for compensation.”) Another reform: Before this bill was enacted, anyone convicted of soliciting “unnatural carnal copulation” for compensation was required to register as a sex offender. Now, one is not deemed a sex offender until a second conviction.

Although the study of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) politics appears to be widely accepted within political science, a recent survey of political scientists reported some skepticism about its legitimacy and scholarly worth (Novkov and Barclay 2010). This article examines potential concerns about LGBT studies and draws attention to the field's scholarly importance. The first part briefly addresses three objections to the study of LGBT politics that echo criticisms of the study and practice of identity politics. I argue that these objections do not withstand scrutiny, and that the case for studying the intersection of politics and sexuality within the discipline of political science is compelling. Sexuality and gender are fundamental aspects of human societies that reflect power relations and increasingly have become the object of public policy. The second part of the article examines the burgeoning literature on the politics of sexual orientation and identity. Beyond its intrinsic importance, LGBT politics contributes to a broader understanding of politics, power, social movements, public opinion, policymaking institutions, urban politics, and the relationship between science and public policy. Though not exhaustive, this review addresses many of the principal empirical and theoretical works in this area.

Doing queer theory as political scientists enables us to approach central questions of the discipline in new and productive ways. This work makes possible innovative theoretical investigation of core concepts in political science such as power, justice, freedom, equality, and democracy. Queer theory can deepen the study of power by focusing on the lives, experiences, and institutions of GLBT people and communities. In the process, new frameworks are developed for the study of political theory more broadly. When done well, queer theory draws on the field's interdisciplinarity by bringing political scientists into conversation with other scholars on key matters that are best not bound by disciplinary borders. Similarly, queer theory at its best draws on the multiple perspectives developed in fields such as post-colonial, ethnic and critical race, feminist, class and ability, religious, and cultural studies.

Over two decades ago, anthropologist Gayle Rubin began a now-classic article with a deceptively simple declaration: “The time has come to think about sex” (1984). Although Rubin was not the first thinker to place sex at the center of her work, her systematic sketch of Western sexual ideology made it possible to think about the political ramifications of sex in new and productive ways by disentangling the physical acts of sex from gender and sexuality (i.e., how we understand, interpret, and ascribe meaning to those acts). Among her many useful insights was the recognition that sex and sexuality are part of a hierarchical value system that serves as the basis for other forms of social, economic, and political power. Sex is the starting point of all human life and, consequently, sexuality subtends all other institutions from marriage to families, communities, states, and international organizations. What Foucault (1978) called biopower—the regulation of bodies, including sex—has continued to change and expand, giving rise to new forms of biopolitics—the regulation of populations and sexuality. Such regulations include moral policing and criminal sanctions, biomedical intervention, family and immigration laws, and a host of other tools that have tended to establish heterosexuality as the only normal and sanctioned sexual behavior. Regulating sex, and particularly reproduction, is an essential objective of the state because, ultimately, sex and reproduction are key to how the state regulates the fundamental element of its own composition: citizenship.

From the infamous blue dress to lewd gesturing under an airport bathroom stall, the scandalous coupling of sex and politics generates a lot of buzz. Political pundits inevitably find themselves on the media frontlines, ruminating on the impact of a particular impropriety, its implications for the dishonored politician's career, and his or her ability to effectively perform his or her job. Comedians gather some of their greatest material from the collision of sex and politics. Their jokes and send-ups, however, are not limited to sexual scandal. Tina Fey's impersonation of Sarah Palin catapulted Saturday Night Live (SNL) to the top of the Nielson ratings map in 2008. The nation collectively busted a gut watching the mock “nonpartisan” television announcement featuring Sarah Palin (dressed in a brightly colored skirt suit and punctuating her statements with emotive winks or cutesy giggles) and Hillary Clinton (sporting a drab pantsuit and underscoring her statements with firm nods or a clenched fist pounding the podium) as they denounced the role that sexism played in the presidential campaign.

In August of 2009, the American Psychological Association adopted the report of its Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation and urged mental health professionals to avoid telling their patients that sexual orientation can be changed (APA 2009a). The report examined the efficacy of “conversion therapies”—also called “reparative therapies”—wherein the patient and therapist attempt to change the sexual orientation of the patient from gay or lesbian to heterosexual. The report is over 160 pages and examines over 80 peer-reviewed, published studies spanning five decades of research. Despite the heft of the report, the findings are briefly and well summarized by the chair of the task force, Judith M. Glassgold, Psy.D.: “Contrary to the claims of sexual orientation change advocates and practitioners, there is insufficient evidence to support the use of psychological interventions to change sexual orientation” (APA 2009b). Of course, this conclusion is a given among all but minor fringe elements in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) community or among this community's friends and affiliates. While sexuality collectively seems to present itself along a scale, it seems for individuals to become fixed at some point along that scale. The APA report provides a useful framework for considering the role of sexuality in political science and raises several important questions for political science as both an endeavor and a discipline.

Political science is diverse in its methods, theories, and substantive interests. A quick perusal of our flagship journals reveals just how heterogeneous we are, with articles ranging from mathematical treatments of theoretical problems to textual exegesis of Plato, and qualitative studies of single countries standing in contrast to quantitative analyses of experiments designed to mobilize voters. At times, the discipline's boundaries are so fuzzy that our territory is alternatively claimed by philosophers, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists.

The academic community studying terrorism has changed dramatically in the past decade. From a research area that was investigated by a small number of political scientists and sociologists and employed mainly descriptive and qualitative studies that resulted in limited theoretical progress (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Crenshaw 2000), it has in a short time become one of the more vibrant and rapidly developing academic realms in the scholarly world today. Scholars from different branches of the social sciences have engaged in an effort to unravel this phenomenon, introducing new theoretical outlooks, conceptualizations, and methods.

In a sense, the study of comparative politics is the study of the role that context plays in structuring behavior. Institutional contexts, such as the nature of the electoral system or the existence of an independent judiciary, drive differences in electoral outcomes or human rights across nations. Individual-level contextual factors such as norms, culture, or ethnic or religious identity can be determinative in understanding when social movements will likely flourish and which cleavages will lead to political parties or ethnic strife. Variation in context leads to variation in political outcomes and behavior across both peoples and nations, and provides comparative politics with its richness.

Some of the most fundamental concerns about democratic politics involve information—who has access to it, how do individuals get it, and of what quality and type is it? The answers to each of these questions invariably involve other people, and it is for this reason that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of social networks.

What are the relational dimensions of politics? Does the way that people and organizations are connected to each other matter? Are our opinions affected by the people with whom we talk? Are legislators affected by lobbyists? Is the capacity of social movements to mobilize affected by the structure of societal networks? Powerful evidence in the literature answers each of these questions in the affirmative. However, compared to other paradigmatic foci, political science has invested tiny amounts of capacity in the study of the relevance of networks to political phenomena. Far more attention has been paid to the psychology of how people process information individually as opposed to collectively, and to the role that institutions play in structuring politics as opposed to the relational undergirdings of politics. A review of the flagship journals in political science reveals a dearth of articles on networks. Few, if any, doctoral programs include courses for which the primary focus is network-related ideas, and even the notion of a relational dependence in data is rarely mentioned in discussions of the assumptions embedded in the statistical methods that dominate political science.

A number of indicators signal a growing interest in the study of political phenomena from a network perspective in the United States, such as the growing number of published articles with a network focus in the discipline's top-tier journals and the creation of a new Political Networks section of the APSA in 2008. Yet another notable indicator is the organization of a new annual conference financially supported by the National Science Foundation—the Political Networks conference. The meeting not only brings together scholars who study networks in political science, but also fosters collaboration across disciplines by encouraging participation of non–political scientists with the goal of achieving more comprehensive answers to questions that cannot be properly answered within the confines of individual disciplines.

The year 2012 will mark a full century in which the size of the House of Representatives has held constant at 435. The 1910 census determined the population of the United States to be 92,228,496, which amounted to an average of one representative for every 212,000 persons. Following the 1910 census, Congress passed Public Law 62-5, which fixed the House size at 435. The law has never been repealed. In 2000, the census showed the population of the United States to be 298,757,310, or about 300 million. Consequently, in 2000, there was one representative for every 687,000 persons counted in the census, a more than threefold increase in district size since 1910. The average district size today is already greater than the populations of the four least populous states. According to population estimates, this average will further increase to 712,000 in 2010 and over 1 million by the middle of the twenty-first century. The 2010 census offers a great opportunity to renew debate about an increase in the size of the House.

In close, disputed elections, outcomes can depend on determinations of voter intent for ballots that have been filled out improperly. We surveyed 899 adult Minnesotans during a time when the state's U.S. Senate election was still disputed and presented them with ambiguous ballots similar to ballots under dispute in the same election. We randomized participants to three experimental groups, across which we varied the names on the ballot. We found that participants' judgments of voter intent were strongly biased by their voting preferences (p < .002 in all four ballots).