This paper attempts to derive several economic conservation laws and to test the validity of the optimal growth models using the income/wealth ratios for the United States, Japan, and other OECD countries. Conservation laws vary with the type of the objective function depicted, such as the maximization of the aggregate consumption or the maximization of per-capita consumption. The operational concept of “wealth-like quantity” is identified, although the Goldsmith-Kendrick standard definition of “net national wealth” should not always be used. The last section of the paper takes up an empirical analysis to determine how different economies have achieved long-term (optimal) growth. The U.S. economy has been operating rather efficiently, whereas the Japanese economy, after the oil shocks of the 1970's, has behaved differently, leading into the bubble period of the early 1990's.

We examine “Forward Guidance Contracts,” which penalize central bankers for choosing high interest rates. We integrate those contracts into the New Keynesian Framework and show that they can be used to overcome a liquidity trap. Moreover, although the government takes only a share of the social benefits into account when it has to decide whether to offer the contract, we demonstrate that for plausible parameter values the government will always find it desirable to offer the contract in a liquidity trap but not in normal times. Finally, we show that the optimal duration of such contracts is typically very short.

I add intangible capital to a variant of the neoclassical growth model that already features physical and human capital, and study the implications for international income differences. I calibrate the parameters associated with intangible capital by using new estimates of investment in intangibles by Corrado et al. [Review of Income and Wealth 55, 661–685 (2009)] and depreciation rates by Corrado and Hulten [American Economic Review 100, 99–104 (2010)]. I find that for a given efficiency difference between rich and poor countries, the model with intangible capital can explain more than double the income differences of the model without. Put another way, in the benchmark case, differences in intangible capital account for 14.3% of the observed income differences. I also examine the role played by intangible capital in versions of the model with barriers to accumulation. In all the variants that I consider, differences in intangible capital account for 10% to 22% of the observed income differences.

This paper presents a model of development that is driven by matching between talents and technologies. Differences in productivity across countries are amplified by three dimensions of talent utilization: the range of talents utilized, the density of a specific talent utilized, and the average match quality in the economy. In our model, higher productivity increases the number of technologies available, enhancing the opportunities for individuals to match their talents to specific technologies and increasing the returns to search. More intensive search further contributes to talent utilization.

This paper studies stylized business-cycle properties of household production in four industrialized countries (Canada, the United States, Germany, and Japan). We employ a dynamic small open-economy business-cycle model that incorporates a household production sector. We use the model to generate data on home output, hours worked in the home sector, and hours spent on leisure. We find that in each country, home output is more volatile than market output, whereas home sector hours are about as volatile as those in the market sector. In each country, leisure is the least volatile series. Leisure hours and home hours are countercyclical in all countries, and home output is not highly correlated with market output. Home sector variables are generally less persistent than market variables and cross-country correlations related to home production tend to be lower than those related to market production. These findings demonstrate that despite some well-known structural differences in labor markets, the cyclical features of home sector variables are similar across the countries we consider.

Exchange rates display excessive volatility and are disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals. This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model in which nonfundamental uncertainty (“sunspots”) in part drives stochastic fluctuations in the exchange rate in a class of rational expectation equilibria. In the model, a combination of financial frictions—incomplete asset markets and a proportional transaction cost associated with trading foreign-currency-denominated bonds—breaks the tight link between exchange rates and fundamentals. Moreover, the model generates a negative Backus–Smith correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate, because relative prices, acting as a source of shocks as opposed to shock absorbers, directly affect relative output and generate a large wealth effect on relative consumption. Using a random walk as an example of sunspot shocks, the volatility of exchange rates relative to that of output and consumption is found to be large in the presence of nontradable goods and distribution services.

Building on the theoretical prediction that income tax progressivity increases the speed of convergence in neoclassical, open-economy growth models, this paper asks whether tax progressivity is a potential source of differences across regions in convergence rates. In a sample of U.S. data, over the period 1920–1990, regional convergence and tax progressivity are found to be positively correlated, which supports the theoretical results. Moreover, some data on six OECD countries also accord with such a positive relationship. Overall, the model is successful in predicting the large range of available convergence estimates when the tax rate is elastic enough with respect to the tax base.

When the financial positions of pension funds worsen, regulations prescribe that pension funds reduce the gap between their assets (invested contributions) and their liabilities (accumulated pension promises). This paper quantifies the business cycle effects and distributional implications of various types of restoration policies. We extend a canonical New-Keynesian model with a tractable demographic structure and, as a novelty, a flexible pension fund framework. Fund participants accumulate inflation-indexed or non-indexed benefits and funding adequacy is restored by revaluing previously accumulated pension wealth (Defined Contribution (DC)) or changing the pension fund contribution rate on labor income (Defined Benefit (DB)). Economies with DC pension funds respond similarly to adverse capital quality shocks as economies without pension funds. DB pension funds, however, distort labor supply decisions and exacerbate economic fluctuations. While DB pension funds achieve intergenerational risk-sharing, welfare analyses indicate that the negative effects of the induced distortions are sizeable.

The transition paths from plan to market have varied markedly across countries. Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries, which opted for fast and deep reforms including transformation of their business environments, rapidly narrowed the productivity gap with advanced economies. In contrast, in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which embarked on reforms later and with less depth, the productivity gap remains large. Whereas the literature has focused mainly on empirical studies, this paper develops a dynamic search model of firm start-ups that reflects these trends. The model shows that an enabling business climate contributes to start-ups of highly productive firms at an earlier stage of transition, underscoring the importance of early reforms. The role of the state sector as an employer during transition rises in countries where reforming the business environment is particularly costly.

This paper sets up a two-sector growth model with sectoral hysteresis because of intersectoral factor reallocation costs. The main results are: (i) The economy under study exhibits nonergodic growth implying path-dependency (history matters) and permanent consequences of temporary shocks. (ii) Flexible economies are more likely to take advantage of technological improvements. The analysis points to a new mechanism in the flexibility-growth nexus, which complements the findings of Bertola (1994). (iii) Periods of negative growth can be explained as optimal responses of an economy to favorable technology shocks. This result sheds light on the fact that economic development is associated with recurring downturns.

Imperfections in the credit market can hamper the flow of factors from less productive to more productive firms and result in a lower aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Depth of such misallocation will depend on per capita income, the level of imperfections in the credit market, and the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity. Under some parameter configurations, we find that per capita income and TFP may affect each other so that an economic boom may cause higher resource misallocation, lower TFP, and economic recession. At the same time, an economic recession may have a “cleansing effect” on TFP leading to a lower resource misallocation, higher TFP, and economic boom. In other words, economic success may breed the failure and the failure can become a precondition for success so that the boom-bust cycles in resource misallocation, TFP, and per capita income may become endogenous.

We estimate the relationship between GDP per capita growth and the growth rate of the national saving rate using a panel of 130 countries over the period 1960–2017. We find that GDP per capita growth increases (decreases) the growth rate of the national saving rate in poor countries (rich countries), and a higher credit-to-GDP ratio decreases the national saving rate as well as the income elasticity of the national saving rate. We develop a model with a credit constraint to explain the growth-saving relationship by the saving behavior of entrepreneurs at both the intensive and extensive margins. We further present supporting evidence for our theoretical findings by utilizing cross-country time series data of the number of new businesses registered and the corporate saving rate.

The literature on international business cycles has employed dynamic factor models (DFMs) to disentangle global from group-specific and national factors in countries’ macroeconomic aggregates. Therefore, the countries have simply been classified ex ante as belonging to the same region or the same level of development. This paper estimates a DFM for a sample of 106 countries and three variables (output, consumption, investment) over the period 1960–2014, in which the countries are classified according to the outcome of a cluster analysis. By comparing the results with those obtained by the previous grouping approaches, we show substantial deviations in the importance of global and group-specific factors. Remarkably, when the groups are defined properly, the “global business cycle” accounts for only a very small fraction of macroeconomic fluctuations, most evidently in the industrialized world. The group-specific factors, on the other hand, play a much greater role for national business cycles than previously thought—also in the pre-globalization period.

The present paper studies the interaction between short-run business cycle fluctuations and economic growth at the empirical level. We identify a measure of potential output with that rate of growth consistent with a constant unemployment rate, and we estimate the effects of GDP growth rates on the latter in 13 Latin American and 18 OECD countries during the period 1981–2011. The results of both parametric (OLS/IV and a panel estimator that allows for parameter heterogeneity and cross-section dependence) and nonparametric (a penalized regression spline estimator) econometric techniques show that the measure of potential output experiences positive (negative) changes in periods of high (low) growth in the majority of countries. However, in contrast to the sample of OECD countries, we find that less than half of the sample of Latin American countries experience statistically significant changes in this measure of potential output in periods of low growth.

By means of an endogenous growth model of directed technical change with vertical and horizontal R&D, we study a transitional-dynamics mechanism that is consistent with the changes in the shares of the high- versus the low-tech sectors found in recent European data. Under the hypothesis of a positive shock in the proportion of high-skilled labor, the technological-knowledge bias channel leads to unbalanced sectoral growth with a noticeable shift of resources across sectors. A calibration exercise suggests that the model is able to account for up to from 50 to about 100 percent of the increase in the share of the high-tech sector observed in the data from 1995 to 2007. However, the model predicts that the dynamics of the share of the high-tech sector has no significant impact on the dynamics of the economic growth rate.

Challenges raised by aging (increasing longevity) have prompted policy debates featuring policy proposals justified by reference to some notion of intergenerational equity. However, very different policies ranging from presavings to indexation of retirement ages have been justified in this way. We develop an overlapping-generations model in continuous time that encompasses different generations with different mortality rates and thus longevity. Allowing for trend increases in both longevity and productivity, we address the normative issue of intergenerational equity under a utilitarian criterion when future generations are better off in terms of both material and nonmaterial well-being. Increases in productivity and longevity are shown to have very different implications for intergenerational distribution. Further, the socially optimal retirement age, dependency ratio, and intergenerational burden sharing in the case of a trend increase in longevity are shown to depend on how individuals' utility for time/leisure is affected by age and longevity.

Recent empirical work on globalization and inflation analyzes multicountry data sets in panel and/or cross-section frameworks and reaches inconclusive results. This paper highlights their shortcomings and reexamines the issue utilizing heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that allow for cross-section heterogeneity and dependence. It finds that in a sample of developing countries globalization of both trade and finance, on the average, exerts a significant and positive effect on inflation, whereas in a sample of developed countries there is, on the average, no significant impact of openness. Neither type of openness disciplines inflationary policy. Despite this, there are large variations in the effect across countries, due possibly to differences in the quality of political institutions, central bank independence, the exchange-rate regimes, financial development, and/or legal traditions.

We incorporate keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (KUJ) preferences into the Blanchard–Yaari framework and develop a model of balanced growth. In this context we investigate status preference, demographic shocks, and pension policy. We find that a higher degree of KUJ lowers economic growth, whereas, in contrast, a decrease in the fertility and mortality rates increase it. In the second part of the paper we extend the model by incorporating a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system with a statutory retirement date. The latter implies that the growth rate is higher under PAYG. We also consider the implications of pension reform under both defined benefit and defined contribution schemes.

The article compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and the transparency solution is not feasible because of verifiability problems. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting, central banks may have an incentive to signal their private information in order to influence the public's expectations about future inflation. We show that inflation targeting is superior to monetary targeting, as it makes it easier for central banks to commit to low inflation. Moreover, central banks that are weak on inflation prefer inflation targeting to monetary targeting.

We propose a simple incomplete-markets small-open-economy model that is amenable to analytical dissection of its policy-relevant mechanisms. In contrast to its complete-markets limit, the equilibrium real exchange rate is irreducible from the incomplete-markets equilibrium. Market incompleteness exacerbates the domestic-inflation and output-gap monetary-policy trade-off in two ways: its steepness and its resulting endogenous cost-push to the trade-off. The latter depends on an equilibrium combination of structural shocks and on agents' beliefs of future events. Thus, in comparison to its complete-markets and closed-economy limits, standard Taylor-type rules are less capable of inducing determinate rational expectations equilibrium in our environment. Despite the larger policy trade-off under incomplete markets, simple policies that also respond to exchange-rate growth are able to manage expectations that drive the endogenous cost-push term. However, policies that respond directly to expectations may turn out to exacerbate the cost-push trade-off further, and thus, to be more likely to fuel self-fulfilling multiple or unstable equilibria.