We present a new simple and short proof of the existence of equilibria in the classical single-sector growth model.

This paper examines a class of interest rate rules that respond to public expectations and to lagged variables and considers varying levels of commitment that correspond to varying degrees of response to lagged output. Under commitment the policymaker adjusts the nominal rate with lagged output to impact public expectations. Within this class of rules, I provide a condition for nonexplosive and determinate solutions. Expectational stability obtains for any nonnegative response to lagged output. Simulation results show that modified commitment is best under least-squares learning. However, in the presence of parameter uncertainty and/or measurement error in the policymaker's data on public expectations, the best policy is one of partial commitment, where the response to lagged output is less than under modified commitment. The case for partial commitment is strengthened if the gain parameter in the learning mechanism is high, which can be interpreted as the use of few lags by public agents in the formation of expectations or as an indication of low credibility of the policymaker. The appointment of a conservative central banker ameliorates these concerns about modified commitment.

We analyze the welfare effects of asset bubbles in a model with income inequality and financial friction. We show that a bubble that emerges in the value of housing, a durable asset that is fundamentally useful for everyone, has regressive welfare effects. By raising the housing price, the bubble benefits high-income savers but negatively affects low-income borrowers. The key intuition is that, by creating a bubble in the market price, savers’ demand for the housing asset for investment purposes imposes a negative externality on borrowers, who only demand the housing asset for utility purposes. The model also implies a feedback loop: high-income inequality depresses the interest rates, facilitating the existence of housing bubbles, which in turn has regressive welfare effects.

The recent global financial crisis and the subsequent recession have revitalized the discussion on causal interactions between financial and economic sectors. In this study, I apply the financial stress and the national activity indices–respectively developed by Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City and Chicago–to investigate the impact of financial uncertainty on an overall economic performance. I examine nonlinear dynamics in a vector smooth transition autoregressive framework, and illustrate regime-dependent asymmetries in the financial and economic indices using the generalized impulse-response functions. The results reveal more amplified dynamics during the stressed conditions. I further evaluate benefits of nonlinear modeling in an out-of-sample setting. The forecasting exercise brings out the important advantages that nonlinear modeling provides in the identification of the causal effect of financial instability on overall economic performance.

In response to the recession brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, EU-wide macroeconomic policy has launched an unprecedented coordinated fiscal expansion across the EU (Next Generation EU or NGEU), financed by issuing common debt. Given NGEU’s nature, it is essential to take fiscal spillovers into consideration when assessing the overall macroeconomic effects of this fiscal expansion. We quantify the effects of the additional public investment for all Member States in a rich macro-model with a trade structure. Our model suggests that, on average, GDP effects are around one-third larger when explicitly accounting for the spillover effects from individual-country measures. For small open economies with smaller NGEU allocations, spillover effects account for the bulk of the GDP impact. We also quantify key transmission channels.

In this paper, we explore the consequence of learning to forecast in a very simple environment. Agents have bounded memory and incorrectly believe that there is nonlinear structure underlying the aggregate time series dynamics. Under social learning with finite memory, agents may be unable to learn the true structure of the economy and rather may chase spurious trends, destabilizing the actual aggregate dynamics. We explore the degree to which agents' forecasts are drawn toward a minimal state variable learning equilibrium as well as a weaker long-run consistency condition.

Bullard and Mitra [Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002), 1105–1130] find that, in a New Keynesian economy without capital and under four variants of the Taylor rule, the Taylor principle is sufficient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability of equilibrium in most cases. Xiao [Macroeconomic Dynamics 12 (2008), 22–49] claims that with capital and mild increasing returns the Taylor principle cannot guarantee either determinacy or E-stability with any of the four rules. In this paper we show that in the Calvo-type sticky price models a second-order condition for profit maximization must be satisfied in firms' pricing decision problem, and we point out that the examples given in Xiao's paper to support his conclusion violate this condition. After imposing this condition, we find that increasing returns have little effect on determinacy and E-stability under two of the policy rules but significant effects under the other two. These results are obtained in models both with and without capital.

In a life-cycle model with dynastic households, parents value the transfer of tangible assets to their offspring in the event of premature death. This raises the subjective reward from investing in them relative to intangible human capital and tilts investment choice away from the latter. These effects of mortality on human capital risk and relative investment can translate into divergent growth paths, delayed transition from physical to human capital accumulation, and a dampened response to mortality shock in developing countries.

Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR protection has shifted toward IPR enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North–South assumptions to study (a) the regions' incentives to enforce IPRs in a decentralized game, (b) the desired IPR enforcement of the two regions in negotiation rounds on global harmonization, and (c) the constrained efficient enforcement level. We show how the different solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the research productivity in the North and the regions' relative market sizes. Although growth rates increase substantially when IPR enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate equals the growth rate of real per capita income, say, 2%, thus falling right into the range suggested by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a simple tool to evaluate small policy changes affecting several generations, by reducing the dynamic problem to a static one. A necessary condition is time invariance, which is satisfied by any common solution concept in an overlapping-generations model with exogenous growth. This tool is applied to derive the discount rate for cost–benefit analysis under two different utilitarian welfare functions: classical and relative. It is only with relative utilitarianism, and assuming time-invariance of the set of alternatives (policies), that the discount rate is well defined for a heterogeneous society at a balanced growth equilibrium, is corroborated by an independent principle equating values of human lives, and equals the growth rate of real per-capita income.

This paper derives a time-varying model to examine the dynamic interdependencies between realized and expected inflation. The results show inflation expectations at the short and long horizon have been uncorrelated over the past three decades, which is consistent with the anchored inflation expectations hypothesis. There is also little evidence that changes in realized inflation have been the result of self-fulfilling variations in the expectations of economic agents. Despite high commodity prices and above-trend inflation, expectations since the financial crisis in 2008 have not become unhinged from fundamentals.

This article aims at studying a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations that incorporates inherited tastes (aspirations) and endogenous longevity. The existence of standard-of-living aspirations transmitted between two subsequent generations in a context where the individual state of health depends on public investments in health has some remarkable consequences at the macroeconomic level. First, aspirations allow escaping from the well-known poverty trap scenario described by Chakraborty (2004). Second, the steady-state equilibrium may be destabilized through a super-critical Neimark–Sacker bifurcation when the health tax rate is set at too high or too low a level. This causes endogenous fluctuations in income and longevity.

This paper examines the dynamic effects of international commodity trade by merging two benchmark environments, namely, the static factor endowments model and the neoclassical growth model. Two main questions are asked. First, how does commodity trade affect the capital-accumulation paths of two trade partners? Second, do the welfare effects associated with these dynamics serve to reinforce or mitigate the well-known welfare effects associated with the static factor endowments model? It is demonstrated that trade will eventually, if not immediately, narrow the difference in domestic capital accumulation paths. This narrowing introduces a negative welfare effect that is large enough to worsen overall welfare for the country whose capital accumulation has declined. Thus, although the dynamic effects of trade are large enough to dominate the static effects, they do not reinforce the concept of mutually advantageous trade.

We examine the impact of balanced-budget labor income taxes on the existence of expectation-driven business cycles in a two-sector version of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (SGU) [(1997) Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000] model with constant government expenditures and counter-cyclical taxes. Our results show that the destabilizing impact of labor income taxes strongly depends on the capital intensity difference across sectors. Local indeterminacy is indeed more likely when the consumption good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate decreases, and less likely when the investment good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate increases. The implication of this result can be quantitatively significant. Indeed, when compared to SGU, local indeterminacy can be either completely ruled out for all OECD countries when the investment good is sufficiently capital intensive or drastically improved, delivering indeterminacy for a larger set of OECD countries, if the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive. Focusing however on recent estimates of the sectoral capital shares corresponding to the empirically plausible case of a capital intensive consumption good, we find that there is a significant increase of the range of economically relevant labor tax rates (from a minimum tax rate of 30% to 24.7% for which local indeterminacy arises with respect to the aggregate formulation of SGU.

This paper examines the effect of a tariff on long-run growth and welfare in a two-country innovation-led growth model. We show that although raising the home country’s tariff reduces the growth and GDP of the foreign country, it will backfire by depressing R&D and growth of the home country. The Nash equilibrium tariffs can be positive, and they are larger when the government expenditure is more beneficial to private production and/or when the productivity of innovation is higher. The presence of positive Nash equilibrium tariffs provides a theoretical explanation for why countries have incentives to implement a tariff policy regardless of its negative effect on growth. Finally, the Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the globally optimal tariffs, that is, the levels that maximize the joint welfare of both countries.

Estimated microproduction functions confront two major problems—those of (1) unknown functional forms and (2) the measurement of capital independent of the distribution of output among the factors of production. The latter problem has emerged unresolved from the earlier Cambridge capital controversy. In the presence of these two problems, all specifications of microproduction functions have involved nonunique coefficients and error terms. We provide a method of deriving time-varying coefficients that produces unique coefficients and error terms. Specifically, we respecify the microproduction function in such a way that its coefficients are the sums of (i) the appropriate partial derivatives and (ii) exact representations of excluded-variable biases. By decomposing the total coefficients, we obtain the unique coefficients and a unique error term. Our treatment of heterogeneous capital is not subject to the criticisms of that concept that emerged during the Cambridge controversy.

We add agency costs into a two-country, two-good international business-cycle model. In our model, changes in the relative price of investment arise endogenously. Despite the fact that technology shocks are uncorrelated across countries, the relative price of investment is positively correlated across countries in our model, much as it is in detrended U.S./Euro-area data. We also find that financial frictions tend to increase the volatility of the terms of trade and the international correlations of consumption, hours worked, output, and investment. We then compare this model to an alternative model that also includes risk shocks. We use credit spread data (for the United States) to calibrate the AR(1) process for risk shocks. We find that risk shocks are too small to significantly impact the model's dynamics.

We study the effect of exporting on markups building on two stylized facts: (1) exporters charge higher markups than nonexporters and (2) firms increase markups when they start to export. These facts suggest that exporting increases markups, but the causal relationship has not been studied directly. To do so, we modify Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) by adding decreasing returns technologies and demand and productivity shocks to account for sales correlations across markets. We calibrate and simulate a trade cost reduction. Old exporters increase markups on average, while new ones reduce them. Three mechanisms matter: (1) cost reductions are not fully passed on to prices, (2) firms expand, increasing marginal cost, and (3) foreign demand is more elastic than domestic demand. The first effect dominates along the intensive margin, while the others prevail along the extensive margin. Thus, exporters charge larger markups in spite of exporting, not because of it.

It has been argued that a clear understanding of the stochastic growth model can best be achieved by working out an approximate analytical solution. This paper follows that idea but streamlines the presentation of the loglinear approximate solution for the neoclassical model of capital accumulation. By focusing on the partial elasticity of capital stock with respect to its lag term, this paper is able to confirm analytically some conclusions based on numerical calculations in previous papers, and to clarify why a simpler solution arises in several special cases.

We estimate elasticities of substitution between components of the Bank of England’s household-sector UK Divisia monetary aggregate using quarterly data from 1999 to 2019, encompassing the period surrounding the global financial crisis. The demand system includes interest-bearing sight and time deposits at monetary financial institutions as components, since deposit data for banks (excluding mutuals) and for mutuals are no longer published separately. We find that the elasticities of substitution that relate to changes in the user cost of noninterest-bearing monetary assets imply inelastic substitution over all or almost all of the sample and, consequently, a conventional monetary aggregate would be a highly misleading economic indicator relative to a Divisia monetary aggregate.