I introduce a minimum innovation size required for patents into a Schumpeterian growth model. We show that to satisfy the patentability requirement for minimum innovation size, each research and development (R&D) firm targets only industries in which the incumbent's technology is of sufficient obsolescence. This is because the technological gap between innovator and incumbent is greater in industries using older technologies. Although the increase in minimum innovation size reduces the number of industries targeted for R&D, it also increases the amount of R&D investment directed at those targeted industries. Consequently, introducing a minimum innovation size has a nonmonotonic (or negative) effect on the aggregate flow of innovations. Further, by deriving the endogenous long-run distribution of innovation size, we show that an increase in minimum innovation size reduces the mean innovation size. This implies that even if the patent office only grants patents for superior innovations, it causes innovators to produce generally inferior-quality innovations.

We analyze a general R&D-based endogenous growth model with a growth-essential natural resource. The economy comprises two separate sectors, final output and R&D, both directly or indirectly dependent on the natural resource. Because the resource is exhaustible and it is an essential productive input, increasing returns to scale to manmade inputs are compatible with nonexplosive sustained growth. The instability problem usually associated with increasing returns is overcome thanks to the existence of imperfect markets in a decentralized economy. We find an admissible range of values for the elasticity of capital in the R&D sector under which growth is fully endogenous and saddlepath stable, with no need of exogenous population growth.

Do immigrants have a higher demand for large-denominated banknotes than natives? This micro study examines whether banknote orders for CHF 1,000 notes are concentrated in Swiss municipalities with a high foreign-to-native ratio. The evidence for 251 Swiss municipalities finds that immigrants hoard fewer CHF 1,000 banknotes than natives. This empirical result means that immigration reduces seigniorage (per person) as measured by banknote orders. A 1% increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio is coincident with a reduction in banknote orders by CHF 4,000. This reduction is attributed to specific traits linked to immigrants.

We estimate the effects of anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy changes on jump variation by employing high-frequency nonparametric jump detection methods. We find that anticipated changes in the Fed funds have no significant effect on jumps. In contrast, jump variation in the price of financial market data increases with monetary policy surprises. We document evidence of asymmetries in the response of jumps to monetary policy changes. Monetary policy surprises and positive changes in the Fed target rate induce increments in jumps. Similar results exist in the sector analysis. In addition, this study uncovers no evidence of endogenous response between jumps and monetary policy surprises.

Consider the problem of a benevolent government that needs to finance the provision of a public good with distortionary taxes and cannot commit to policies beyond the current period. In such a case, public expenditure is inefficiently low. If the government further loses the ability to set tax rates before production in the period takes place, then it will not internalize how its policy choices distort current factor markets. Thus, to counterbalance the costs of future distortions, it increases public good provision. For a calibrated economy, removing within-period commitment implies a welfare gain worth half a percent of yearly consumption. A similar gain can be obtained if instead, capital depreciation is allowed to be fully deducted from taxable income.

A model is constructed in which trading partners are asymmetrically informed about future trading opportunities and spatial and informational frictions limit arbitrage between markets. These frictions create inefficiency relative to a full-information equilibrium, and the extent of this inefficiency is affected by monetary policy. A Friedman rule is optimal under a wide range of circumstances, including ones where segmented markets limit the extent of monetary policy intervention.

We analyze optimal dynamic taxation when labor supply is indivisible. As in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), markets are complete, and an employment lottery determines who works. The consumer can buy insurance to diversify this income uncertainty. The optimal wage tax is generally positive except for some special cases when leisure is nonnormal and the government can use debt as a policy instrument in addition to its tax instruments. We derive a HARA class of preferences, for which we characterize the dynamic paths of the wage tax. The optimal paths of the labor tax differ between divisible- and indivisible-labor economies.

In previous work, we estimated a dynamic model of the Italian economy, showing that its weakness in the past two decades is mainly due to the slowdown in total factor productivity growth. In those models, two parameters play a key role: technological progress and the elasticity of substitution. Recent estimates of those parameters are affected, in our opinion, by a specification problem: technological parameters are inherently long-run but their estimates are based on short-run data. Looking deeply into the estimation procedure, we show that the misspecification issue present in the estimates gives rise to a spurious regression bias (high R2, low DW), because the standard approach does not incorporate frictions and rigidities. Our modeling strategy takes account of them. Although we cannot in general say that our framework gets rid of the serial correlation problem, the statistics for our model do show that residuals are not serially correlated.

A known result holds that capital taxes should be high in the short run and low or zero in the long-run steady state. This paper studies the dynamics of optimal capital taxation during the transition, when a high rate is no longer optimal but the economy is still in flux. The main result is that capital should be taxed whenever the sum of the elasticities of marginal utility with respect to consumption and labor supply are rising and subsidized whenever this sum is falling. If the utility function displays increasing relative risk aversion, this paradoxically implies that capital should be taxed when the capital stock is below the modified golden-rule level and subsidized whenever it exceeds this level. Thus, savings incentives sometimes can be more desirable when the capital stock is large than when it is small.

Sweden has a long and distinguished tradition in economics, beginning with Knut Wicksell and continuing with Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Erik Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and Erik Lundberg, all of whom are now gone. Yet, for several of these men, economics was not enough: Wicksell spoke out on moral issues and served time in jail, and Myrdal was for many years a high official at the United Nations and, briefly, a cabinet minister, as was Ohlin, who made his mark at home primarily as leader of the opposition in a country governed mostly by Social Democrats, serving in parliament for 32 years. For Assar Lindbeck, however, economics has been broad enough: he has devoted a long and distinguished career to economics, and to economics alone, with unfailing enthusiasm and energy over half a century. Not that he was not wanted elsewhere: over the years, he has declined challenging job offers from an international organization and a Swedish daily newspaper, to name but two examples, as well as from universities outside Sweden. Assar has managed to harness his varied and wide-ranging talents within the many mansions of economics. He is one of the most versatile economists of his generation. Indeed, he is one of the few who, for clarity, need to divide their bibliography into categories by subject: Macroeconomics and monetary economics, Public economics, Labor economics, International economics, Economic systems and economic structures, Methodology and history of economic thought, and Swedish economy. His work on these different subjects has ranged from pure theory to applied policy-oriented and empirical studies. In addition to the numerous scientific publications listed at the end of this interview, his bibliography includes nearly 200 articles for magazines and newspapers. His ivory tower has always been equipped with a high-speed elevator. But, as he points out in the conversation to follow, all his research work, as well as his journalism, is driven by an overarching interest in bettering economic policy and organization—in other words, boosting economic and social efficiency for the purpose of lifting ordinary people's standard of life. This has been, and remains, a guiding principle—a Leitmotiv, if you prefer—from which he has never swerved. Assar Lindbeck is a towering figure in Swedish economics and in Swedish national life.

This paper investigates, in the case of the euro area, the standard assumption that the liquidity trap steady state, which arises from the existence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, is locally unstable. We show that the policy function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. Then, using our estimations, we show that around the liquidity trap steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values. Finally, we find that an inflation shock is more efficient than a demand shock to escape the liquidity trap steady state.

We study the money-in-the-utility-function model in which agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth. We show that the Friedman rule is not optimal even if the government uses nonlinear income taxation for redistribution. A positive nominal interest rate raises social welfare because it relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint for highly endowed agents. Although the setup is close to that of da Costa and Werning [Journal of Political Economy (2008) 116, 82–112], who investigate skill heterogeneity, the role of the nominal interest rate in this paper here differs from the one in their model.

It has repeatedly been shown that properly constructed monetary aggregates based on index number theory (such as Divisia money) vastly outperform traditional measures of money (i.e. simple sum money) in empirical models. However, opponents of Divisia frequently claim that Divisia is “too complex” for little gain. And indeed, at first glance it looks as if simple sum and Divisia sum exhibit similar dynamics. In this paper, we want to build deeper understanding of how and when Divisia and simple sum differ empirically using monthly US data from 1990M1 to 2007M12. In particular, we look at how they respond differently to monetary policy shocks, which seems to be the most essential aspect of those differences from the perspective of the policy maker. We use a very rich, fairly agnostic setup that allows us to identify many potential nonlinearities, building on a smoothed local projections approach with automatic selection of the relevant interaction terms. We find, that—while the direction of change is often similar—the precise dynamics differ sharply. In particular in times of economic uncertainty, when the proper assessment of monetary policy is most relevant, those existing differences are drastically augmented.

The paper suggests that the political changes brought about by the increase in the proportion of college graduates in the U.S. labor force in the 1970s may have contributed to the decline in the college premium during the 1970s and its increase during the 1980s and 1990s. The study argues that the proportion of skilled workers in the labor force affected their relative importance in the political process. Thus, the increase in the proportion of skilled workers during the 1970s reduced the skill premium in the short run, but induced a change in policies that favored skilled workers and increased the skill premium in the long run.

This paper presents a simple model of an economy with heterogeneous agents to show that the redistribution of wealth among such agents can play a significant role in the propagation mechanism of financial crises. In an economy where firms with heterogeneous productivity operate under borrowing constraints, the redistribution reproduces hump-shaped responses for output and labor and procyclicality in observed productivity. In this model, a financial shock generates a persistent and hump-shaped response, whereas a productivity shock does not. Further, the redistribution of wealth significantly amplifies the persistence and hump shape of these responses following a financial shock. This model suggests that redistribution may thus be a key driving force behind the transmission of financial crises.

We provide a theory-based inquiry into the contours of China's international balance sheets after the renminbi becomes convertible under the capital account. We construct a two-country general equilibrium model with trading in equities and bonds and calibrate the model with U.S. and Chinese data. We interpret Chinese capital account liberalization as a removal of restrictions that prohibit agents trading Chinese bonds and U.S. equities. We explore how international risk-sharing can be achieved through portfolio diversification in each of these asset market configurations. We also look at how these holdings would change as China gradually rebalanced its production with a larger share of labor income, and as the productivity gap between China and the United States narrowed. We find that both U.S. and Chinese residents would have incentives to increase their holdings in each other's equities and to issue debt in each other's currency.

Empirical evidence shows that entrepreneurs hold a large fraction of wealth, have higher saving rates than workers, and face substantial uninsurable entrepreneurial and investment risks. This paper constructs a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model with uninsurable entrepreneurial risk and capital-market imperfections to explore the implications of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk for wealth distribution and aggregate activity in an incomplete market economy. It is shown that entrepreneurial risk can substantially affect both the wealth distribution and the macroeconomy.

We contribute to the literature on empirical macroeconomic models with time-varying conditional moments, by introducing a heteroskedastic score-driven model with Student’s t-distributed innovations, named the heteroskedastic score-driven $t$-QVAR (quasi-vector autoregressive) model. The $t$-QVAR model is a robust nonlinear extension of the VARMA (VAR moving average) model. As an illustration, we apply the heteroskedastic $t$-QVAR model to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, for which we estimate Gaussian-ABCD and $t$-ABCD representations. We use data on economic output, inflation, interest rate, government spending, aggregate productivity, and consumption of the USA for the period of 1954 Q3 to 2022 Q1. Due to the robustness of the heteroskedastic $t$-QVAR model, even including the period of the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we find a superior statistical performance, lower policy-relevant dynamic effects, and a higher estimation precision of the impulse response function for US gross domestic product growth and US inflation rate, for the heteroskedastic score-driven $t$-ABCD representation rather than for the homoskedastic Gaussian-ABCD representation.

We use a labor search model with heterogenous households and firms to study the efficacy of a wage subsidy during a pandemic, relative to enhancing unemployment benefits. A large proportion of the economy is forced to shut down, and firms in that sector choose whether to lay off workers or keep them on payroll. A wage subsidy encourages firms to keep workers on payroll, which speeds up labor market recovery after the pandemic ends. However, a wage subsidy can be costlier than enhancing unemployment benefits. If the shutdown is long or profit margins are low, then a wage subsidy is preferable and vice versa. The optimal mixture of policies includes a wage subsidy that covers 90$\%$ of the first $200/week of earnings and expands unemployment benefits to cover all salary up to $275/week. Low-income workers, as well as those in less productive jobs, benefit the most from a wage subsidy.

How should central banks optimally aggregate sectoral inflation rates in the presence of imperfect labor mobility across sectors? We study this issue in a two-sector New-Keynesian model and show that a lower degree of sectoral labor mobility, ceteris paribus, increases the optimal weight on inflation in a sector that would otherwise receive a lower weight. We analytically and numerically find that, with limited labor mobility, adjustment to asymmetric shocks cannot fully occur through the reallocation of labor, thus putting more pressure on wages, causing inefficient movements in relative prices, and creating scope for central bank’ s intervention. These findings challenge standard central banks’ practice of computing sectoral inflation weights based solely on sector size and unveil a significant role for the degree of sectoral labor mobility to play in the optimal computation. In an extended estimated model of the US economy, featuring customary frictions and shocks, the estimated inflation weights imply a decrease in welfare up to 10% relative to the case of optimal weights.