2004 marks the tenth anniversary of both the start of the genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR by the UN Security Council. In the past decade the ICTR has operated slowly but progressively, and it has delivered some insightful case law. Legal issues continue to arise, however, in the practice of the ICTR. This article considers some of these issues, namely the vagueness of the indictment, complicity in genocide, and the nexus requirement for war crimes. The overview shows that in various instances the ICTR has relied on pivotal case law of the ICTY. Moreover, it is demonstrated that, on occasion, the case law of the ICTR has been somewhat inconsistent. Nevertheless, the ICTR's case law is a next step in the building of a sound international criminal law system, and there will certainly be more opportunities for the ICTR to contribute. These contributions will only be worthwhile, however, if the ICTR's output continues to be of high quality.

This article explores the phenomenon of judicial dissents at the ICC. The main subject is the process of collective decision-making and judicial deliberations in cases where members of a particular ICC chamber cannot reach a consensus on factual, substantive or procedural issues and render a unanimous decision. The article examines why and when international criminal judges dissent according to the views expressed by ICC judges. Drawing heavily on field research in The Hague, the article presents a qualitative analysis of the ICC judges’ perceptions and experiences of using dissenting opinions at the Court. Empirical findings derived from interviewing ICC judges support the hypothesis that international criminal judges’ personality, that is, their character differences (such as self-discipline and other work habits), their previous career experience, and their field of expertise determine their likelihood of using judicial dissents. In case of disagreement within an ICC Chamber, judges with criminal law backgrounds who previously worked as professional judges are more likely to append their dissent to a majority ruling with which they do not agree than international judges, diplomats, and professors with public international law expertise who are more willing to discuss and negotiate in order for the Court to speak with one voice.

Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the IMF, London, Cavendish Publishing, 2001, ISBN 1859416659, 240 pp., £71.50 (pb).

Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow:The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, ISBN 1841133906, 376 pp., £42.00.00 (hb).

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, ISBN 0521016711, 360 pp., £19.99 (pb).

This article is about a relatively new version of the ‘emerging’ jus post bellum concept. It asks whether the jus post bellum as ‘integrity’ is useful as a normative guide in the interpretation of international criminal law during transitions when the requirements of international criminal law are ambiguous or unclear. It develops the main elements of the jus post bellum as integrity as an analytical framework. It then evaluates the theoretical and practical application of the concept in relation to the task of the International Criminal Court in evaluating the ‘alternative sentences’ regime in Colombia. It argues that a Dworkinian approach to international criminal law must make certain assumptions about the international legal order which are difficult to sustain. The difficulties discussed here are related to the structural conditions needed for a ‘community of principle’ to arise in Dworkin’s theory. The article demonstrates that the jus post bellum as integrity may be useful for identifying the principles of international criminal law that should apply to states in transition from conflict to peace. However, despite its usefulness, the concept is susceptible to the usual arguments against adopting ‘natural law’ constructions in international legal method (and post-conflict law).

The article scrutinizes some of the surprising commonalities in the reasonings of two recent decisions by two separate judicial forums: the ITLOS’s judgment in the M/V Norstar case and the award of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case. One key connection between the two decisions is their heavy reliance on the Lotus judgment of the PCIJ. Another similarity between the two disputes is that both of them revolve around the concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article 92(1) and adjacent questions of jurisdiction on the high seas. The article is going to subject both decisions to criticism and argue that some of the more problematic positions adopted by the tribunals in both cases amount to no more than obiter dicta – thus establishing an additional parallel with Lotus, which also received heavy criticism for its controversial obiter dictum. The two tribunals’ new-found interest in Lotus also provides an opportunity to discuss the utility and legal weight of Lotus as a precedent in the face of a century of developments in treaty law and judicial practice. In this sense, this article builds on and attempts to continue the recent trend in scholarship advocating for a renewed appreciation of the Lotus case against the backdrop of decades of criticism against it. Accordingly, the article aims to facilitate a better understanding of all three disputes, the principles they applied, and the dynamics of international adjudication and international law in general.

Understanding law as a continuous process with circular and interacting phases of selection, construction, and reception makes it possible to account for the variety of actors and resources implicated in the process of incrementally changing a norm of international law. This process is visualized through an analogy to knitting. One can start the knitting project with one needle, but to actually construct anything, more than one needle is necessary: at least two actors need to collaborate and build upon each other’s work. If those two actors neatly agree upon the pattern to be knitted, the resulting product may be uniform and dense, able to cover all situations it is intended for. However, it is not that easy to knit in exactly the same pace and pattern. The constructed law may not fit perfectly all situations it is intended for, because the different actors may have had different patterns in their head. Also, sometimes, the wool is held too tightly, and the net becomes too dense; sometimes the wool is held too loosely, and the net will have holes. With this visualization in mind, we can think of legal changes as continuously intermingling and building upon each other: international law is generally knitted with different colours of wool, each colour representing a different normative resource. Thus, ‘norm knitting’ provides for an analytical tool that makes it possible to demonstrate the variety in ‘successful’ change of a given norm in international law in response to specific challenges which the actors face.

This article explores the quest for sovereign equality by China and Japan as it unfolded in a specific historical moment, the third quarter of the nineteenth century. It does so by focusing on the debate around the ‘coolie trade’, i.e., the traffic of Chinese indentured labourers, which offered an opportunity for non-Western countries such as China and Japan to position themselves with respect to Western conceptions of ‘modernity’ or ‘civilization’ and thereby advance their quest for ‘parity with all nations’. Through a study of the Maria Luz case, decided in the early 1870s by Czar Alexander II and drafted by de Martens, the article sheds light on the different approaches of Japan and China with respect to international law at this critical historical juncture. Specifically, it shows that, although the coolie trade mostly affected China, it was Japan who first managed to reap a parity dividend by firmly condemning the practice, whereas China’s action was steered by the circumstances. Eventually, however, China’s growing interest in Chinese populations abroad paved the way for the establishment of its first permanent diplomatic representations overseas. For both countries, the events encapsulated by the Maria Luz case unveil an important, yet overlooked, moment in their quest for parity with all nations and, more generally, in their engagement with international law.

In 2017 the Leiden Journal is celebrating its 30th anniversary. Since the inception of the journal in 1988, much has changed. This includes not only the structure, lay out, organization and publisher of the journal, but also the general environment in which the journal is published. This editorial's aim is to briefly sketch the journal's life over the past 30 years and to reflect on it.

This article examines the case of Gaza Marine, a small offshore natural gas reservoir in Gaza that has remained undeveloped since its discovery in 2000. Due to the complicated political status of the Gaza Strip over the past two decades, neither the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, nor Israel could claim full rights to Gaza’s maritime zones or develop the Gaza Marine field. However, the devastating 2023 Israel-Hamas war created four possible scenarios of administration over Gaza, each with its own legal implications for the development rights of the field. These scenarios include Palestinian independence, continued Israeli occupation, international transitional administration (ITA) over Gaza, or partial Israeli annexation of Gaza. This article argues that the development of Gaza Marine is a vital part of Gaza’s postwar reconstruction and is possible under these scenarios, the most understudied of which is the ITA model. This article can thus serve as a roadmap for other postwar coastal territories with contested rights over offshore energy deposits.

The East-West detente has uncovered the importance of statehood for the international protection of peoples in international conflicts. The importance becomes obvious from a comparison between the legal position of the Kuwaitis with that of the Kurds and, more in particular, the Palestinians in that respect. The Gulf war urged the Security Council to enforce Iraq's compliance with the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. The Council has also taken the position that Israel should apply this convention de jure in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, albeit lessforcefully. This is partly due to the fact that the UN itself has caused confusion concerning the legal status of these territories. History shows that the Palestine Mandate should not be considered as indivisible in such a way that the creation of Israel automatically implied the termination of the mandate as a whole. The Palestine Mandate still exists for the area of the Arab state, defined in the General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of November 29,1947, recommending a partition plan for Palestine. Subsequent resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council imply that the Palestinian people can only claim the West Bank including East Jerusalem -hereafter referred to as the West Bank- and the Gaza Strip as its future territory. The Palestinian people appears to have resigned itself to this fact of life since its acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22,1947, and 338 of October 22,1973. In doing so it has stopped any further erosion of its claim to an independent state by virtue of its right to self-determination. Neither the Gulf war nor an international peace conference on the Middle East can alter the new situation one bit anymore. For the first time since 1947 the General Assembly is now in the position to keep the promise of self-determination towards the Palestinianpeople as well. The 1950 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the international status of South West Africa gives it a good point of departure for assuming its full responsibility for doing justice to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. Legally speaking the role of the UN in the development of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East is crucial for the future of Israel and Palestine.

Until recently, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has been an institution that one reads about, if at all, principally in the background sections of international law casebooks. This article suggests, and indeed this issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law confirms, that the level of scholarly attention to the Court is changing due to recent developments in the work of the PCA. The purpose of this article is to report and reflect on an emerging effort in the international community to restore the PCA to a prominent place in international arbitration. This article describes the impetus for this effort and the actions taken to reestablish the PCA, as well as the challenges that lie ahead in that effort.

This article deals with recent developments in the United States' refugee legislation and policies. After an examination of the relevant procedural aspects, the author discusses several concepts and criteria that play an important role in the decision whether an alien will be granted asylum in the United States. Despite recent jurisprudence, the related concepts of ‘wellfounded fear’ and ‘clear probability’ of persecution remain vague and illdefined. Thus, according to the author, it is doubtful whether the present standards of United States refugee law contribute to the protection of truly politically persecuted. Besides, the concept of ‘safe haven’ should not replace the concept of ‘firm resettlement’.

Is the concept of humanitarian intervention part and parcel of customary law? In order to answer this question the or gins of the concept, (alleged) pre- and post-Charter state practice and the relation with the principles of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction and the non-use of force will be considered. It will be concluded that the aforementioned question must be answered in the negative, notwithstanding the fact that genuine humanitarian interventions tend to be tolerated by the international community.

One year ago in this Journal Carty offered a reassessment of Schmitt's writings on international law, in an attempt to present them as a still valuable theoretical tool in a contemporary critical discourse on (neo)liberalism. Carty's proceedings, thought provoking as they may be, is unconvincing, because Schmitt's views on international law are indissolubly tied up with Nazi ideology and political purposes. Paradoxically a transfer in our time of Schmitt's Großraum concept provides a less critical argument against neoliberalism than at the best a dubious bolster to it.

After an extensive discussion of the treatment of cultural property through the ages, the author focuses on the position of art treasures under current international law. Are states under an obligation to return cultural property to its country of origin? In order to answer this question, the author introduces a ‘gliding scale’, based on the circumstances of the removal of the works of art.