1 The jus post bellum can be defined as ‘the body of laws, norms, and principles that apply during the transition from conflict to peace’, see Easterday, J., ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’, in Stahn, C., Easterday, J. and Iverson, J., (eds.), Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (2014), 379–415CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This article is focused only on the transitional criminal justice aspects of the jus post bellum.

2 See J. Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’, in Stahn, Easterday and Iverson, ibid., at 58.

3 On interpretivism and international law see Kirgis, F. L., ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’, (1987) 81 AJIL 146CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tasoulias, J., ‘In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’, (1996) 86 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roberts, A., ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law’, (2001) 95 AJIL 575CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Çali, B., ‘On Interpretivism and International Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 805CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Capps, P., ‘Lauterpacht’s Method’, (2012) 82 British Yearbook of International Law 248–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 After all, Dworkin did not write very much about international law, though see Dworkin, R., ‘A New Philosophy’, (2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1Google Scholar.

5 See generally R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (2006), Ch. 7.

6 The primary rules are exemplified by specific treaty provisions, i.e., the prohibition on the use of force in the Charter of the United Nations. Secondary rules are those rules that establish where we find the primary rules and how those change, i.e., in the sources doctrine. Of course, there are now many challengers to the ‘traditional’ approach, see Walker, N., ‘Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’, (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Bianchi, International Law Theories (2016).

7 International criminal law may be less susceptible to worries of moral relativism. Its general purpose is clear: to prevent the commission of international crimes by ensuring that the perpetrators are investigated, prosecuted, and punished. However, the body of law remains a body of ‘international’ law and so, even then, it presents special problems for a Dworkinian analysis.

8 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at vii.

9 Ibid., at 225.

10 P. Capps, supra note 3, at 248–80, highlighting the similarities between Dworkin’s ‘constructive interpretation’ and Lauterpacht’s ‘progressive interpretation’.

11 Schwartz, A., ‘Patriotism or Integrity? Constitutional Community in Divided Societies’, (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 518.

12 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 215.

13 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 503. Though see Dworkin’s doubts in that regard, supra note 5, at 208, fn. 24.

14 Ibid.

15 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS 1155.

16 C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000); J. Stromseth, D. Wippman and R. Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights – Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (2006); C. Stahn and J. K. Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (2008); Stahn, Easterday and Iverson, supra note 1.

17 I use atrocities to refer to the so-called ‘core international crimes’: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.

18 Bell, supra note 16, at 260; Bell, C., Campbell, C. and Ní Aoláin, F., ‘Justice Discourses in Transition’, (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies 305CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 306.

19 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November – 1 October 1946, Judgment, at 223 (1947), available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf (emphasis added).

20 Anonymous, ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’, (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 249.

21 When a clear ‘winner’ to the armed conflict has emerged to dictate the criminal justice aspects of transition, the potential for ‘transitional justice’ to morph into ‘victor’s justice’ is a clear and present danger, see Reydams, L., ‘The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 977–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Eltringham, N., ‘“When we Walk Out, What was it all About?”: Views on New Beginnings from within the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2014) 45 Development and Change 543–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Ambos, K., ‘Principle 19 - Duties of States with Regard to the Administration of Justice’, in Haldenamm, F. and Unger, T. (eds.), The UN Principles to Combat Impunity – A Commentary (2018), 205–16Google Scholar, at 215; see also R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000); Bell, supra note 16, at 259; V. Chetail, Post – Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon (2008), 368.

23 See the ‘Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter ‘Final Agreement’) signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016. The full text of the peace agreement is available at www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf (I will use my translations from Spanish to English throughout).

24 These are the government’s own figures, see Unidad para las Víctimas (Victims Unit), available at www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/.

25 Laplante, L. J. and Theidon, K., ‘Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de Justicia y Paz’, (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 49Google Scholar.

26 See Legislative Act No. 1 of 2012, ‘Legal Framework for Peace’, available at www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=48679. An English version of the Constitution of Colombia is available at www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf.

27 See ‘Final Agreement’, supra note 23.

28 Ibid., at 127.

29 Ibid., at 129.

30 Ibid., at 130.

31 Ibid., at 129 (emphasis added).

32 For a comprehensive description of the post-conflict legal framework see Olasolo, H. and Ramirez Mendoza, J. M. F., ‘The Colombian Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition’, (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1011–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 See ‘Final Agreement’, supra note 23, at 148.

34 Amnesty Law 1820 of 2016 (30 December 2016), No. 50.102, available at www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1820_2016.html, at 23(a).

35 See ‘Final Agreement’, supra note 23, at 176.

36 Ibid., at 165.

37 Ibid., at 176.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 See the most recent ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018’, 5 December 2018, The Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, available at www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf.

43 The Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2017) – Colombia, 4 December 2017, available at www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=2017-otp-rep-PE-Colombia, at 144.

44 Ibid., at 144.

45 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia, ‘Fe de Erratas as Comunicado’ No. 55, 14 November 2017, available at www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/No.%2055%20comunicado%2014%20de%20noviembre%20de%202017.pdf.

46 See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018, supra note 42, at 44.

47 See the ‘consolidated version’, Amnesty Law 46/1977, 15 October 1977, BOE-A-1977-24937, available at www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1977/BOE-A-1977-24937-consolidado.pdf (in Spanish, I use my own translations). The amnesty law continues to function as a ‘shield’ against the investigation and prosecution of those responsible owing to the fact that the main political parties continue to uphold its validity and vote against any proposed amendments, see www.publico.es/politica/ley-amnistia-seguira-escudo-franquista.html.

48 Igreja, V., ‘Amnesty Law, Political Struggles for Legitimacy and Violence in Mozambique’, (2015) 9 International Journal of Transitional Justice 239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 See D. Cerqueira and L. Arteaga, ‘Challenging the Amnesty Law in El Salvador: Domestic and International Alternatives to Bring an End to Impunity’, Due Process of Law Foundation, June 2016, available at www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/amnesty_law-final-24june.pdf.

50 See Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara, Decision on challenge to jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, para. 72.

51 C. Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria – What’s in a Name’, in Stahn, Easterday and Iverson, supra note 1, 181–206, at 187. See also Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador, Judgment of October 25, 2012 (Merits, reparations and costs) (25 October 2012) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 252, paras. 283–96.

52 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 45.

53 Ibid., at 167.

54 See generally Dworkin, ibid; R. Dworkin, supra note 4, at 1.

55 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 30.

56 Robinson, D., ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the ICC’, (2003) 14 EJIL 481–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 483.

57 See preamble to the Rome Statute, supra note 55, Preamble, 3–5.

58 As a matter of international law, the principle of peace is reflected in the general prohibition of the use of force between states in Art. 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, see 1945 United Nations Charter, 1 UNTS XVI. In Colombia, the principle of peace is reflected in the various rules that prevent interpersonal violence.

59 See Rome Statute, supra note 55, Art. 16.

60 Ibid., Art. 53. It now appears that a Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) can disagree with the OTP’s assessment that there is no reasonable basis to think that an investigation would not be in the ‘interests of justice’, see Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-O2/17-33, Pre-Trial Chamber II, (12 April 2019) paras. 87–96. An appeal hearing has now been scheduled for 4–6 December 2019.

61 Ibid.

62 Anonymous, supra note 20, at 249, 257.

63 See Introduction, ‘Final Agreement’, supra note 23.

64 Ibid.

65 Constitution of Colombia of 1991, available at www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/inicio/Constitucion%20politica%20de%20Colombia%20-%202015.pdf, Art. 22.

66 Ibid., Art. 95(6).

67 See UN Charter, supra note 58, Art. 1.

68 See Rome Statute, supra note 55, Art. 17(1)(a).

69 At the time of writing, the SJP has opened seven cases related to a number of different ‘situations’ including: kidnapping; the recruitment and use of child soldiers; the ‘false positives’ executions; and a number of situations in specific geographical areas. All the notifications, decisions, and sentences of the SJP are available (in Spanish) at www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/Inicio.aspx.

70 However, a close look at the numbers leaves one uncertain. In relation to so-called ‘false positive’ killings carried out by members of the Colombian armed forces, the OTP reported that Colombia has ongoing ‘investigations’ in 1,179 cases (out of which only 53 are at the trial stage). This is slow justice. However, the OTP appears content to monitor the situation from a distance for a while longer. This is, it is submitted, because the SJP has only recently begun its work.

71 See UN Charter, supra note 58, Art. 2(7).

72 A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (1966), 1.

73 Whether the SJP can function as the negotiating parties intended is a matter of continued political and legal contestation at the domestic level, see K. Ambos and S. Aboueldahab, ‘Colombia: Time for the ICC Prosecutor to Act?’, EJIL: Talk!, 2 April 2019, available at www.ejiltalk.org/colombia-time-for-the-icc-prosecutor-to-act/.

74 For the classic statement on the separation of law and morals see Hart, H. L. A., ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, in Hart, H. L. A., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1988), 49Google Scholar.

75 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 1.

76 Ibid.

77 R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011).

78 There are different ways of defining a community, this chapter is concerned with whether a Dworkinian community exists; see, for example, T. Frank, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 10: a ‘community is defined by having a corpus of rules which it deems to be legitimate and by having agreed on a process that legitimates the exercise of authority …’, at 12.

79 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 208.

80 Ibid., at 209.

81 Ibid., at 210.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., at 211.

86 Ibid., (emphasis added).

87 SJP Communication 084 of 2019, ‘Presidente Duque sanciona la Ley Estatutatia de la JEP’, available at www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/Presidente-Duque-sanciona-la-Ley-Estatutaria-de-la-JEP.aspx.

88 CNN Latinoamérica, ‘Corte Constitucional de Colombia rechaza objeciones de Duque sobre la ley estatutaria de la JEP, que significa?’, available at cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/05/30/corte-constitucional-de-colombia-rechaza-objeciones-de-duque-sobre-la-ley-estatutaria-de-la-jep-que-significa/.

89 ICRC, ‘Colombia: Five armed conflicts – What’s happening?’, 30 January 2019, available at www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-five-armed-conflicts-whats-happening.

90 T. Volckhausen, ‘Colombian land defenders: “They’re killing us one by one”’, Mongabay, 9 March 2018, available at news.mongabay.com/2018/03/colombian-land-defenders-theyre-killing-us-one-by-one/; see also Sedacca, N., ‘The “turn” to Criminal Justice in Human Rights Law: An Analysis in the Context of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement’, (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 315–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 343.

91 The term ‘sovereign state’ can be considered a pleonasm. All states, by virtue of being recognized as states, are ‘sovereigns’, see Crawford, J., ‘Sovereignty as a legal value’, in Crawford, J. and Koskenniemi, M., The Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 117CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 118.

92 A. Cassese, International Law (2005), 5.

93 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 196.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., at 197.

96 Ibid.

97 Although state consent would not function to negate the kind of principles that Dworkin refers to. It may be that states have consented to the fundamental principles of the international community, thereby, bringing the relevant norms under the ‘positivist’ international legal order. The point is that Dworkin’s principles emerge purely from the association of citizens (states).

98 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (1963), 41.

99 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 199.

100 Ibid., at 213.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., at 200.

103 Though some international organizations, such as the UN, are endowed with some legal personality, for example, in terms of immunities from suit, see 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

104 Kingsbury, B., ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, (1998) 9 EJIL 599;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Roth, B., ‘Sovereign Equality and Non-Liberal Regimes’, (2012) 43 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 25–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar

105 See Kingsbury, ibid., at 599, 600.

106 Ibid., at 600.

107 B. Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement (2011), 13. See also Chimni, B., ‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law’, (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Ibid., at 5.

109 Roth, B. ‘Sovereign Equality and “Bounded Pluralism” in the International Legal Order’, (2005) 99 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 392Google Scholar.

110 B. Çali, supra note 3, at 805.

111 Ibid., at 805, 817.

112 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 185.

113 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 503.

114 This phrasing is attributable to Professor R. Cryer.

115 Often cited as a ruling to this effect in international law is Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), PCIJ 1927 (series A) No. 10. Although, for a convincing argument that this is a misread of the case, see Guilfoyle, D., ‘SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927)’, in Bjorges, E. and Miles, C. (eds.), Landmark Cases in Public International Law (2018), 89.Google Scholar

116 Alvarez, J., ‘Interliberal Law: Comment’, (2004) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 249Google Scholar.

117 Slaughter, A., ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’, (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 240Google Scholar, 241.

118 Peters, A., ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’, (2009) 20 EJIL 513CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid., at 514. See also Robinson, D., ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’, (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 127–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis added). Robinson has proposed that international criminal law is founded on a set of liberal-cosmopolitan principles. These characterize a system of criminal law that is ‘constrained by respect for the autonomy, dignity, or agency of the individual …’, at 133.

121 J. Stewart, ‘The Role of the ICC in the Transitional Justice Processes in Colombia’, 30–31 May 2018, The Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180530-otp-stat.

122 Ibid., at 144.

123 Ibid., at 147.

124 Ibid., at 145.

125 Ibid., at 149.