This article is about a relatively new version of the ‘emerging’ jus post bellum concept. It asks whether the jus post bellum as ‘integrity’ is useful as a normative guide in the interpretation of international criminal law during transitions when the requirements of international criminal law are ambiguous or unclear. It develops the main elements of the jus post bellum as integrity as an analytical framework. It then evaluates the theoretical and practical application of the concept in relation to the task of the International Criminal Court in evaluating the ‘alternative sentences’ regime in Colombia. It argues that a Dworkinian approach to international criminal law must make certain assumptions about the international legal order which are difficult to sustain. The difficulties discussed here are related to the structural conditions needed for a ‘community of principle’ to arise in Dworkin’s theory. The article demonstrates that the jus post bellum as integrity may be useful for identifying the principles of international criminal law that should apply to states in transition from conflict to peace. However, despite its usefulness, the concept is susceptible to the usual arguments against adopting ‘natural law’ constructions in international legal method (and post-conflict law).

Over the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.

This case note focuses on two key aspects of the Vasiljević Judgement. The first one is the accused's acquittal of the charge of ‘violence to life and person’ under common Article 3 for the reason that the trial chamber was not satisfied that it constituted a crime under customary international law. The second aspect is the trial chamber's analysis of state practice to identify the definition under customary law of extermination as a crime against humanity.

The judiciary’s counter-majoritarian role in the realm of national security is of paramount importance. By and large the Israel Supreme Court has taken cognizance of this truism and has imposed significant procedural and substantive restrictions on the Israeli military authorities, relying more and more on public international law. Yet when faced with house demolition measures, it has adopted a different stance, preferring to conduct a judicial review which is devoid of any meaningful scrutiny of the measures according to international law. The article attempts to ascertain the reasons for the Court's different judicial position, by advancing, inter alia, legal, historical, socio-political, and personal reasons, reasons relating to the nature of the petitioners, as well as those pertaining to the intertwined concepts of status quo bias, omission bias, and loss aversion. The findings of the case study may be relevant to other courts, in other countries. When faced with deterrent measures that are employed at times of severe security threats and that are strongly supported by the political establishment and by the public, courts may find it difficult to perform a counter-majoritarian role and to abide by their own judicial doctrines and principles.

On December 7, 1975 Indonesian forces invaded the territory of East Timor, a Portuguese colony for some four and a half centuries. Following the 1974 Portuguese revolution, East Timor, like other Portuguese non-self-governing territories had been going through a process of self determination. Portuguese authorities evacuated the territory in August 1975 during civil disorders, condoned if not fomented by the Indonesians. The Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), a popular group which aimed at independence for the territory after a short transitional period, gained the upper hand. It declared independence on November 28, 1975, hoping this would strengthen its hand in dealing with Indonesian border incursions. A full-scale Indonesian invasion followed.

The effort to attract commercial arbitration to the Permanent Court of Arbitration [hereinafter PCA] in 1962 by introducing the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes between Two Parties of Which only One is a State [hereinafter the 1962 Rules], has met with little success. In other articles of this issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law the reasons for this failure are discussed. These articles also contain suggestions on how changes in the legal framework and the administration of the PCA may improve this situation.

After Chernobyl, the perception of a common interest in internationally organised nuclear safety measures has been evident among all governments of countries with nuclear power plants, as well as those likely to be involved in or affected by a nuclear accident. Dr. Peter D. Cameron examines the two principal developments in international lawwhich reflect this consensus: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. While representing a considerable achievement, the Conventions underline the determination of states parties not to lose control over nuclear matters at the national level.

After looking into sexual abuse in some armed conflicts that occurred in the past, this article will attempt to give reasons for the sudden interest in this long ignored crime. Subsequently, it will examine the provisions relevant to the issue of sexual abuse in various international instruments. The article will then focus on the problems in implementing international humanitarian law. Not only will it describe the weak points, it will also present some possible improvements. The article will end with a look at the position of the victim in the process of prosecuting those accused of sexual abuse. In closing, it will offer some ways to ease the difficulties a woman encounters at this stage, and take a look at how the Yugoslavia Tribunal deals with this issue.

The first indictments against high-ranking political and military leaders were issued by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on 25 July 1995. Those indicted include Radovan Karadžić, the President of the Bosnian Serb Administration of Pale;Ratko Mladić, the commander of the army of the Bosnian Serb Administration;and Milan Martic, the President of the former Croatian Serb Administration of Knin. On the same day, the defence motion challenging the jurisdiction of the ICTY to try the accused currently before it, Dusko Tadicwas argued before the Trial Chamber. On 10 August 1995, this motion was dismissed.These recent developments, amongst others, are the culmination of the Prosecution's work in confronting the immense challenges of this unique international jurisdiction. Although the task is far from complete, the achievements to date provide a stable foundation upon which to progress with confidence. This article will comment on the significance of these new developments.

Rankings and indicators have been with us for a while now, and have increasingly been objects of attention in international law. Likewise, they have been with the LJIL as a journal for a while now. Our so-called ‘impact factor’ is, to my untrained eye, the most prominent feature on the LJIL webpage hosted by our publisher. So this editorial is something of a rearguard action. The indicators and rankings, however, keep piling up. Proliferation may afford a perverse sort of optimism, about which below but, as will be clear, I do not share it. The increasing number and command of indicators and rankings reflects a consistent trend and a bleak mode of knowledge production. Knowledge production has been a topic in these pages recently, for instance Sara Kendall's excellent editorial on academic production and the politics of inclusion. I mean to continue in that vein, with respect to other aspects of the political economy of the academic production of international law, especially at a nexus of publishing, scholarship and market practices. There is an undeniable element of nostalgia in what will follow, but I do not really mean to celebrate the publishing industry, status quo ante, that has put me in this privileged position to wax nostalgic. The academic publishing business is flawed. What we are preparing the way for is worse. When I say we, I mean to flag my complicity, both as an individual researcher and as an editorial board member. I use the word complicity to convey a personal anxiety, also in my role as editor, so let me be clear: the LJIL board has no policy concerning rankings, and rankings have never influenced review at the journal. Moreover, while I cannot claim to speak for the LJIL as a whole concerning the topic of rankings or any other matter, nor is mine exactly a dissenting voice on the board. The tone of this polemic is mine alone; the concern is not.

2004 marks the tenth anniversary of both the start of the genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR by the UN Security Council. In the past decade the ICTR has operated slowly but progressively, and it has delivered some insightful case law. Legal issues continue to arise, however, in the practice of the ICTR. This article considers some of these issues, namely the vagueness of the indictment, complicity in genocide, and the nexus requirement for war crimes. The overview shows that in various instances the ICTR has relied on pivotal case law of the ICTY. Moreover, it is demonstrated that, on occasion, the case law of the ICTR has been somewhat inconsistent. Nevertheless, the ICTR's case law is a next step in the building of a sound international criminal law system, and there will certainly be more opportunities for the ICTR to contribute. These contributions will only be worthwhile, however, if the ICTR's output continues to be of high quality.

In Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, after three weeks of proximity talks, the Bosnian parties, joined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, initialled a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with twelve Annexes. Following an implementation conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995, the General Framework Agreement and its accompanying Annexes were signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. They came into force upon signature.

There is a broad political consensus that states must not facilitate money laundering, especially as relates to the proceeds of foreign grand corruption. Over the past 30 years, an elaborate regulatory regime has been put in place in most countries to ensure that proceeds of crime are interdicted and confiscated. It rests on the technically non-binding recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, an influential intergovernmental grouping. Despite this progress and the adoption of international treaties against corruption and organized crime, international law contains no express treaty rule that enjoins states from facilitating money laundering. Furthermore, there are formidable legal and practical obstacles to invoking international legal responsibility of states that do choose to benefit from enabling money laundering. This article explores the disconnect between international law as it stands and the widely accepted political imperative that states must not facilitate money laundering. It argues in favour of recognizing a self-standing customary rule to that effect, and outlines the content and likely impact of such a rule.

This article shows how the political, historical, sociological, and economic narrative of Ibn Khaldun influenced the conjunction of elements that were essential to the civilizing language promoted by European and American liberals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The ‘standard of civilization’ has experienced a revival among critical legal scholars. These authors have reconstructed a historical process of ‘rise, fall, and rise’ of the ‘standard of civilization’, identifying its reappearance in an era of globalization and global governance with the current existence of a (neo-)colonial paradigm in international law and a (neo-)liberal global economy. This study is divided into three parts intended to examine in depth the precursory role of this Islamic thinker in the shaping of civilizing language. The first part examines Ibn Khaldun's life as a way of understanding his thinking on civilization. The second part explores the influence of Ibn Khaldun's work on the discourse surrounding the standard of civilization, by reintroducing the interpretation of Rafael Altamira (1866–1951). The third starts with Ibn Khaldun's writings on economic science and Joseph Spengler's (1902–1991) approach to his works. Several Islamic economic institutions and their influence on the state and concept of international society are examined. The revival of Ibn Khaldun's thinking is partly intended to fill an existing gap in the studies of medieval Islamic theorists. By examining his ideas about the socio-political and economic viability of a dynasty (or a civilization or a state), this article attempts to shed light on the intercultural origins of international law.

On 22 July 2009 a Tribunal of five leading international lawyers rendered their award at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), thereby redrawing the boundaries of Abyei, a small patch of land in the centre of Sudan and source of violent conflict throughout recent years. The arbitration was initiated by the two signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that in 2005 brought an end to the longest civil war in Africa. Both parties, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, expressed satisfaction with the award, which conceivably saved the CPA from potential collapse. This article examines the legal oddities which accompanied the settlement of the dispute over the Abyei area. It analyses both the referral of the dispute to the PCA through the lens of the Sudanese Constitution and the legal ambiguities of the award itself.

The thematic horizon within which this article takes place is the colonial expansion of the Western powers in China between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Focusing on the foundation of the British, French and American concessions in Tianjin, it aims to reconstruct the Western strategies of colonial governance and the role played by law in the process of production of a new social space. Opened as a treaty port in 1860, Tianjin is the only Chinese city where up to nine foreign concessions coexisted, becoming a complex, hybrid space (in)between East and West, defined by social practices, symbolic representations, and legal categories, which does not coincide simply with the area defined by the entity as a state, nation, or city.

The article scrutinizes some of the surprising commonalities in the reasonings of two recent decisions by two separate judicial forums: the ITLOS’s judgment in the M/V Norstar case and the award of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case. One key connection between the two decisions is their heavy reliance on the Lotus judgment of the PCIJ. Another similarity between the two disputes is that both of them revolve around the concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article 92(1) and adjacent questions of jurisdiction on the high seas. The article is going to subject both decisions to criticism and argue that some of the more problematic positions adopted by the tribunals in both cases amount to no more than obiter dicta – thus establishing an additional parallel with Lotus, which also received heavy criticism for its controversial obiter dictum. The two tribunals’ new-found interest in Lotus also provides an opportunity to discuss the utility and legal weight of Lotus as a precedent in the face of a century of developments in treaty law and judicial practice. In this sense, this article builds on and attempts to continue the recent trend in scholarship advocating for a renewed appreciation of the Lotus case against the backdrop of decades of criticism against it. Accordingly, the article aims to facilitate a better understanding of all three disputes, the principles they applied, and the dynamics of international adjudication and international law in general.

Next year, the ‘discovery’ of America by Columbus, 500 years ago, will be commemorated. The discovery of America started a time of colonization for the original inhabitants, the Indians. Since the 1970s an Indian movement has emerged in North America demanding the Indians' ‘rightful place among the family of nations’. This article contains a survey of the current international legal position of Indians in North America. Wiemers holds that international legal principles, developed in the decolonization context, are applicable to the North American Indian population. The right of a people to selfdetermination is the most discussed one.