As the most serious war crimes (grave breaches) should not be left unpunished, the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain an unusually worded obligation to either prosecute such a suspected war criminal or to hand him over to another country to be tried there (aut judicare aut dedere in stead of aut dedere aut judicare). Fifty years on, less than one in six of the parties to the Conventions have established universal jurisdiction over grave breaches which is necessary to prosecute a suspect if he was to be found in their country. An assessment and classification of the Conventions, national laws, prosecutions and practical obstacles. But if, what God forbid, these Conventions should ever have to be applied, they must be obeyed.M.W. Mouton, Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 16 July 1949

The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) up to the Lubanga judgment showed definite interpretive trends on the modes of principal liability. This article aims first to make a critical assessment of these trends by focusing on methodological and substantive aspects. On the one hand, the practice of having resort to theories derived from Continental legal systems, albeit legitimate, is based on a methodology that raises some concerns as to the selection and (mis)interpretation of such theories. On the other hand, the Court has clearly adopted a wide interpretation of some critical elements in which the different modes of principal liability are grounded. This choice has caused a significant expansion of the scope of principal liability as well as a breach of the principles of legality and of individual criminal responsibility. In our opinion, the underpinning of these interpretations is a flawed understanding of the criteria for distinguishing between principals and accessories.

This perspective has been overturned by the Katanga judgment, on which the second part of this article will focus. This judgment correctly argues that the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices is grounded only on the autonomous or vicarious character of their contribution to the offence. Furthermore, it follows a partly different approach as to both the methodology and the interpretation of the constitutive elements of principal liability. In our view, this approach better fits both the relevant statutory provision and the basic principles of criminal law.

The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, set up pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, is an important contribution to the evolving law of genocide. The Commission concluded that genocide had not been committed, but that the case should be referred to the International Criminal Court for prosecution as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Commission did not find significant evidence of genocidal intent. It looked essentially for a plan or policy of the Sudanese state and, in its absence, concluded that genocide was not being committed. The Commission endorsed the ‘stable and permanent groups’ approach taken by one trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). On this point, it exaggerated the acceptance of this interpretation, which has been ignored by other trial chambers of the international tribunals. However, the Commission found that the better approach to determination of the groups covered by the Convention is subjective, and that the targeted tribes in Darfur meet this criterion.

Taking Edward Said's ‘orientalist’ thesis as a starting point, this piece considers the manner in which the ‘Orient’ has been transformed by the West into a zone wherein the dictates of international law need not hold. By giving voice to a number of cases – the regime of the Suez Canal, the creation of the state of Israel, aggression during the Lebanese and two gulf wars, UN-imposed Iraqi sanctions, and states of emergency in Syria and Egypt – it becomes evident that international law has been utilized in an instrumental manner. The outcome is a region which has been treated as the underclass of the international community, wherein international law has been, in fundamental instances, interpreted arbitrarily, applied selectively, and enforced punitively.

During the Interlaeken and Brighton conferences in 2010 and 2012 on the reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) the High Contracting Parties demanded an increased focus of the Court on subsidiarity when considering cases. The ECtHR had been criticized by several states, in particular the United Kingdom (UK), for second-guessing domestic decisions of the democratically elected legislator. A procedural rationality approach could answer this critique. This approach implies that the Court takes the quality of the decision-making procedure as a decisive factor for its assessment of the proportionality of a domestic measure. In several recent high-profile cases the Court has adopted such approach providing the defending state with a wide margin of appreciation due to the high quality of the decision-making procedure. This contribution discusses to what extent the Court has applied this approach pre- and post-Brighton and the potential pitfalls. The contribution concludes that this approach could provide a vital leeway between the Court's supervisory and subsidiary role in the protection of human rights if applied coherently and consistently. However, it is no magic solution to silence the criticism against the Court as the opponents of the Court do not just reject its approach to proportionality review, but judicial review of legislative decisions altogether.

The goal of this article is to initiate an interdisciplinary and historical reflection on one of the central preoccupations of our time: the relationship of religion to international order. This current project grows out of my long-standing work on the genealogy of modern internationalism. In my past work, I have argued that internationalists constructed their own disciplines in tandem with their construction of nationalism, to such an extent that modern ‘internationalism’ and modern ‘nationalism’ must be understood in relation to each other; in the present essay, I contend that ‘internationalism’ and ‘religion’ have an equally mutually constitutive relationship. This article seeks to retell the story of international law over the past century through the lens of its relationship to religion – a lens that both overlaps with and differs from that of nationalism. Its historical narrative is rooted in the early twentieth century – a period to which so many of our ‘modern’ cultural conceptions may be traced. Its methodology is broadly interdisciplinary, setting changing international legal conceptions of religion in relation to contemporaneous developments in domains such as sociology, religious studies, and historiography. This is the first piece of a series of projected studies on the construction and contestation of ‘religion’, ‘the secular’, and ‘the international’ over the past century. It is also my first publication associated with the interdisciplinary Religion and Internationalism Project, which I co-direct at Brown University.

Paragraph 80 of the Kosovo AO reflects a very traditional conception of international law. By insisting on the inter-state character of the principle of territorial integrity, the Court refused to challenge the classical argument of the ‘neutrality’ of international law in regard to secession. The Court also refused any reinterpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As already stated in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the prohibition of the use of force is only applicable between states. It does not apply between states and non-state actors, whether secessionist or not. Similarly, the Court refused the argument of ‘remedial secession’, at least as far as it would imply a right to violate the principle of territorial integrity of a state by a secessionist group. Indeed, if the latter principle is not applicable in such situations, it logically cannot be violated and there is therefore no right to infringe it. Finally, the Court refused to consider Kosovo as a ‘special case’ or a sui generis situation. According to the Court, this situation must be governed by the traditional rules of general international law. This implies that Kosovo did not violate international law by proclaiming independence. But this also implies that a declaration of independence by a secessionist group inside Kosovo would not be contrary to international law. Moreover, it can be pointed out that if Kosovo is not a state (a hypothesis perfectly compatible with the advisory opinion), then general international law would not preclude Serbia from invoking the argument of ‘legal neutrality’ to support such a secessionist group.

On 11 June 2010, the first Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted Resolution RC/Res. 6 on the ‘Crime of Aggression’ by consensus, after years of debates and negotiations in the framework of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court and the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. The resolution includes a definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions under which the Court could exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crime, while making the actual exercise of jurisdiction ‘subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017’ by states parties. This outcome has triggered a broad variety of reactions. The UN praised it as a ‘historic agreement’ and a significant step towards a new ‘age of accountability’. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed concerns that the compromise deepens the gaps between states and leaves accountability loopholes. US legal advisor Harold Koh qualified the compromise as an opportunity for further constructive dialogue and positive engagement with the ICC.

This article explores the conditions and modalities under which a state can incur responsibility in relation to violations of international law involving military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. While the question of how to attribute and allocate responsibility for wrongful conduct is one of the central contemporary challenges of AI, the perspective of state responsibility under international law remains relatively underexplored. Moreover, most scholarly and policy debates have focused on questions raised by autonomous weapons systems (AWS), without paying significant attention to issues raised by other potential applications of AI in the military domain. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of state responsibility in relation to military AI. It discusses state responsibility for the wrongful use of AI-enabled military technologies and the question of attribution of conduct, as well as state responsibility prior to deployment, for failure to ensure compliance of AI systems with international law at the stages of development or acquisition. Further, it analyses derived state responsibility, which may arise in relation to the conduct of other states or private actors.

Fragmentation of international law is a phenomenon that has been discussed ever since the ILC in 2000 decided to add to its programme of work the topic ‘Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of international law’. Koskenniemi, in a paper published in this journal, was one of the first to address fragmentation in legal literature. In 2006, he finalized a voluminous report on ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, providing for means and ways to cope with fragmentation.

This is a study of three authoritative instruments that promote a common idea: economic activities and development should be conducted with respect for human rights. The World Bank Framework, the International Financial Corporation Performance Standards and the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights are examined to get clarity on how human rights risk management differs from more conventional management approaches. The focus here is on prevention of human rights impacts. Do the three instruments employ approaches adequate for handling human rights risks? To understand prevention, one needs to reflect on what makes human rights a particular type of impact and account for the regulatory context of protecting human rights transnationally. The analysis identifies four ‘offsets’ through which economic decision-makers can distort their human rights performance and place causal observers at a disadvantage. Prevention becomes an issue of how to relate to ‘residual impacts’ on human rights. This article finds that the ‘hierarchy or mitigation’ and even ‘human rights due diligence’ under illuminate the challenge. The proposal here is to add ‘reduction at source’ as a parameter of human rights risk management. The sources for this analysis are the three instruments, and the practice of implementing organizations, particularly IFC projects, CAO cases, impact assessments, and CSR reports. In conclusion, the potential for cross-fertilization among instruments is genuine. Increased clarity on prevention of human rights impacts should assist economic decision-makers in their risk management task and casual observers in assessing their performance.

This article considers fairness in international environmental law (IEL) in light of the convergence of two contemporary phenomena: the rise of social movements and the increasing power of large developing countries. These two trends will be determinative for the future of IEL. They have brought issues of fairness, equity, and justice to the forefront of contemporary IEL debates. Despite inability to adequately address issues of fairness at the international level, as demonstrated by negotiating gridlock at international summits, IEL can evolve in more equitable directions through the influence of subaltern experiences. This article examines domestic law-reform efforts of Indian social movements, focusing particularly on indigenous movements responding to extractive industries, with a view to determining international implications. The way states such as India address environment-related conflict, respond to demands for fairness, and evolve domestic understandings of inclusive and sustainable law and development will increasingly shape IEL.

This article considers the contribution of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) to the development of the rules and principles of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’). In recent times, the contribution of the Court to this body of the law has been overshadowed by the work of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, established by the Security Council to punish those responsible for serious breaches of IHL. Nevertheless, the ICJ, in both its contentious and advisory jurisdictions, has considered the provisions of IHL on a number of occasions, and in the process has clarified many areas of IHL. This article is concerned with one particular issue: how does the Court perceive the fundamental nature of IHL? The analysis adopts two themes. First, an assessment is made of the part played by the Court in the process of bringing IHL into conformity with the changing emphasis of general international law. In both the Nicaragua case and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the Court continued the process of what has been referred to as the “humanization of international law.” Second, the approach of the Court to the vexed issue of the relationship between ius ad bellum and IHL is considered. The conclusion is reached that the approach of the Court to this latter issue has undermined its contribution to infusing the humanitarian ethos into IHL.

This article considers the initiative of UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) in criminalizing incitement to terrorist acts, in the light of criminal and international human rights law. The analysis is informed by the specific type of terrorism with which Resolution 1624 (2005) is concerned, namely ‘modern’ terrorism. The article argues that the rationales for a prohibition on incitement to terrorist acts call for a relatively wide definition of potentially proscribed speech. This can be achieved without excessively infringing freedom of expression. However, the present interpretation of the proposed prohibition is so restrictive that the prohibition may fail to counter the phenomenon with which it grapples. The article also considers whether incitement to terrorist acts can be regarded as an international crime. It concludes that in some instances there may be an overlap between incitement to terrorist acts and certain international crimes, but classification of incitement to terrorist acts as an international crime requires a fragmented approach to terrorism, which is contrary to current trends.

More than 20 years on from the signing of the Rome Statute, delivering victim-centred justice through reparations has been fraught with legal and practical challenges. The Court’s jurisprudence on reparations only began to emerge from 2012 and struggles to find purchase on implementation on the ground. In its first few cases of Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi the eligibility and forms of reparations have been limited to certain victims, subject to years of litigation, and faced difficulties in delivery due to ongoing insecurity. This is perhaps felt most acutely in the Bemba case, where more than 5,000 victims of murder, rape and pillage were waiting for redress, and the defendant was not indigent, but where he was later acquitted on appeal, thereby extinguishing reparation proceedings. This article critically appraises the jurisprudence and practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on reparations. It looks at competing principles and rationales for reparations at the Court in light of comparative practice in international human rights law and transitional justice processes to consider what is needed to ensure that the ICC is able to deliver on its reparations mandate. An underpinning argument is that reparations at the ICC cannot be seen in isolation from other reparation practices in the states where the Court operates. Reparative complementarity for victims of international crimes is essential to maximize the positive impact that the fulfilment of this right can have on victims and not to sacrifice the legitimacy of the Court, nor quixotically strive for the impossible.

International humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the application of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups. It examines the principal arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law's detention-related provisions. On the basis of current understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although, perhaps, problematic from certain states’ perspective, this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are identified: implicit detention authority may be (i) rejected; (ii) accepted; or (iii) re-examined in light of the non-state status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of international humanitarian law, and state sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the non-state status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of imposed obligations.

In the previous editorial, Larissa van den Herik and Jean d'Aspremont referred to LJIL's ‘special plural identity’. On the one hand, this plurality shows in its table of contents; on the other hand, the plural identity is equally – if not even more – treasured in terms of appreciating the plurality of voices within the legal discipline, as the editors-in-chief also highlight. Diversity and heterogeneity are an asset for academic debate, and LJIL as such seeks to provide a forum for scholars from different ‘paradigms’. The appreciation of diversity and plurality is also reflected in the interest of LJIL to look beyond the confines of the legal discipline itself and engage with external perspectives to foster discussions about international law. It is in light of this open-mindedness and the wish to reach out to non-legal audiences, and to the international relations community in particular, that I was invited to join the LJIL team some years ago. Whereas there is a growing audience of IR scholars genuinely interested in (theorizing) international law, LJIL is not very well known as a journal with that profile for its International Legal Theory section. As a leading scholar in IR once remarked: ‘LJIL is the best kept secret in IR’. So when the request came for me to write an editorial, it seemed only apt to reflect upon some of the perils and promises of interdisciplinarity from my experience as an IR scholar within the LJIL editorial board.

Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.

It is commonly agreed that international criminal law (ICL) is a ‘hybrid’ legal culture, which mixes the legal traditions of the common law and civil law. However, the precise nature of this legal culture remains a contentious legal and theoretical issue. The paper identifies the two dominant models of ICL within these debates as either a clash of cultures or a sui generis system, and shows how neither satisfactorily engages with the concept of legal culture itself. To address this problem, the paper develops a new account of ICL as a global legal culture. The paper first identifies the distinctive ‘cultural logic’ of ICL, drawing on the example of recent developments in sexual violence offences. It then examines how ICL takes a global legal form, which ‘globalizes’ liberal legal culture. Finally, the paper shows how this process of making the legal culture of ICL ‘global’ creates its cultural contradictions, but also enables the possibility of making a new legal culture at the international level.