This article discusses the normative essence of the principle of non-appropriation in outer space as envisaged in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as its standing under customary international law. The analysis is structured with reference to the general public international law framework that governs the acquisition of territory by states, following the territorially based paradigm still prevalent in international law theory in stressing that the non-appropriation principle is indeed a norm of most increased significance within the corpus juris spatialis, i.e. the Grundnorm of international space law.

In much international legal scholarship, Iraq stands for what lies beyond the UN Charter – a world in which international institutions have proved unable to challenge the pragmatists of the new American empire, or one in which international institutions must be remade to suit the interests of the only state capable of acting as the sovereign enforcer of the law. Yet this sense of a crisis of legal authority is not novel for international law – rather, it pervades the discipline. Seen in this light, the inability of the United Nations either to prevent the use of force against Iraq, or to develop an effective multilateral response to terrorism, is simply another manifestation of that crisis, another moment in which international law is called upon to renew itself and reassert its relevance. International law is thus a useful site to explore modern responses to the pervasive uneasiness about legal authority and its legitimacy. Attention to anxious representations about what lies ‘beyond’ the law allows an exploration of the nature of the crises of legal authority that haunt modernity, and have returned again so traumatically in this time of terror. International law is also a continuing source of extremely productive responses to that crisis of authority. These responses include conventional attempts to find a new sovereign ground for the law, whether that be in the form of international organizations or of powerful national sovereigns who stand outside the law and guarantee its operation. But international law is also a source of much more surprising and radical responses to the sense of anxiety produced by that crisis. This article develops these arguments through engaging with readings by Jacques Derrida and Shoshana Felman of Sigmund Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Beyond was written at a time of some crisis for the new discipline of psychoanalysis and for Freud, its sovereign. At stake was the relevance of the discipline, its lack of mastery over its own knowledge, and questions of its proper heirs. All of these issues are at stake for the discipline of international law today.

The chief aim of this article is to unearth, explicate, and contextualize the various techniques on which Mahmut Esat, Turkey's agent before the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, drew in order to narrate a fresh understanding of Turkish ‘nationhood’ during a period of intense vulnerability for the newly established Republic. The argument advanced by Turkey in this case – that it need not demonstrate the existence of a specific jurisdictional exception in international law in order to proceed with its prosecution of the French captain of the Lotus, a French vessel – has often been dismissed as an example of cynical apologetics. Nevertheless, a close reading of Turkey's pleadings reveals that it was inclined to oscillate between a variety of universalistic and particularistic approaches, Esat litigating the Lotus with an eye to exploiting the schism that lies at the heart of the concept of ‘civilization’ so as to submit Turkey to the normative authority of the international legal system while bolstering its positive power as an independent sovereign state. More specifically, it was by merging two modes of reasoning – the one prizing systematicity, the other prioritizing sovereignty – that Esat sought to construct a new, robustly reconciliatory identity for the ‘Turkish nation’, one that would enable it to embrace its commitment to international order by securing its place in ‘la civilisation contemporaine’ while amplifying the ambit of its autonomy as ‘un état civilisé’.

On 31 May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled in a sweeping but brief decision that the Court had jurisdiction over Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia at the time of his indictment. The judges reached this conclusion finding that the accused could not invoke immunities ratione personae before this institution, an international criminal court. As this article demonstrates, the Chamber's argumentation lacks specificity and displays confusion over certain issues related to UN law, the law of international institutions and international immunities. The factual outcome is a welcome one, facilitating the prosecution of international crimes. Yet, the Appeals Chamber's approach is regrettable, especially if one considers that the same result could have been reached through less controversial avenues, without endangering the credibility of the Court and thereby the idea of international criminal justice through internationalized criminal courts.

The New Stream of critical international legal theory has been a welcome corrective to theory-blindness in international law, but it is limited by its philosophical idealism. The materialist philosophy of Marxism, by reference to political–economic contexts and conflicts, can better explain many of the New Stream's insights. The pioneering jurisprudence of Evgenii Pashukanis shows that many ‘traditional’ Marxist theories of law are limited and limiting. A reformulation of Pashukanis's ‘commodity-form’ theory shows that contra claims that the rule of law is characterized by peaceful coexistence, the unequal political violence of imperialism is intrinsic to the international system and to international law.

The African Union marks a new era in institution-building in postcolonial Africa. It is conceived as an aspect of Africa's response to the challenges of globalization and regional integration. It is also part of the historic quest for deeper African unity. This discussion focuses on the political and contextual dynamics behind this development, and assesses its significance for the project of African integration. While offering no extensive examination of all the core provisions of the Constitutive Act, particular attention has been paid to some key principles. It is argued that the African Union represents a significant departure from the political, legal, and institutional framework of the OAU, and is predicated on a range of principles that reflect new thinking and approaches among the African states.

This article argues that a contemporary form of ‘cosmopolitan legality’ serves as an animating force behind contemporary practices of global civil society and global governance. The first part provides an account of the recent history of civil society engagement with the World Trade Organization. It observes that civil society groups have focused their collective efforts on issues relating to procedural legitimacy, including accountability, openness, and transparency, potentially to the detriment of efforts to bring about more fundamental change. In the second part of the article, various theoretical approaches to cosmopolitan legality are discussed, including their claimed Kantian origins, and are mapped on to the preceding discussion of the place of a global public sphere in global governance. Programmatic approaches that purport to mobilize cosmopolitanism in the service of either a political or legal project are ultimately rejected, and a provisional alternative reading is suggested.

This contribution examines the problem of review of targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council in the light of recent developments occurring in the EU context. Some recent judgments of the European Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) are analysed, as rendered in the cases of Yusuf and Kadi and also in the more recent cases of the Mujaheddeen and Sison. These last two judgments show that flaws in the targeted sanctions regimes exist not only at UN level. The CFI also does not substantively review the listing when this listing is carried out by the Council of the EU. An examination of the progress made at UN level to address procedural flaws shows that, more than anything else, the real stumbling-block is the lack of a substantive review of intelligence information by an independent and impartial organ. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we are on the way towards a better de-listing procedure, but are not there yet.

Four discrete issues demonstrate how complex the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court will be following the amendments approved in Kampala in June 2010. First, the absence of an explicit magnitude, or gravity, requirement for determining an act of aggression ignores the reality of how matters are referred to the ICC as well as how one first determines the existence of aggression. The gravity test of a crime of aggression is insufficient and misleading in arriving at a methodology for a logical determination of both acts and crimes of aggression. An agreed understanding in Kampala to resolve the dilemma is fraught with contradictions. Second, the amendments fail to address how the ICC should respond to a Security Council determination that an act of aggression has not occurred. Third, the lingering debate over how the Rome Statute should have been amended to activate the crime of aggression will burden the Assembly of States Parties, which should focus on arriving at a united interpretation of the procedures used to approve the Kampala amendments. Fourth, given the many permutations of how states will fall within or outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court regarding the crime of aggression, the resulting patchy landscape of coverage should surprise no one.

The difficulty in identifying the contours of the international regulation of the use of force is not merely the product of the highly politicized character of this area of international law, let alone of the divide between theory and practice. This paper submits that the problem rather lies in the fact that the interpretive community that produces the official discourse on the use of force is no longer able to agree on the way in which legal categories and interpretive techniques should be used to identify the applicable law. A reflexive consideration, by all actors involved, of the method by which the discourse on the use of force is formed seems to be necessary in order to establish or restore, within that interpretive community, the societal consensus needed to provide the international community with a common understanding of the extant regulatory framework and its scope of application.

The article explores the political context of the Bosnian Genocide case recently decided by the International Court of Justice. It strives to show that an appreciation of the larger disputes within Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is necessary for understanding the Court's judgment properly, particularly when it comes to the litigation strategies of the two parties which shaped the final outcome of the case, and, above all, for understanding how the judgment was perceived by the general public of the former Yugoslavia.

To help states parties circumvent domestic prohibitions on, inter alia, the extradition of nationals, the ICC Statute formally distinguishes ‘surrender’ of individuals to the Court from interstate ‘extradition’. The European Arrest Warrant contains a similar solution. As (successful) constitutional challenges by nationals to be surrendered under a European arrest warrant indicate, such a (semantic) distinction may not suffice. Despite considerable differences between surrender within the EU and to the ICC, these cases offer useful guidance to domestic legislatures occupied with implementing obligations arising under the ICC Statute so that they can ensure that ICC requests concerning the surrender of nationals can be honoured.

The legal argument of intervention by invitation has been used by all 11 states intervening in Iraq (nine members of the US-led coalition, Russia, and Iran), by Egypt for its airstrikes against ISIL in Libya, and by Iran and Russia for their interventions in Syria. To the extent that these consensual military interventions targeted ISIL and other UN-designated terrorist groups, their legality has not been challenged by any state. Strong criticisms marked nonetheless military operations undertaken by invitation, but not targeting ‘terrorist groups’, such as the alleged Russian strikes against the ‘Syrian moderate opposition’. The arguments advanced by intervening states seem to confirm the purpose-based approach of intervention by invitation. They did not claim a ‘right to intervene in a civil war’, but relied on the existence of both a request by the government and a legitimate purpose: fighting ISIL and other terrorist groups. The different reactions also show unwillingness by the international community to recognize a general right of intervention in a civil war. Turning to the strikes of the US-led coalition in Syria, it is impossible to rely on the legal basis of ‘intervention by invitation’. The controversial theory of ‘passive consent’ could be used to some extent – but not after September 2015 when Syria denounced these strikes as a ‘flagrant violation’ of its sovereignty. The current efforts of the international community to find consensual solutions to the dramatic conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq could offer new possibilities of consensual interventions against ISIL and other terrorist groups.

This article examines the law of self-defence as applied to non-state attacks in light of the coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. It critiques the two current interpretations of the law of self-defence – one based on attribution and the other on the ‘unable or unwilling’ test – for failing to address adequately the security threat posed by non-state actors or for not addressing convincingly the legal issues arising from the fact that the self-defence action unfolds on the territory of another state. For this reason, it proposes an alternative framework which combines the primary rule of self-defence to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors, with the secondary rule of self-defence to excuse the incidental breach of the territorial state's sovereignty.

This article reassesses how members of the UN Security Council exercise influence over the Council’s decision-making process, with particular focus on the ten elected members (the E10). A common understanding of Security Council dynamics accords predominance to the five permanent members (the P5), suggesting bleak prospects for the Council as a forum that promotes the voices and representation of the 188 non-permanent members. The assumption is that real power rests with the P5, while the E10 are there to make up the numbers. By articulating a richer account of Council dynamics, this article contests the conventional wisdom that P5 centrality crowds out space for the E10 to influence Council decision-making. It also shows that opportunities for influencing Council decision-making go beyond stints of elected membership. It argues that the assumed centrality of the P5 on the Council thus needs to be qualified and re-evaluated.

Judges are at the very centre of Anne-Marie Slaughter's influential liberal theory of international law. More than a century after liberal internationalists were making bold plans for a permanent international court, Slaughter's theory offers an alternative liberal account of the constitution of a global community of law. For Slaughter, domestic courts are responsible for enforcing a ‘new’ transnational legal order established by the interactions between citizens, corporations, and governmental agencies of increasingly disaggregated and porous states. This article challenges the role of adjudication in Slaughter's theory by unpacking the normativity inherent in her ostensibly descriptive liberalism, and identifying problems with the values and commitments at its foundation.

The MOX Plant award, rendered on 3 July 2003, contributes to elucidation of the right of access to environmental information under the OSPAR Convention. However, the ‘self-contained’ vision of the OSPAR Convention embraced by the majority on the panel – rejecting in effect the relevance of competing international environmental regimes and dispute settlement procedures – deserves criticism. First of all, it leads to the establishment of a more limited right of access to environmental information under the OSPAR Convention than is recognized under other arrangements. It also represents an approach which might exacerbate the fragmentation of an increasingly complex body of international law.

This article considers the relationship between the United Nations and its member states in view of the Security Council's assertion of legislative powers. It claims that the exponential growth in UN powers at the expense of the powers of its member states cannot be arrested by legal means, because of the nature of the UN system and the absence of legally enforceable criteria and compulsory dispute-settlement mechanisms. For this reason, it proposes a different approach to law-making in the area of international peace and security – one that is built around the principle of subsidiarity, as reflected in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. The role of the principle of subsidiarity in this respect is to determine which authority is best suited to exercise legislative power and how such power should be exercised in order to attain the objective of peace and security more efficiently. It is thus contended that the principle of subsidiarity promotes co-operative relations between the United Nations and its member states by protecting the latters' jurisdictional authority from unnecessary interference.

As the glow that accompanied the kinetic judicialization of the field of international criminal justice has faded over time, scholars have increasingly turned to expressivist strands of thought to justify, assess, and critique the practices of international criminal courts. This expressive turn has been characterized by a heightened concern for the pedagogical value and legitimating qualities of international criminal courts. This article develops a unique typology of expressivist perspectives within the field of international criminal justice, distinguishing between three strands of expressivism: instrumental expressivism, which concerns the justification of different practices of international criminal courts in terms of the instrumental value of their expressive qualities; interpretive expressivism, which concerns the identification of expressive avenues for improving the sociological legitimacy of international criminal courts; and critical expressivism, which concerns the illumination of the expressive limits of international criminal courts, as well as unveiling the configurations of power that underpin the messages and narratives constructed within such courts in different institutional contexts. Reflecting on the limitations of these perspectives, the article elaborates a nascent strand of expressivism – strategic expressivism – which concerns whether and how different actors in the field may harness the expressive power of international criminal justice in line with their strategic social and political agendas.

This article seeks to show that both the conceptualization and practice of international human rights education within the mainstream human rights community has been shaped and framed, with mostly negative consequences, by at least three constitutive orthodoxies: a heaven-hell binary distinction between an all but “perfect” West and an all but “hellish” Third World; a consequent unidirectional traffic of human rights teaching from the West to the rest; and a reliance on the abolitionist paradigm of human rights education. It starts by mapping these orthodoxies, and proceeds thereafter to challenge them as fundamentally problematic and as capable of frustrating the project of progressive human rights education. The article ends by offering an insight into the ways in which international human rights education might be re-imagined if it is to have a better chance of achieving its ordinarily laudable mission.