This paper was written at the request of the LJIL editorial board as a reply to the article by Karemaker, Taylor, and Pittman published in the previous issue. It is argued that their position starts from incorrect assumptions and that their overall assessment of proofing is flawed, especially with regard to the risks for fair trial. As to the law of the international tribunals it is acknowledged, however, that there is a structural and normative difference between the ICTY (as the most important ad hoc tribunal) and the ICC. While the former still follows, despite some normative changes, a predominantly adversarial procedure, the ICC Statute provides for a mixed adversarial–inquisitorial procedure. Such a procedural model is not compatible with the adversarial origins of witness proofing and it is therefore not surprising that the ICC Statute does not provide for this technique. As a consequence, at the ICC proofing is neither legally admissible nor necessary.

This article introduces some quantitative and qualitative analysis on the use of written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony at trial to assess in practice the impact of the rules on the admissibility of written witness testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. It traces pieces of evidence admitted under the newer, more liberal, rules on written witness testimony from admissibility to judgment, to establish what impact, if any, these rules have had in practice and whether the critique that such rules might jeopardize fair-trial standards has been realized. The analysis illustrates that the newer rules on admissibility are used with relative infrequency in some tribunals, but that the admission of such statements could raise the question of equality of arms in others, given that the more liberal rules on written statements tend to be used more frequently by the prosecution than by the defence. It will be shown that some chambers have continued to emphasize the importance of oral testimony and have taken a very cautious approach when weighing written testimony, whilst others have suggested that written testimony that was not subject to full cross-examination should not, in principle, be given less weight than oral testimony. The ‘totality of the evidence’ approach in weighing the evidence will be analysed from a practical standpoint, and it will be shown that recent Appeals Chamber jurisprudence suggests that trial chambers may need to take a more particularized approach to pieces of evidence in the future.

Traditional rules of international law do not recognize a positive right of revolution, nor a prohibition thereof as the relevant rules merely place the legality of revolutions in their effectiveness. However, the recent upsurge in democratically inspired revolutions has provided high currency to proposals that seek to re-evaluate the position of international law towards revolutions. Proponents of the theory of democratic revolution have sought to establish the legality of revolutions on an elevated normative ground using the lofty ideals of human rights and democratic governance and ultimately suggesting the existence of a positive right of democratic revolution under international law. Focusing on the Arab spring and the normative framework of the African Union, this article argues that the existing (emerging) human rights and democratic norms do not necessarily provide any distinct normative justifications for democratic revolutions beyond the legality that could be possibly established on the basis of traditional norms of international law. While the study recognizes emerging norms that represent a shift away from the effectiveness doctrine, it is observed that the pro-revolutionary implications of the norms are not as obvious as their importance as an (anti-revolutionary) injunction against the forcible ouster of democratically elected governments. The article concludes with the observation that the premium placed on democratic elections in the various normative instruments underscores the centrality of elections – and, alas, not revolutions – as the primary means through which the people's constitutive power (pouvoir constituant) is to be expressed.

The United States has entered into a fairly large number of bilateral agreements with states parties to the Rome Statute in order to prevent the exposure of US nationals to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 98 of the Rome Statute allows for such agreements and provides that the Court should yield to obligations which emerge from those agreements. The author, however, argues that the current scope of these agreements, covering all US nationals, is too wide. They should rather take as a point of departure the status of forces agreements, which envisage primary jurisdiction for the sending state, in case of military service personnel and personnel of peacekeeping operations. In their present form, the bilateral agreements compel states parties to act in contravention of the object and purpose of the Statute.

This article explores the role of international climate change adaptation law in promoting the use of genetically engineered crops as an adaptation strategy. The severity of climate change impacts and the realization that, by now, some adverse effects are inevitable, has intensified the urgency to devise effective adaptation strategies. Genetically engineered climate-resilient crops are presented as one possible means to adapt to the predicted adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture and crop yields. Despite increased attention on the research and development of climate-resilient crops, particularly by private sector seed corporations, there are many controversies surrounding this proposed adaptation strategy. The key contentions relate to apprehensions about genetically engineered crops more generally, the effectiveness of climate-resilient crops, and the involvement of the private sector in international climate change adaptation initiatives.

The main argument in this article is that the emerging field of international climate change adaptation law contributes to promoting genetically engineered climate-resilient crops as a possible means of adaptation. Moreover, international adaptation law creates an enabling environment for the active engagement of private sector corporations in devising adaptation strategies. Notwithstanding controversies over genetically engineered crops and the role of the private sector, there has been little consideration so far of the influence of the growing international legal regime on climate change on the types of adaptation strategies that are devised and promoted.

What role have international legal scholars played in the development of international criminal law? Building on recent studies of the citation practices of international courts, the article provides an empirical assessment of the use and functions of citations to scholarly writings in the judgments of international criminal courts and tribunals. Using a mixed-methods approach, the article combines: a) a quantitative analysis of judgments interpreting the law of war crimes across four international and hybrid courts; with b) qualitative interviews with judges and legal officers at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ad hoc Tribunals, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The article argues that scholarly writings have been strikingly visible in the judgments of international criminal courts and tribunals, and especially at the ICC, which entails significant implications for the functions of academic writings and the role of international legal scholars.

Under contemporary international law, war crimes are conceived as particularly serious violations of the laws of armed conflict. Mere participation of rank-and-file soldiers in an unjust or unlawful war is generally not considered to warrant legal punishment. This position is based on the principle of equality between belligerents. During the last 20 years, this principle has been challenged by the so-called revisionist position in just war theory, as well as by certain scholars in international law. According to them, unjust or unlawful participants in armed conflict perpetrate serious wrongs. This article argues that their conduct is not only morally wrongful, but also that it should be criminalized under certain circumstances. On the basis of empirical research on cognitive biases, and on one of the leading accounts of legitimate authority in political philosophy, it argues that participation in war warrants criminalization only when the war is knowingly or manifestly unlawful. Furthermore, it claims that this position is not only sound at the level of deep moral principles, but that in fact it provides a persuasive reinterpretation of existing international law.

International organisations have recently assumed a more intrusive role in settling conflicts in all continents. At the same time, post-conflict or post-settlement tasks seem to be emerging as an important function, encompassing the conduct of democratic elections, the guarantee of security, development of civil society, etc. In order to operationalise such wide-ranging and deeply intrusive social aims it is not sufficient to have peace-keepers or elections monitoring missions sent into the conflict-torn territories. Concentrated and centrally planned efforts of international governance are needed. In the present day, however, there is no such systematic scheme to which to refer. Yet institutional structures are needed to administer the extensive tasks and functions assigned in certain post-conflict situations. Therefore many questions of legitimacy and fundamental accountability arise.

The pending dispute at the ICJ between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy on jurisdictional immunities of states bears on the hotly debated question of whether a state having committed a violation of jus cogens loses its immunity from civil jurisdiction abroad, as maintained by the Italian Court of Cassation. The article aims to demonstrate the untenability of the position of the Italian Court of Cassation, not only under current international customary law, but also under a prospective de lege ferenda. Nevertheless, different options are open to the ICJ to adjudicate the case, without impinging on possible future developments of state practice. The article closes by pointing at the risks that, in a strict dualist/pluralist perspective, not even an ICJ's decision in favour of Germany would eventually ensure compliance by Italian domestic judges.

This article explores the structural link between international law's long-standing doctrinal commitment to commerce and its inability to act decisively on behalf of the environment. One of the fundamental rights the early authors of jus gentium discovered was the right to engage in commerce. Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, and Hugo Grotius each drew on and applied a providentialist theory of commerce. The doctrine held that Providence distributed scarcity and plenty across the earth so that peoples could not be self-sufficient, but would need to go in search of one another in order to acquire what they lacked. Commerce imagined in its pure form of reciprocal, mutually beneficial exchange would be the means to bring separated mankind to friendship. The embrace of the providentialist doctrine by these early exponents of the law of nations, carried forward by Emer de Vattel, set the stage for international law's longstanding commitment to international commerce, viewed (despite all the distortions) as a virtuous activity that tends to the common good. The doctrine's additional legacy was the installation of a view of nature as commodity. The providentialist doctrine of commerce, adopted by the early authors of international law, remains embedded in the structure of international law and cannot easily be dislodged. Until this doctrine is dislodged, however, international law will continue to be hobbled in its ability to address the urgent task of protecting the natural environment.

Prepared as a working paper for the International Law Commission, this article discusses whether there can be said to be a general customary law of human rights, or whether any such customary law might be of a special nature.

A person with moral commitments can respect International Humanitarian Law (IHL) only if the permissions granted by it do not depart radically from their basic morality, but the features of contemporary war require considerable departures from morality in the content of any rules applicable to war. The features of the contemporary international political arena, in turn, and especially the dominant interpretation of sovereignty, require that IHL be the same for all parties. But, contrary to the arguments of some influential analytic philosophers, such ‘symmetry’ in the laws need not involve their content's departing excessively from basic morality. Insisting on the same rules for all, however, leads to the problem that, other things equal, the more stringent the content of a set of rules, the greater the temptation on the part of self-interested parties to flout the rules. However, a hard-headed view of IHL requires no concessions to terrorists or anti-terrorists.

Since the end of the Cold War, societies from the former Soviet Union and others throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America have overthrown dictators and other authoritative rulers in the hope of allowing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In some cases, the change has been violent and drawn out, while in other cases the change has been quick and (more or less) non-violent. Regardless of whether the change has been violent or not, a crucial question during and after transition is: In what ways should post-authoritarian and/or post-conflict societies deal with their ‘evil’ past in order to ‘enable the state itself to [once again] function as a moral agent’? This question constitutes the very core of what is known as ‘transitional justice’ (TJ).

According to well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the prohibition on expulsion resulting in ill-treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is ‘absolute’: it does not allow for balancing of interests. Analysis of the Court's case law, however, shows that the application of the provision involves various forms of balancing, for example when delimiting the burden of proof or qualifying an act as ill-treatment. The absolute character expresses a value judgement about the importance of the prohibition, and it serves as an argumentative tool applied to sustain wide or inclusive readings of Article 3 ECHR.

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is neither fish nor fowl. Its primary purpose is to consider coastal states’ proposed limits of the outer continental shelf and to make recommendations thereto. Albeit the establishment of the outer limits is an act within the sole discretion of a state, the role of the Commission in the establishment of such limits is of pivotal importance. Due to its mandate, it can reasonably be argued that the Commission is, by way of implication, deemed to be vested with rights that cannot be seen to be limited to a technical review stricto sensu. This paper seeks to determine the exact terms of reference of the Commission and to what extent it comprises powers to undertake legal interpretations of the Convention. It will be concluded that a fair balance governs the operations of the Commission, although they, at times, comprise tasks that are essentially of a legal nature.

How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls's conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one. Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to which he refers as decent peoples, as equal members in good standing in a just society of peoples. It would be a violation of liberalism's own principle of toleration to deny the international legitimacy of decent peoples who, among other things, affirm human rights and accept peaceful coexistence with other societies. According to the cosmopolitan idea of international toleration, on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally imperialistic.

Marxian thought retains its relevance in the current period, not as a comprehensive replacement for liberal human rights theories, but as a source of critique that challenges those theories on the basis of the very values of human freedom and dignity that they espouse. The Marxian approach entails no general rejection of human-rights-oriented constraint, procedural or substantive, on efforts to achieve social change, but rather serves the human rights project by demonstrating how contradictory class interests manifest themselves as contradictions within the effort to apply liberal principles in a class-divided society.

The equal application of international humanitarian law (jus in bello) to all parties to an international armed conflict is a cornerstone principle of jus in bello. In his article, Professor Mandel casts doubt on the legal basis of this principle. Reacting to this claim, this contribution demonstrates that the ‘equality of belligerents’ is a principle firmly grounded in both conventional and customary international law. Moreover, its legal force withstands the test of international jurisprudence, including the International Court of Justice's controversial Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.

In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros proceedings, the parties, viz. Hungary and Slovakia, defended their conduct, amongst others, with arguments derived from the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility, and from the law of state responsibility itself. In its judgment, the International Court of Justice disentangled the mixture of arguments derived from the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility advanced by Hungary, and drew a clear line between these two branches of international law. Second, it rejected several circumstances that were advanced by the parties to preclude the wrongfulness of their conduct. On both these accounts, the author opines that the declaratory dicta of the Court have contributed to the development of the law of state responsibility. Third, the Court decided on the legal consequences of the intersecting internationally wrongful acts committed by Hungary and Slovakia. According to the author, the Court erred in its reasoning on this account by confusing the award of cessation of the internationally wrongful acts with the award of reparation for these acts.