As Kenneth Arrow has pointed out in a recent paper, “David Ricardo was a peaceful man” (Arrow 1991, p. 70). Indeed he was—during his lifetime. I am not so sure he is resting peacefully given the further assertion that his system was “a bold attempt to determine values independent of demand considerations” (ibid., p. 75). Arrow adds, byway of qualification, that he does “not think, as some neo-Ricardians seem to, that there was in any sense an intended repudiation of the demand schedule”; rather Ricardo did not conceive of such a schedule even though “some of [his] analysis can only be made sensible on the basis of such a concept.”

From Jacob Viner (1927) to David A. Reisman (1998), Adam Smith's departures from an advocacy of laissez-faire in The Wealth of Nations have been interpreted by a number of scholars. In this paper, we examine one of the oddest, and perhaps least noticed, of those departures. That was Smith's defense of the civil law of lay patronage in the established Presbyterian Church of Scotland, which appears in his discussion of the social benefits and potential social costs of institutions for religious instruction. A lay patron was a non-cleric individual who held the right under civil law to select the minister of a local parish church. In Smith's time, roughly two-thirds of the lay patrons in Scotland were wealthy landowners and one-third were crown officials. In addition, municipal corporations (cities) and universities held some patronage rights.

Aleksander Bilimovich (1876–1963) is often considered to have been one of the last representatives of the Kiev School of economics, which was influenced by the German Historical School as well as by the emerging neoclassical theory. After the Soviet revolution, Bilimovich continued his work in exile and was developing his theoretical and methodological views along two lines of the Kiev tradition. On the one side he maintained the historical approach, and on the other side he was inclined towards the deductivist and mathematical approach. The paper thus questions the established view among the historians of Russian economic thought of Bilimovich as a consistent adherent of marginalism. His work bears also several features of historicism.

The paper shows how William Barber’s background as a development economist influenced his research agenda in the history of economic thought, in terms of the questions he asked and the way he approached them. The links between the history of economic theory and of policy-making are highlighted, as well as Barber’s investigation of the engagement of British economists with India’s economic matters throughout the time span of the British East India Company.

This article examines the way Vilfredo Pareto addresses the dynamics of social equilibrium and the evolution of economic institutions based on the principle of the rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. In the first part, we analyze why and how Pareto’s categories (residues, derivations, interests, \social heterogeneity, logical actions, and non-logical1 actions) borrow from those of Machiavelli (virtù, fortuna, corruptio, and ordine) to define various forms of the Machiavellian Moment. In the second part, we show that this borrowing allows Pareto to explain: (i) the evolution of political equilibriums, from the distinction the author makes between “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” and “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy”; and (ii) the alternative between free trade and protectionism.

The controversial question of whether the millennium began on January 1, 2000 or on January 1, 2001 weighed heavily on my mind as I composed my talk. The dilemma is, I should think, evident: Should a historian of thought want to give the last address of the old millennium, or the first address of the new one? I couldn't make up my mind about this, so I decided to consult my friends, particularly those whom I felt had given the question their considered attention. I asked David Colander, and he assured me that my preferences didn't matter, since he in fact had certainly given the final presidential address of the last millennium when he spoke in Greensboro the previous June. I then asked John Davis, and he assured me that my preferences didn't matter since he, in fact, was certainly going to give the first one of the new millennium, in 2001. Now being not nearly so stupid as I look, it occurred to me that if I listened to both of these individuals, there was a chance that I was going to give neither the last address of the old nor the first address of the new millennium. Feeling that this was, to put it mildly, an unacceptable outcome, I decided to disregard the ill-considered advice of my so-called friends and take firm control of the situation. Ladies and gentleman, I am very proud to be before you here today, delivering both the last presidential address of the old millennium and the first of the new one.

The story of the body of economic analysis that were initiated by Léon Walras can be divided into developments before and after 1930. During the period before 1930 there were two phases to the story. The first was the seminal achievement of Walras. The second was the refinements and extensions made by the generation of Walrasian theorists that followed him. During the period after 1930 the story is also divided into two phases. One is the work that has been done on the type of Walrasian model in which there are no disequilibrium transactions. The other is the beginning of work on the behavior of general equilibrium systems in which disequilibrium transactions and production occur. These phases will be sketched very briefly with the objective of giving a beginner's introduction to some major aspects of the history of general equilibrium theory.

Utilitarianism as conceived of in the present article is the philosophical movement that is roughly characterized by three main features: (1) during his lifetime a person maximizes his utility, which depends on his pleasure and his pain; (2) an individual's behavior should be based on a good education and guided by effective legislation; (3) society's ultimate purpose is the maximization of the aggregate happiness of all people.

In March 1776 when Etienne Bonnot, abbe de Condillac, published Commerce and Government, he was sixty-one years old, the same age as Francois Quesnay when he first published on economics. According to Jacqueline Hecht he had been a habitué of Quesnay's entresol (1958, p. 252), and Nicholas Baudeau has referred to Condillac's close friendship with Quesnay (1776/1903, p. 443). A book aimed to present a complete account of political economy from one of France's most distinguished philosophers, a member of the Academie franchise (“the immortals”) and the Royal Academy of Berlin, was bound to arouse great interest.

The early 1620s trade crisis had a significant influence on the way public opinion in England regarded economic issues, and the pamphlets written during that period convey the impression that the supply of money was the undisputed primary concern of economic policy. However, monetary matters occupied a prominent position in the political agenda of England only during times of crisis, when the kingdom faced a perceived threat of demonetization. The paper argues that, during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, concern with a positive balance of trade was of only secondary importance, being normally overshadowed by a more fundamental goal: a well-ordered, stable, and properly managed trade. This opened the door for debates about the limits of free initiative and regulation in economic affairs, as evidenced most clearly by the debates about free trade and monopolies that permeated James I’s reign.

This paper reconsiders the contribution of Henry Ludwell Moore to dynamic economics through the use of harmonic analysis. We show that Moore’s analysis is innovative in its use of the Fourier transformation for the identification of cycles with different periodicities. This enables Moore to identify cycles of longer length with more precision than would be the case for the standard methodology. We are able to replicate the main features of his results and confirm the existence of a rainfall cycle with a periodicity similar to that of the business cycle (eight years). However, we find that the evidence for a longer (thirty-three-year) rainfall cycle is weaker than Moore indicates. We also argue that a central theme of Moore’s analysis—the relationship among rainfall, agricultural productivity, and the business cycle—marks an early precursor of the “real business cycle” approach. George Stigler’s (1962) dismissal of Moore’s work on cycles as “a complete failure” is therefore, in our opinion, unfair. Instead, we argue that, although his work is certainly flawed, it nevertheless deserves a place in both the history of business cycle theory and empirical economics.

Charles Coquelin and Jules Dupuit both advocated free banking, but they articulated different views on credit, the note-issuing mechanism, and the role of banking in economic crises. For Coquelin, credit allowed producers to enhance their productive capacities. There was no need to restrict the issuing of banknotes to the quantity of metallic reserves. Coquelin emphasized the role that privileged banks played in the emergence of economic crises. For his part, Dupuit did not believe that credit could create more capital, and warned against the excessive issuing of banknotes. Dupuit considered economic crises to be caused by real factors. I argue that Coquelin’s ideas reflected a credit theory of money while Dupuit’s views were characteristic of a monetary theory of credit.

The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic debate about wages, efficiency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system (1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt (1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct influence by these writers cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic theorizing and social legislation.

The association of the equilibrium real rate of interest with the marginal product of capital is a staple of modern mainstream economics. Indeed, when graduate students are asked to find a typical model's equilibrium values of the real wage and interest rate, there is apparently nothing more natural than calculating the derivative of the production function with respect to labor and capital, respectively. This seems to make perfect economic sense, because under competitive conditions, the laborer gets paid the marginal product of his labor, while the capitalist gets paid the marginal product of his capital. Students can even derive the “factor-price frontier” (developed in, for example, Samuelson 1953) to show the inverse relationship between real wages and the real rate of interest, where the “factors” are, of course, labor and capital.

François Quesnay’s Tableau, as it appears in Philosophie rurale, is an understandable, robust, and innovative construction despite detail errors. It provides a precise representation of the economic circuit. We introduce the accounts of chapter VII of Philosophie rurale and we explain how Quesnay’s Tableau comes from these accounts. The transposition of the accounts of chapter VII and of the Tableau into two input-output tables shows the balance of resources and uses. In order to shed light on the progress of exchanges along the year, the Tableau is also transposed into three double-entry accountings (proprietors, farmers, and artisans).

During the period 1871–1918, Sweden was under the in.uence, in many respects, of intellectual currents emanating from the German Empire. On the plane of economic policy many Swedish social scientists and public debaters were in.uenced by German Kathedersozialismus and state socialism. In Sweden, as in other countries, this heritage has long been tucked out of view in historical writings, perhaps because there was not much to boast about after the defeat of the “German model” in the First World War.1 Interest has begun to awaken in recent years, however. Leading economists such as Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner have attracted attention (see e.g., Backhaus 1997) and their in.uence in the United States has been examined (Carlson 1999, Rodgers 1998, and Senn 1997). In Sweden, too, interest in German Kathedersozialismus and state socialism is rising with respect to its in.uence on social scientists (Wisselgren 2000) and (social democratic) politicians (Karlsson 2001).

The dispute between Hollander and Peart, and Hirsch, turns on the nature and role of verification in Mill's perception of the appropriate method for Political Economy. Professor Hirsch maintains against us that, for Mill, the models constructed by political economists are insulated from verification. His case is based on two counterclaims. First, that when Mill writes of “verification” in Book III of the Logic, he has in mind a procedure differing from that appropriate for Political Economy, which allows only “indirect verification” (outlined in Book VI). Hirsch finds that Hollander and Peart confuse the two. Secondly, since the contexts of our case studies often relate to policy formulation, Hirsch finds our elucidations of an appeal to experience of a more basic order to be unconvincing.

Our paper analyzes and compares two attempts at integrating unemployment in macroeconomics. The first, due to Peter Diamond, consists in a search model exhibiting multiple equilibria and wherein cycles may be produced. The second is due to David Andolfatto and Monika Merz, who, more or less simultaneously, constructed models enabling the integration of the matching function into RBC modeling. In the first sections, we present the methodology upon which our paper is based—Axel Leijonhufvud’s decision-tree insight—and briefly describe these three economists’ motivations and the context in which they were working. We continue with recounting the birth and further development of the search paradigm upon which Diamond’s, Andolfatto’s, and Merz’s attempts were based. These preliminaries settled, we address the heart of the paper, the critical analysis of their respective contributions. Our interest lies specifically in how they made their way in the development of the field. We explain why Diamond’s model, which ambitioned to rival Robert Lucas’s explanation of business fluctuations, did not live up to its author’s expectations. Andolfatto’s and Merz’s project was less ambitious, yet their model became an established component of the RBC program—but at the price of abandoning several constitutive traits of the search approach.