This article investigates the influence of political measures and instruments on women's employment in OECD countries. The policy dimension builds the central explanatory category filling the ‘black box’ between political institutions and the decision-making process on the one hand, and policy outcome on the other. Unlike former comparative studies on the relationship between women's employment and public policies, this article analyses a much larger country sample, looking at 28 OECD countries as well as a broader range of policies. Additionally, path analyses are conducted, modelling direct and indirect causal effects on women's labour market integration. The analyses show that while the cultural, economic and political framework can create a positive environment for women's employment in general, ‘women-friendly’ public policies are important, and are necessary for the more intensive and egalitarian labour market integration of women compared to that of men.

This article explores the voluntary, self help sector of preschool provision, using material from an in-depth study of playgroups in economically deprived areas of Lancashire. It argues that such playgroups tend either to collapse or to abandon the principle of self help because the economic, structural and cultural location of working class women makes these alternatives to statutory provision not a viable option in such localities. The restructuring of welfare to encourage self help is deceitful because it promotes forms of provision which working class women cannot provide for themselves; it fits well, however, with encouraging them to be ‘better’ mothers on a full-time basis.

Many commentators contend that the Chinese government adopted an incremental approach to welfare policy reform because its leaders lacked an overall blueprint for it, allowing initiatives to be implemented only after lengthy experimentation. While this perspective has provided an essential account of the implementation and changes of some welfare programmes, it has inadequately addressed the slow progress in rural areas' welfare programmes and the different welfare entitlements for rural and urban residents. Further investigation is therefore required to resolve these anomalies. Using the minimum standard of living scheme (MSLS) as a case example, this article illustrates how the Chinese government's legitimacy needs, during different stages of its economic reforms, have been the principal motivation for the implementation of such schemes. The introduction of an urban MSLS in 1997 aimed to reduce laid-off workers' dissatisfaction following the government's reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The implementation of a rural MSLS in 2007 was intended principally to minimise conflicts between land-losing farmers and local officials after widespread rural riots. These MSLSs are also minimal and stigmatising public-assistance schemes that fulfil the dual objective of securing a stable political environment for economic reform and maintaining poor people's work ethic for China's mixed economy.

This paper is concerned with tracking the shifts in media discourses surrounding issues of race and social policy interventions through an examination of the newspaper media responses to the Brixton Inquiry and Scarman Report in 1982 and the Lawrence Inquiry and Macpherson Report that appeared eighteen years later in 1999. Brought about by two very different sets of historical events, albeit events which shared certain common features, this paper argues that the Scarman and Macpherson Reports have framed the changing story of ‘race relations’ in Britain in the last quarter of the twentieth century. While there have, inevitably, been comparisons between the content of the two Reports there has not been a comparative focus on the media reception of the findings and recommendations of the Inquiries. Using written and visual media text from five newspapers the paper seeks to map the extent to which media narratives around both race and race related policy-making have shifted during the course of almost two decades. The paper questions the boundaries of any such changes and examines what remains unchanged.

Despite the centrality of shame and stigma within research on welfare in high-income countries, these issues only exist within the periphery of rapidly expanding practice in and research on social assistance in low- and middle-income countries. This oversight undermines social assistance’s potential in breaking the poverty-shame cycle and ignores its role in the (re)production of shame and stigma. This article offers a critical exploration of the role of social assistance in alleviating or reinforcing shame and stigma in low- and middle-income countries. Findings indicate that positive and negative effects co-exist but that far too little evidence is available to judge whether social assistance receipt overwhelmingly negates or plays into shame and stigma, particularly in low-income countries. Greater awareness of the interface between social assistance, shame and stigma, explorations of policy options that minimise or counter stigmatisation, and critical engagement with ideological and political discourse underpinning design and delivery of interventions represent crucial steps to move towards ‘shame proofing’ social assistance in low- and middle-income countries.

In a context where the employment model of welfare is dominant, family policy has remained an area of limited and indirect competence for the European Community. Comparative analysis of Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany as examples of EC member states with different socio-cultural traditions and policy styles shows the limitations of theories about universalism, convergence and harmonisation of family structures and policies. Compared with Britain and Germany, the family policy making style in France is more explicit, visible, coherent and legitimate. Its objectives are overtly pro-natalist and it would seem to have had a stronger direct socio-economic impact.

This paper takes up three particular themes in the historical development of the present pattern of social service provision in the United Kingdom and argues that existing accounts are somewhat misleading in their treatment of these issues. The three themes are the relationship between collectivism and individualism in social policy legislation and practice, the influence of centre and periphery in British political life and, to a lesser extent, the occupational roles available to women in the social services. These questions are examined through a study of the history of health visiting. It is argued that the fluctuating fortunes of the health visiting service allow us to see more clearly the changing influence of collectivist and individualist philosophies on government policy and the degrees to which definitions of problems and possible solutions have either been imported from the national periphery to the national centre or vice versa. Insufficient attention has been given to the defeat of metropolitan individualist philosophies by the peripherally-based public health movement at the beginning of the twentieth century and to the conditions which have led to their subsequent re-emergence and the waning influence of collectivist approaches.

Since Beveridge, budget standards have been neglected in British social policy research. Empirical effort has concentrated on developing social indicator methods of investigating relative poverty. This paper explores the potential of budget standards for assessing whether the scale rates of supplementary benefit are adequate. Three applications of budget standard methodology are presented.

Long-range temporal choices are built into contemporary policy-making, with policy decisions having consequences that play out across generations. Decisions are made on behalf of the public who are assumed to give much greater weight to their welfare than to the welfare of future generations. The paper investigates this assumption. It briefly discusses evidence from sociological and economic studies before reporting the findings of a British survey of people's intergenerational time preferences based on a representative sample of nearly 10,000 respondents. Questions focused on two sets of policies: (i) health policies to save lives and (ii) environmental policies to protect against floods that would severely damage homes, businesses and other infrastructure. For both sets of policies, participants were offered a choice of three policy options, each bringing greater or lesser benefits to their, their children's and their grandchildren's generations. For both saving lives and protecting against floods, only a minority selected the policy that most benefited their generation; the majority selected policies bringing equal or greater benefits to future generations. Our study raises questions about a core assumption of standard economic evaluation, pointing instead to concern for future generations as a value that many people hold in common.

This article examines the relationship between the family and work histories of older women and their personal incomes in later life, using retrospective data from the first 15 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. The association between women's family histories and their incomes later in life are relatively weak, explaining only a small proportion of the overall variation in older women's incomes. Divorce, early widowhood and re-marriage are not associated with any significant differences in older women's incomes, while motherhood is only associated with a small reduction in incomes later in life. While there are significant differences in the work histories of older women with different family histories, this translates into relatively small differences in their personal incomes, because the types of employment career pursued by most women are not associated with significantly higher retirement incomes and because public transfers dampen work history-related differentials, especially for widows. On the one hand, this could be seen as a positive finding in that the ‘pension penalty’ associated with life-course events such as motherhood and divorce is not as severe as often anticipated. On the other hand, the main reason for this is that the pension returns to working longer are relatively low, particularly for women with few qualifications. The analysis suggests that women retiring over the next two decades are unlikely to benefit significantly from the additional years they have spent in employment, because most of this increase has been in part-time employment. The article highlights the tensions between two objectives: rewarding work, and protecting the most vulnerable, such as carers, long-term disabled and unemployed. Resolving this dilemma involves moving away from a close association between pension entitlements and work history and towards universal entitlement based on a citizen's pension.

This article provides an overview of the academic debates and recent research on the dynamic perspective on poverty and anti-poverty policy. Renewed theoretical interest in dynamic analysis is discussed in the context of the more general debate about the roles of structure and agency in social relations. This is followed by a brief outline of some of the new empirical datasets now available for longitudinal research, in particular in the UK. The implications of dynamic analysis for our understanding of poverty are summarised, followed by a discussion of the impact of this on anti-poverty policy, again drawing largely on the UK, and some specifically English, developments. The article concludes that dynamic analysis and the role of agency has had a significant impact on both academic debate and policy intervention on poverty, but that this should not be interpreted as leading to an abandonment of policies for structural reform aimed at redistributing resources to the poor.

This research note describes the distribution of family income in seven industrial nations, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Significant differences between the countries are identified. A ‘poverty cycle’ of the type identified by Rowntree still describes the distribution of income over age groups, but it is neither strong nor universal. Elderly families are found to be a key group for understanding the degree of income inequality in contemporary societies.

Within both publicly and privately financed health care Systems different funding mechanisms have evolved, or have been proposed, to deal with the problem of ‘moral hazard’. Moral hazard arises when financial incentives within the health care System lead to either inefficient demands for care by consumers or inefficient supply of care by providers. In this paper the problem of moral hazard is outlined in more detail, and different ways of countering moral hazard are reviewed in terms of three criteria: effect on patient utilisation of health services in general; effect on utilisation by different groups of patients; and effect on health status. It is concluded that evidence on different methods of funding health services can only be judged in the context of objectives. If the objectives of health care delivery are ‘maintenance or improvement of health’ and ‘equal access for equal need’ then charges and finance of care through health maintenance organisations both appear to be less favourable than ‘free’ care at the point of delivery whilst the latter is not necessarily more costly as a resuit. Research on other suggested alternatives is required, otherwise radical changes to health care financing in the UK will simply result in movement from one unproven system to another.

The Work Programme's use of severe social security benefit sanctions reflects British coalition ministers’ belief that many people on out-of-work benefits do not want a job. While a substantial empirical literature has repeatedly demonstrated that in fact unemployed benefit claimants possess the same work values as the employed and that the vast majority want paid work, it has ignored some conservative authors’ pleas to consider the views and experiences of people who work with the unemployed. Forty employees of agencies contracted to help unemployed people into employment were interviewed in summer 2011. Respondents had spent an estimated combined total of 147,000 hours in the presence of people who have claimed Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) for over six months. Most said that between a quarter and half of their present clients did not want employment. This finding does not contradict existing research, given that most JSA claimants re-enter employment within six months. However, all forty agreed that many others remained unemployed because they were choosy in the jobs they were willing to undertake, and, most strikingly, respondents overwhelmingly endorsed the view that a ‘dependency culture’ exists in households and neighbourhoods that have experienced joblessness for several generations.

Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.

Using voluntary blood donation as a case example, the study on which this article is based explored not only the extent, or breadth, of community involvement in social policy behaviours, but also the continuity, or depth, of this commitment. Demographic and motivational data were collected through a postal questionnaire returned by 1,784 persons who had voluntarily donated blood at least once in metropolitan Toronto between 1974 and 1978. An empirical distinction was also drawn between the ‘active’ and the ‘lapsed’ donor.

The study found that while certain sectors of society were probably disproportionately represented among those who chose to undertake voluntary social behaviours, the continuity of these actions could not be statistically associated with demographic or socio-economic variables. However, it did find that donors initially motivated by ‘external’ considerations such as convenience of location were more likely to lapse, while those for whom moral considerations and a sense of community were most important were more likely to continue as active donors.

The general conclusion suggests that manipulating the context may be useful to broaden the initial participatory base in voluntary actions, but to produce continuity in this involvement the challenge must be phrased in moral language.

The idea of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) has moved rapidly up the British political agenda in recent years, with support from the Green Party, the Royal Society of Arts, and left-wing writers such as Paul Mason. Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell has set up a working group to examine its implications, and four Scottish councils are hoping to launch pilot schemes. Contemporary British interest in UBI forms part of a lively global debate about automation, inequality and precarious labour, but it also draws on a long history of proposals for tax-benefit reform within UK social policy. This article identifies five waves of enthusiasm for basic income in Britain over the past century and highlights patterns of continuity and change. It shows that interest in the proposal has been greatest at times of pessimism about the future of the labour market, though concerns about the ethics and affordability of unconditional payments have always been difficult to shake. Advocates of UBI have also struggled to reconcile the technocratic approach of its Conservative and Liberal supporters with the transformative ambitions of the radical left. It remains to be seen whether the recent growth of left-wing support for UBI will improve its prospects of implementation.

The ‘unitary household’ lives on in policymakers’ assumptions about couples sharing their finances. Yet financial autonomy is seen as a key issue in gender relations, particularly for women. This article draws on evidence from semi-structured individual interviews with men and women in thirty low-/moderate-income couples in Britain. The interviews explored whether financial autonomy had any meaning to these individuals; and, if so, to what extent this was gendered in the sense of there being differences in men's and women's understanding of it. We develop a framework for the investigation of financial autonomy, involving several dimensions: achieving economic independence, having privacy in one's financial affairs and exercising agency in relation to household and/or personal spending. We argue that financial autonomy is a relevant issue for low-/moderate-income couples, and that women are more conscious of tensions between financial togetherness and autonomy due to their greater responsibility for managing togetherness and lower likelihood of achieving financial independence. Policymakers should therefore not discount the aspirations of women in particular for financial autonomy, even in low-/moderate-income couples where there remain significant obstacles to achieving this. Yet plans for welfare reform that rely on means testing and ignore intra-household dynamics in relation to family finances threaten to exacerbate these obstacles and reinforce a unitary family model.

In the context of population ageing and low retirement incomes, the UK government is encouraging delayed retirement. However, the OECD has argued that UK means-tested benefits disincentivise employment for the poorest, and Vickerstaff (2006b) has suggested managers have typically controlled opportunities to work beyond 65. In the US, contrastingly, benefits are meagre and difficult to access, and age discrimination legislation protects individuals from forced retirement. Would a US ‘self-reliance’ policy approach increase employment amongst the poorest over 65s in the UK and enhance or diminish their financial position? The evidence suggests that extending UK age discrimination legislation and restricting benefits would increase overall employment past 65, although not necessarily to US levels. Analysis of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing and the US Health and Retirement Study finds the poorest over 65s were more likely to work in the USA than in England in 2002. However, within the USA, employment amongst the poorest was still low, especially compared with wealthier groups; logistic regression analysis primarily attributes this to lower levels of health and education. A US policy approach would therefore most likely damage the financial position of the poorest in the UK, as increased employment would not sufficiently compensate for lost benefits.

Following the success of a recent Swiss Citizens’ Initiative to grant each citizen an unconditional income guarantee and the Finnish Government's plans to conduct the first national pilot project, the idea of a basic income as a citizens’ right has gained much prominence in the policy debate. This article reviews a number of policy developments on the ground through the lens of the policy transfer literature. In the absence of a fully developed basic income in place, proponents must rely on partially implemented schemes or proposals that differ in crucial respects from the basic income ideal. This paper outlines three sets of empirical cases and analyses what (if any) lessons we can draw from them regarding the future of basic income schemes.