In this paper we explore whether the recent rise in food bank usage in the UK has been induced by the roll-out of Universal Credit. We bring together official statistics on the introduction of Universal Credit with data on food bank usage from the UK’s largest food bank network. We test the relationship between Universal Credit and food parcel distribution using a range of causal identification strategies (such as fixed-effects model, Granger causality tests, and matching designs) and consistently find that an increase in the prevalence of Universal Credit is associated with more food parcel distribution. We also find that the relationship between Universal Credit and food parcel distribution is stronger in areas where food banks are active, suggesting food insecurity arising from Universal Credit may be hidden in places where food banks are largely unavailable. Though it is challenging to implement any large-scale change to social security, our analysis suggests systemic and persistent problems with this new system. Whilst the logic of Universal Credit is intuitively appealing, it has also proven to be unforgiving, leaving many struggling to make ends meet.

The use of social indicators in the implementation of area-specific positive discrimination programmes is increasing and is likely to continue to do so. It is important in this context that some of the unintended consequences of their use be appreciated.

It is argued that the concentration on the statistical niceties and technical details of social indicators especially as they are applied to the identification of areas of urban deprivation has been misplaced, and the concern for the ‘arithmetic of woe’ has diverted attention away from some of the more fundamental assumptions underlying their use.

As predominantly used, social indicators have assumed both that a value consensus exists about the nature and parameters of urban deprivation, when in fact this is an issue of value (and political) conflict, and, more specifically, that urban deprivation springs from social pathology. By default, urban deprivation has been assumed to be that which the indicators measure, when in fact they often reflect no more than existing levels of service provision and current social policies.

There is a need for a clear (even if arbitrary) definition of deprivation, and the derivation of indicators from such a definition. In the latter part of the article the author outlines an attempt to do this.

It remains a puzzle as to why incapacity claims rose in many OECD countries when life expectancy was increasing. While potentially due to hidden unemployment and policy failure, this paper tests a further explanation: that work has become more difficult for disabled workers. It focuses on the UK as a ‘most likely’ case, given evidence of intensification and declining control at work. To get a more objective measure of working conditions, the models use average working conditions in particular occupations, and impute this into the British Household Panel Survey. The results show that people in low-control (but not high-demands) jobs are more likely to claim incapacity benefits in the following year, a result that is robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. Deteriorating job control seems to be a part of the explanation for rising incapacity, and strategies to cut the number of incapacity claimants should therefore consider ways to improve job control. Given the challenges in changing job characteristics, however, an equally important implication is that high levels of incapacity should not just be seen as a result of poor policies and a lack of jobs, but also as a result of the changing nature of work.

In contrast to most other welfare states, the development of the Israeli welfare state has occurred in the shadow of an ongoing military conflict. This study examines one of the consequences of this development by focusing on the impact of benefits for disabled war veterans upon the country's social security system. Not only are the benefits for Israeli disabled veterans more generous and expensive than those in other welfare states but they have also had a significant impact upon the nature of other social security programmes. In particular, we identify the differential impact of the policy legacies of this programme on benefits and services for other ‘deserving’ groups in Israeli society and on programmes for those disabled from natural causes.

The decline in smoking prevalence in Britain has been associated with a narrowing of gender differences and a widening of class differences in cigarette smoking. The shrinking population of smokers is increasingly drawn from those occupying subordinate positions in the gender and class hierarchies. The article reviews the evidence linking social inequality and women's smoking, drawing on conventional measures of gender and socio-economic position and on alternative measures which tap more directly into the processes that sustain gender and class inequality. The article deepens its analysis of the links between social inequality and smoking behaviour through a survey of women caring for young children in manual households. The survey uncovered pronounced intra-group differences in the smoking behaviour of women occupying broadly similar gender and socio-economic positions. These differences were associated, in clear and systematic ways, with differences in the mothers' social and material circumstances. High rates of prevalence and consumption and low rates of cessation were related to heavier caring responsibilities and to greater material disadvantage.

The pervasive sense of crisis in Japan over the falling birth rate and aging society issues is generating an active public debate about gender, the family, the organization of the workplace and the policy approaches best able to cope with these problems. This article considers explanations for demographic change, then turns to current Japanese family policy, focusing on the contradiction between formal laws and policies which aim at supporting families and informal practices which make domestic responsibilities more burdensome. It attempts to provide insight into these policies by focusing on the policy process, identifying characteristic patterns and approaches, strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese political system.

This paper explores the impact of legal rights to housing for homeless people, focusing on the capacity of such rights to ‘empower’ those experiencing homelessness. Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional view of power, complemented by Bourdieu's (1972) concept of ‘habitus’, is used to distinguish between conceptualisations of empowerment. A distinction is drawn between ‘traditional’ understandings of empowerment, which focus on people's capacity to realise their ‘subjective interests’, and on understandings that foreground ‘real interests’. These latter ‘radical’ perspectives direct attention to people's ‘habitus’ – their internalised dispositions to perceive situations and act in particular ways. Empirically, the paper draws on a qualitative comparison of approaches to homelessness in Scotland and Ireland. Whereas in Scotland virtually all those who are homeless now have a legal right to settled accommodation, Ireland has rejected such a ‘legalistic’ approach, pursuing a consensus driven ‘social partnership’ model. Based on primary research with national experts, service providers and homeless single men in both countries, it is argued that legal rights can effectively empower homeless people. These findings call into question popular and political understandings of the relationship between legal welfare rights and self-reliance.

This essay critically assesses nine claims concerning freedom and the welfare state, the latter defined narrowly and the former broadly. On balance, the findings favour the welfare state. Allegations concerning its negative impact on freedom, where true, are contingently rather than inherently so. The positive impacts are more clearcut, and work to the benefit of citizens as a whole in addition to welfare recipients themselves.

This article presents a theoretical critique of the employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) (1995), focusing on the definition of disability. It argues that the underpinning medical assumption of the statutory definition of disability is detrimental to the achievement of disability equality in the workplace and is problematic for practitioners and Employment Tribunals. In particular there are four areas of significant confusion arising from the need for medical evidence, the lack of congruence between managerial and legal definitions, the focus on the negative aspects of disability and the fact that disability is often hidden. By exploring these four themes and drawing on comparisons with the other equality laws, the article concludes that the definition of disability contained in the DDA (1995) contradicts many of the principles of the liberal equality framework that underpins it. Finally the article considers the public policy implications and suggests a new statutory approach.

Although reduced working time and furlough policy initiatives are widely regarded as important for economic and business reasons, little is known about their impacts on workers’ mental health at the onset of COVID-19 pandemic. Using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Panel Study data from 2018 to February 2020 and April 2020 and change score analysis, this study aims to compare mental health changes between those who worked reduced hours, were furloughed and left/lost paid work. The results suggest that at the onset of COVID-19 reduced working time and furlough can protect workers’ mental health, but only for men not for women. The gender differences remain significant even after controlling for housework and childcare responsibilities at the onset of COVID-19. These results highlight the importance of distributing paid work more equitably and formulating gender-sensitive labour market policies in protection of workers’ mental health.

This article reviews the policy process behind recent welfare reforms and considers the policy styles used in a broad range of social policy areas on the basis of interviews with leading policy actors. It argues that a mix of policy-making methods is currently being used, ranging from the classic top-down approach, through the use of external commissions to a more bottom-up approach, where policy is to a large degree designed by external groups. The type of policy and the power relations between key actors and the government determine the approach. Indeed, this shows a different perception of British policy-making, as the inclusive approach contrasts sharply with the traditional directive Westminster model.

The Netherlands are of considerable interest to students of comparative social policy, because Christian democracy and not social democracy is the leading political force. This article analyses the history of the Dutch system of social security in terms of political forces and their power resources. In particular, it considers the reasons for the comparatively high level of social security development in the Netherlands. The various approaches which have been adopted in much current research in comparative social policy are critically discussed in the context of the Dutch experience.

A study of elite opinion on the nature and future of the welfare state in six European countries, conducted during 1994, found that most of the traditional differences of opinion between left and right were still valid. Public opinion studies have consistently found strong support for state welfare. Yet during the past decade or so, governments in Europe have been pursuing policies that are largely similar in the sense that they are leading towards the containment and retrenchment of state welfare. The pressures of economic globalisation and of national structural factors have led to the replacement of the dominant social democratic expansionist model of welfare with the neo-liberal contractionist model. The result is that in the same way that governments of the right pursued expansionist policies of welfare during the reign of the social democratic model in the 1960s and early 1970s, governments of the left have in the past few years pursued policies of containment and contraction and they are likely to continue do to so in the foreseeable future.

There is growing concern about the problem of in-work poverty in the UK. Despite this, the literature on in-work poverty remains small in comparison with that on low pay and, in particular, we know relatively little about how people move in and out of in-work poverty. This paper presents an analysis of in-work poverty transitions in the UK, and extends the literature in this field in a number of identified ways. The paper finds that in-work poverty is more transitory than poverty amongst working-age adults more generally, and that the number of workers in the household is a particularly strong predictor of in-work poverty transitions. For most, in-work poverty is a temporary phenomenon, and most exits are by exiting poverty while remaining in work. However, our study finds that respondents who experience in-work poverty are three times more likely than non-poor workers to become workless, while one-quarter of respondents in workless, poor families who gained work entered in-work poverty. These findings demonstrate the limits to which work provides a route out of poverty, and points to the importance of trying to support positive transitions while minimising negative shocks faced by working poor families.

The sociology of post-fordism has facilitated the development of a new welfarism which suggests that economic globalisation, labour market flexibility, more complex patterns of family life and the dissolution of traditional class structures require a new welfare settlement. Since full employment, redistribution and expensive universal services are no longer seen as feasible, the new welfare can only justify social spending as investment in human capital and as the enhancement of individual opportunities. Welfare states are all driven in the same direction by the imperatives of international competition.

A review of available evidence indicates that the progress of post-fordist social change is partial. Inequalities in life-chances have grown wider. Changes in patterns of employment and new legislation weaken the working class. The ruling class is well aware of its interests. Increases in productivity at a time when investment is not rising, the decline in union membership and militancy and the intensification of work coupled with a policy stance by both main parties that supports lower taxes, a shift in the tax burden downwards and a decline in state intervention all indicate that capital is in the ascendant in the UK. Comparative work shows that the policies pursued under different regimes can make a difference to welfare outcomes despite the increased stringency of competition. The traditional agenda of social policy – class inequality, the strength of capital and the policy programme of the nation-state – merits particular attention in Britain in the 1990s.

Using rich administrative data on unemployed welfare recipients in Germany and propensity score matching, the author analyses the effects of participating in four major active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on various dimensions of job quality. In Germany, welfare recipients may suffer from poor job quality because they are forced to accept any reasonable job offer. However, few studies consider the effects of participation in ALMPs on job quality. The results imply that participation in a programme not only increases the probability of taking jobs but also increases the probability of holding a high-quality job for some dimension of job quality. In particular, further vocational training is very effective in terms of job quality for West German women. Thus, job centres should focus on the activation of unemployed welfare recipients.

This article highlights some of the issues raised by incomplete coverage of the 1991 census in Britain, illustrating how far-reaching are its implications across the spectrum of social statistics. The origins and the current state-of-play of the debate over the distribution of the non-response are summarised and the implications then assessed. For many census variables, non-response reduces the observed variation between areas, with consequences for the distribution of resources for local services. The implications for the reliability of the most basic of health statistics are raised through mortality rates. A rough estimate is made, and supporting evidence presented, of the possible numbers of households which were missed by the census. Some implications for housing needs assessments are illustrated along with the effect of the sudden upwards revision of official estimates of the dwelling stock and the resulting overall great uncertainty over the number of vacant dwellings in the country. Finally, recent research on the electoral implications of people's choice not to be registered is discussed as this may well help to understand census non-response. Such a pervasive degree of uncertainty across almost all figures concerning people has not been experienced in Britain since the last century. There is little reason to expect this uncertainty and the importance of its social policy implications to diminish in the future, without significant changes to census procedures and to the relationship between government and governed.

There is increasing evidence that characteristics of place influence health and that the dimensions of rurality interlock with the process of ageing to produce a number of distinctive patterns. For the rising number of older people living in rural England, it is clear that, overall, the countryside promotes the health and wellbeing of the newly retired, fitter cohort who have access to financial and community resources. However, it carries a number of risks for elders who are frail, deprived or isolated; inequalities combine to undermine health and deepen exclusion. The efficacy of policy in taking account of the needs of rural elders is uneven. Analysis of the three most pivotal policy arenas – rurality, ageing and health, and community development – suggests that while some initiatives do promote quality of life, significant limitations remain. Further, the overarching policy response is incoherent and fragmented. Key deficits relate to resource allocation, limited recognition of rural disadvantage, and minimal incorporation of the perspectives of rural elders. That the majority of policy is rurally blind is a fundamental challenge; for rural elders to benefit from policy investment, a systemic shift is required in the mechanisms that steer its development, funding and implementation.

Drawing upon a qualitative exploration of the role of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in service provision for homeless people in the UK, this paper examines the ways in which the ‘faith’ in ‘faith-based’ services is articulated and experienced ‘on the ground’. It demonstrates that the ‘F’ in FBO is expressed in a myriad of nuanced ways, and that the strength of ‘coupling’ between many welfare agencies and organised religion has diminished over time such that some projects’ faith affiliation or heritage is now evident in palimpsest only. Homeless people do in fact often find it difficult to discern tangible differences between avowedly ‘faith-based’ and ‘secular’ projects, given a blurring of boundaries between the religious and the secular. These findings problematise FBO typologies, and highlight the complexity and fluidity of the very concept of ‘FBO’ itself. Certainly, they suggest that the differences between faith-based and secular provision should not be exaggerated, whilst recognising the importance of faith to the motivations of many service providers and the potential value of the (optional) ‘spiritual’ support offered by most FBOs.

This article explores the voluntary, self help sector of preschool provision, using material from an in-depth study of playgroups in economically deprived areas of Lancashire. It argues that such playgroups tend either to collapse or to abandon the principle of self help because the economic, structural and cultural location of working class women makes these alternatives to statutory provision not a viable option in such localities. The restructuring of welfare to encourage self help is deceitful because it promotes forms of provision which working class women cannot provide for themselves; it fits well, however, with encouraging them to be ‘better’ mothers on a full-time basis.