We analyze initial public offering (IPO) activity under political uncertainty surrounding gubernatorial elections in the United States. There are fewer IPOs originating from a state when it is scheduled to have an election. To establish identification, we develop a neighboring-states method that uses bordering states without elections as a control group. The dampening effect of elections on IPO activity is stronger for firms with more concentrated businesses in their home states, firms that are more dependent on government contracts (particularly state contracts), and harder-to-value firms. This dampening effect is related to lower IPO offer prices (hence, higher costs of capital) during election years.

This paper shows that there is a close relation between corporate governance and the portfolios held by investors. Most firms in countries with poor investor protection are controlled by large shareholders, so that only a fraction of the shares issued by firms in these countries can be freely traded and held by portfolio investors. We show that the prevalence of closely-held firms in most countries helps explain why these countries exhibit a home bias in share holdings and why U.S. investors underweight foreign countries in their portfolios. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world float portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm level for Sweden confirms the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings.

During 1980–2000, an average of 310 companies per year went public in the United States. Since 2000, the average has been only 99 initial public offerings (IPOs) per year, with the drop especially precipitous among small firms. Many have blamed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the 2003 Global Settlement’s effects on analyst coverage for the decline in IPO activity. We find very little support for the conventional wisdom, and we offer an alternative explanation. Our economies of scope hypothesis posits that the advantages of selling out to a larger organization, which can speed a product to market and realize economies of scope, have increased relative to the benefits of operating as an independent firm.

For financial management to make wealth maximizing capital budgeting decisions, a model that will determine correctly the market value of a project's levered cash flows is required. A capital budgeting model should account not only for the effects of the investment decision, but also for the effects of the financing decision and the interactions between the two decisions. In perfect capital markets all the effects of the financing decision pertain to the tax shield created by debt financing. Thus, as originally shown by Modigliani and Miller [8], the value of a project's levered cash flow stream equals the market value the stream would have if it were unlevered plus the market value of the stream of tax savings on interest payments associated with the debt employed to finance the project. While this result is completely general with respect to the specific processes utilized by the market to value the two components, MM specified the value of the unlevered component as the present value of the unlevered cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk adjusted unlevered cost of capital and they specified the value of the tax savings component as the present value of the tax shield on interest discounted at the cost of debt. Accordingly, the value of a project's levered cash flows is specified as the sum of these two present values, one representing the effects of the investment decision and the other capturing the effects of the financing decision. The MM valuation model has been extended to normative capital budgeting analysis by Myers [9] in terms of the adjusted present value (APV) model.

This paper investigates the impact of a firm’s annual report readability and ambiguous tone on its borrowing costs. We find that firms with larger 10-K file sizes and a higher proportion of uncertain and weak modal words in 10-Ks have stricter loan contract terms and greater future stock price crash risk. Our results suggest that the readability and tone ambiguity of a firm’s financial disclosures are related to managerial information hoarding. Shareholders of firms with less readable and more ambiguous annual reports not only suffer from less transparent information disclosure but also bear the increased cost of external financing.

We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-level data across 26 non-U.S. economies between 2000 and 2010, we show that foreign institutional ownership has a positive, causal effect on firm innovation. We further explore three possible underlying mechanisms through which foreign institutions affect firm innovation: Foreign institutions act as active monitors, provide insurance for firm managers against innovation failures, and promote knowledge spillovers from high-innovation economies. Our article sheds new light on the real effects of foreign institutions on firm innovation.

We examine the impact of explicitly incorporating a measure of debt capacity in recent tests of competing theories of capital structure. Our main results are that if external funds are required, in the absence of debt capacity concerns, debt appears to be preferred to equity. Concerns over debt capacity largely explain the use of new external equity financing by publicly traded firms. Finally, we present evidence that reconciles the frequent equity issues by small, high-growth firms with the pecking order. After accounting for debt capacity, the pecking order theory appears to give a good description of financing behavior for a large sample of firms examined over an extended time period.

In considering trade credit, we need to ask three questions:

1. Why do nonfinancial firms commonly participate in the process of financial intermediation by extending credit to their customers?

2. What explains differences in credit periods between firms and industries as well as over time for specific firms and industries?

3. How do changing monetary conditions affect the credit that firms extend to their customers?

To answer these questions, we first identify two reasons for credit sales: the first we might call a financing motive, and the second a transactions motive. The transactions motive can readily be understood—it costs something to match the time pattern of payment for goods with the time pattern of receipt of goods. Buyers benefit if bills are allowed to accumulate for periodic payment. Furthermore, trade credit gives buyers time to plan for the payment of unexpected purchases, enables them to forecast future cash outlays with greater certainty, and simplifies their cash management. To the extent that buyers benefit, sellers have an opportunity to sell credit. It is likely that, to a large extent, the aggregate stock of trade credit is explained by the transactions motive.

Under the assumption that individuals are single-period maximizers of the expected utility of their future wealth, this essay extends the mean-variance security valuation model developed by Sharpe [10], Lintner [4, 5, and 6], and Mossin [7 and 8] to a general parameter-preference model, with and without the simplifications of homogeneous subjective probabilities and the existence of a risk-free security. Results with quadratic and cubic utility are developed as special cases.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by laborunions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity issignificantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holdsafter controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust toendogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, theunionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargainingenvironment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positivelyrelated to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest thatlabor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasingfirms’ operating flexibility.

A link between the firm's operating decisions and the riskiness of its stocks was established. Differences in the production process affecting the relative shares of fixed and variable costs (i.e., the operating leverage) were found, both analytically and empirically, to be associated with risk differentials. Specifically, other things equal, the higher the operating leverage (i.e., the lower the unit variable costs) the larger the overall and systematic risk of the stocks.

Various practical implications are suggested by these findings. On the firm level, it can be expected that large capital expenditures associated with an operating leverage increase will increase stock riskiness. In these cases, the cut-off rate used for the capital budgeting decision (i.e., the cost of capital) should allow for the increased risk. The use of the current cost of capital as the cut-off rate would probably result in a decrease in stock prices, adversely affecting stockholders' wealth. On the investor level, these findings might assist in the estimation of common stocks' risk given expected changes in the firm's operating leverage. Specifically, they suggest that, if a firm will experience a significant operating leverage change, the estimation of risk measures based exclusively on historical returns would be inappropriate.

It has long been market folklore that the best time to buy stocks is when individual investors are bearish, and the best time to sell is when individual investors are bullish. We examine the forecast power of three popular measures of individual investor sentiment: the level of discounts on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases, and net mutual fund redemptions. Using data from 1933 to 1993, we find that fund discounts and net redemptions predict the size premium, the difference between small and large firm returns, but little evidence that the odd-lot ratio predicts returns.

In this study, we examine the impact of security analysts' monitoring and marketing functions on firms' market value. We postulate that security analysts' monitoring of corporate performance helps motivate managers, thus reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. We also argue that the information intermediary function provided by security analysts helps expand the breadth of investor cognizance. Consistent with these conjectures, this study finds that analyst following exerts a significant and positive impact on firms' market value. We also find evidence that security analysts have a stronger incentive to follow stocks of high quality companies, since such stocks arc easier to market. Hence, the security analysis activities appear to be determined, in part, by the marketing considerations of brokerage companies.

The vector of equilibrium aggregate market values (or per share prices) of a given set of risk assets trading in purely competitive markets of individually risk-averse investors has been derived in earlier work under certain simplifying assumptions, including the absence of taxes and transactions costs and a single (uniform) holding period for the assessment of uncertain outcomes (See [8], [9], [10], [15], and [12]). The other critical assumptions in these studies were (a) the existence of a riskless asset available for holding or borrowing at a fixed, exogenously determined interest rate, (b) an assumption that all investors act in terms of identical joint probability distributions over end-of-period outcomes, and (c) the acceptance of a mean-variance criterion for portfolio decisions.

This study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

We examine the association of a venture capital (VC) firm’s reputation with the post-initial public offering (IPO) long-run performance of its portfolio firms. We find that VC reputation, measured by the past market share of VC-backed IPOs, has significant positive associations with long-run firm performance measures. While more reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, more reputable VCs continue to be associated with superior long-run performance, even after controlling for VC selectivity. We find that more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms, and this continued VC involvement positively influences post-IPO firm performance.

This article incorporates well-documented managerial traits into a tradeoff model of capital structure to study their impact on corporate financial policy and firm value. Optimistic and/or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and issue new debt more often but need not follow a pecking order. The model also surprisingly uncovers that these managerial traits can play a positive role. Biased managers' higher debt levels restrain them from diverting funds, which increases firm value by reducing this manager-shareholder conflict. Although higher debt levels delay investment, mildly biased managers' investment decisions can increase firm value by reducing this bondholder-shareholder conflict.

Unlike previous studies, this paper finds a consistent and highly significant relationship between beta and cross-sectional portfolio returns. The key distinction between our tests and previous tests is the recognition that the positive relationship between returns and beta predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model is based on expected rather than realized returns. In periods where excess market returns are negative, an inverse relationship between beta and portfolio returns should exist. When we adjust for the expectations concerning negative market excess returns, we find a consistent and significant relationship between beta and returns for the entire sample, for subsample periods, and for data divided by months in a year. Separately, we find support for a positive payment for beta risk.

This paper evaluates a nonparametric sign test for abnormal security price performance in event studies. The sign test statistic examined here does not require a symmetrical distribution of security excess returns for correct specification. Sign test performance is compared to a parametric t-test and a nonparametric rank test. Simulations with daily security return data show that the sign test is better specified under the null hypothesis and often more powerful under the alternative hypothesis than a t-test. The performance of the sign test is dominated by the performance of a rank test, however, indicating that the rank test is preferable to the sign test in obtaining nonparametric inferences concerning abnormal security price performance in event studies.

International asset pricing models suggest that barriers to portfolio flows and availability of market substitutes affect the degree and time variation of world market integration. We use GARCH-in-mean methodology to assess the evolution in market integration for eight emerging markets over the period 1977–2000. Our results suggest that while local risk is still a relevant factor in explaining time variation of emerging market returns, none of the countries appear to be completely segmented. We find that there are substantial crossmarket differences in the degree of integration. The evolution toward more integrated financial markets is apparent although at times we do observe reversals. In addition, we provide clear evidence on the impropriety of directly using correlations of market-wide index returns as a measure of market integration. Finally, financial market development and financial liberalization policies play important roles in integrating emerging markets.