This study examines the kinds of events that cause large shifts in the volatility of emerging stock markets. We first determine when large changes in the volatility of emerging stock market returns occur and then examine global and local events (social, political, and economic) during the periods of increased volatility. An iterated cumulative sums of squares (ICSS) algorithm is used to identify the points of shocks/sudden changes in the variance of returns in each market and how long the shift lasts. Both increases and decreases in the variance are identified. We then identify events around the time period when shifts in volatility occur. Most events tend to be local and include the Mexican peso crisis, periods of hyperinflation in Latin America, the Marcos-Aquino conflict in the Philippines, and the stock market scandal in India. The October 1987 crash is the only global event during the period 1985–1995 that caused a significant jump in the volatility of several emerging stock markets.

The relations between volume, volatility, and market depth in eight physical and financial futures markets are examined. Evidence suggests that linking volatility to total volume does not extract all information. When volume is partitioned into expected and unexpected components, the paper finds that unexpected volume shocks have a larger effect on volatility. Further, the relation is asymmetric; the impact of positive unexpected volume shocks on volatility is larger than the impact of negative shocks. Finally, consistent with theories of market depth, the study shows large open interest mitigates volatility.

This research examines the relationship between policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that policy uncertainty is negatively related to firm acquisitiveness and positively related to the time it takes to complete M&A deals. In addition, policy uncertainty motivates acquirers to use stock for payment and to pay lower bid premiums. Acquirers, on average, create larger shareholder value from M&A deals undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty, which is attributable to their prudence as well as the wealth transfer from the financially constrained targets to acquirers.

We examine how shocks to the supply of credit impact corporate financing and investment using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989; and regulatory changes in the insurance industry as an exogenous contraction in the supply of below-investment-grade credit after 1989. A difference-in-differences empirical strategy reveals that substitution to bank debt and alternative sources of capital (e.g., equity, cash balances, and trade credit) was limited, leading to an almost one-for-one decline in net investment with the decline in net debt issuances. Despite this sharp change in behavior, corporate leverage ratios remained relatively stable, a result of the contemporaneous decline in debt issuances and investment. Overall, our findings highlight how even large firms with access to public credit markets are susceptible to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

This paper investigates to what extent globalization and regional integration lead to increasing equity market interdependence. I focus on Western Europe, as this region has gone through a unique period of economic, financial, and monetary integration. More specifically, I quantify the magnitude and time-varying nature of volatility spillovers from the aggregate European (EU) and U.S. market to 13 local European equity markets. To account for time-varying integration, I use a regime-switching model to allow the shock sensitivities to change over time. I find regime switches to be both statistically and economically important. Both the EU and U.S. shock spillover intensity increased substantially over the 1980s and 1990s, though the rise is more pronounced for EU spillovers. Shock spillover intensities increased most strongly in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. I show that increased trade integration, equity market development, and low inflation contribute to the increase in EU shock spillover intensity. I also find evidence for contagion from the U.S. market to a number of local European equity markets during periods of high world market volatility.

This paper estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs), who have control of a firm's votes, while owning only a minority of the cash flow rights. Analyzing a panel of 309 listed Swedish firms during 1991–1997, for which we have complete and detailed data on ownership and corporate control instruments, we provide these results; families employ CMS structures, via dual-class shares and other corporate control instruments, about 1.5–2 times more often than other categories of owners (corporations, financial institutions). Estimated agency costs of controlling shareholders are 6%–25% of firm value (Tobin's q) for the median firm among the different categories of controlling owners, ceteris paribus. Family CMSs are associated with the largest discount on firm value. The source of the discount seems to be partly what such owners/firms do: return on assets is significantly lower for firms with concentrated vote control. It also seems as if the discount is related to what such owners/firms do not do. Family CMSs seem to hang on to the control too long from the non-controlling shareholders' perspective; e.g., firms with family CMSs are about 50% less likely to be taken over compared to other firms.

This paper has developed a model of bank margins or spreads in which the bank is viewed as a risk-averse dealer. It was demonstrated that an interest spread or margin would always exist, and that this was the result of transactions uncertainty faced by the bank. Moreover, it was shown that this pure spread depended on four factors: the degree of managerial risk aversion; the size of transactions undertaken by the bank; bank market structure; and the variance of interest rates. The model implied that liability and asset structures had to be analyzed together since they were directly interrelated through transactions uncertainty. It was shown that because of this transactions uncertainty, hedging behavior was perfectly rational within an expected utility maximizing framework. Extending the model from a structure with one kind of loan and deposit to loans and deposits with many maturities should lead to further interesting insights into margin determination especially as “portfolio” effects may become apparent.

The informational opacity of small businesses makes them an interesting area for the study of banks' lending practices and procedures. We use data from a survey of small businesses to analyze the micro level differences in the loan approval processes of large and small banks. We provide evidence that large banks ($1 billion or more in assets) employ standard criteria obtained from financial statements in the loan decision process, whereas small banks rely to a greater extent on information about the character of the borrower. These cookie-cutter and character approaches are compatible with the incentives and environments facing large and small banks.

Motivated by a theoretical model, we examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or policy uncertainty that affects technological innovation more. Innovation activities, measured by patent-based proxies, are not, on average, affected by which policy is in place. Innovation activities, however, drop significantly during times of policy uncertainty measured by national elections. The drop is greater for more influential innovations (citations in the right tail, exploratory rather than exploitative innovations) and for innovation-intensive industries. We use close presidential elections and ethnic fractionalization to address endogeneity concerns. We uncover the mechanism underlying the main result by showing that the number of patenting inventors decreases with policy uncertainty. Political compromise, we conclude, encourages innovation.

This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging decisions. The paper examines the evidence in light of currently mandated financial reporting requirements and, in particular, the constraints placed on anticipatory hedging. Data on hedging are obtained from 1992 annual reports for a sample of 3,022 firms. Out of the 771 firms classified as hedgers, 543 firms disclose information in their annual reports on their hedging activities; the remaining 228 firms report use of derivatives but no information on hedging activities. Based on the evidence, I draw the following conclusions with respect to the models of hedging: evidence is inconsistent with financial distress cost models; evidence is mixed with respect to contracting cost, capital market imperfections, and tax-based models; and evidence uniformly supports the hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale.

Most asset pricing models postulate a positive relationship between a stock portfolio's expected returns and risk, which is often modeled by the variance of the asset price. This paper uses GARCH in mean models to examine the relationship between mean returns on a stock portfolio and its conditional variance or standard deviation. After estimating a variety of models from daily and monthly portfolio return data, we conclude that any relationship between mean returns and own variance or standard deviation is weak. The results suggest that investors consider some other risk measure to be more important than the variance of portfolio returns.

We examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.

This paper provides a simple method to account for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence in samples with large cross sections and relatively few time-series observations. The method is motivated by cross-sectional regression studies in finance and accounting. Simulation evidence suggests that these estimators are dependable in small samples and may be useful when generalized least squares is infeasible, unreliable, or computationally too burdensome. We also consider efficiency issues and show that, in principle, asymptotic efficiency can be improved using a technique due to Cragg (1983).

This study provides evidence on joint characteristics of hourly common stock trading volume and returns on the New York Stock Exchange. Average volume traded shows significant differences across trading hours of the day and across days of the week. Average returns differ across hours of the day, and, to some extent, across days of the week. There is a strong contemporaneous relation between trading volume and returns and also a relation between trading volume and returns lagged up to four hours. Furthermore, the trading volume-returns relation is steeper for positive returns than for nonpositive returns.

This paper documents a strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession. The likelihood that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO increases monotonically with the percentage of outside directors. This monotonic relation is observed for both voluntary and forced departures. Evidence from stock returns around succession announcements indicates that, on average, shareholders benefit from outside appointments, but are harmed when an insider replaces a fired CEO.

This paper solves, in closed form, the optimal portfolio choice problem for an investor with utility over consumption under mean-reverting returns. Previous solutions either require approximations, numerical methods, or the assumption that the investor does not consume over his lifetime. This paper breaks the impasse by assuming that markets are complete. The solution leads to a new understanding of hedging demand and of the behavior of the approximate log-linear solution. The portfolio allocation takes the form of a weighted average and is shown to be analogous to duration for coupon bonds. Through this analogy, the notion of investment horizon is extended to that of an investor who consumes at multiple points in time.

We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. This finding is robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital measure and incremental to the effects of religiosity, corporate social responsibility, and tax avoidance. We identify the causal relation using companies with a social-capital-changing headquarters relocation. We also find that high-social-capital firms face loosened nonprice loan terms, incur lower at-issue bond spreads, and prefer public bonds over bank loans. We conclude that debt holders perceive social capital as providing environmental pressure that constrains opportunistic firm behaviors in debt contracting.

Using genetic programming techniques to find technical trading rules, we find strong evidence of economically significant out-of-sample excess returns to those rules for each of six exchange rates over the period 1981–1995. Further, when the dollar/Deutsche mark rules are allowed to determine trades in the other markets, there is significant improvement in performance in all cases, except for the Deutsche mark/yen. Betas calculated for the returns according to various benchmark portfolios provide no evidence that the returns to these rules are compensation for bearing systematic risk. Bootstrapping results on the dollar/Deutsche mark indicate that the trading rules detect patterns in the data that are not captured by standard statistical models.

Miller (1977) hypothesizes that dispersion of investor opinion in the presence of short-sale constraints leads to stock price overvaluation. However, previous empirical tests of Miller's hypothesis examine the valuation effects of only one of these two necessary conditions. We examine the valuation effects of the interaction between differences of opinion and shortsale constraints. We find robust evidence of significant overvaluation for stocks that are subject to both conditions simultaneously. Stocks are not systematically overvalued when either one of these two conditions is not met.

In this paper, I examine survivorship bias in hedge fund returns by comparing two large databases. I find that the survivorship bias exceeds 2% per year. Results of survivorship bias by investment styles indicate that the biases are different across styles. I reconcile the conflicting results about survivorship bias in previous studies by showing that the two major hedge fund databases contain different amounts of dissolved funds. Empirical results show that poor performance is the main reason for a fund's disappearance. Furthermore, I find that there are significant differences in fund returs, inception date, net assets value, incentive fee, management fee, and investment styles forthe 465 common funds covered by both databases. Mismatching between reported returns andthe percentage change in NAVs can partially explain the differences in returns.