Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors.

The onset of COVID-19 was characterized by voluminous, negative news. Higher narrativity news topics (measured by textual proximity to articles describing the 1987 stock market crash and textual distance from Federal Reserve communications) were systematically associated with contemporaneous market responses, which were larger on high volatility days (hypersensitivity), and with markets–news feedback. Hypersensitive news topic-market pairs were associated with next-day reversals. A test using the news–markets relationship identifies a mid-March 2020 structural break, which was knowable by the end of April. Post break, markets and news became considerably less coupled, and hypersensitivity and reversals abated.

We show theoretically that the usual estimated investment strategies will not achieve the optimal Sharpe ratio when the dimensionality is high relative to sample size, and the $ 1/N $ rule is optimal in a 1-factor model with diversifiable risks as dimensionality increases, which explains why it is difficult to beat the $ 1/N $ rule in practice. We also explore conditions under which it can be beaten, and find that we can outperform it by combining it with the estimated rules when $ N $ is small, and by combining it with anomalies or machine learning portfolios, conditional on the profitability of the latter, when $ N $ is large.

We propose a novel measure of the market return tail risk premium based on minimum-distance state price densities recovered from high-frequency data. The tail risk premium extracted from intra-day S&P 500 returns predicts the market equity and variance risk premiums and expected excess returns on a cross section of characteristics-sorted portfolios. Additionally, we describe the differential role of the quantity of tail risk, and of the tail premium, in shaping the future distribution of index returns. Our results are robust to controlling for established measures of variance and tail risk, and of risk premiums, in the predictive models.

This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.

This article studies the relationship between credit provision and stock trading behavior. We collect every stock transaction of the three major British companies during the 1720 South Sea Bubble and link stock trading to margin loan positions with the Bank of England. We give insights in the selection of traders into the loan facility by comparing the trading behavior and realized returns of borrowers to other traders. We find that loan holders are more likely to buy following high returns and document strong underperformance of borrowers.

I study whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program reduced informed trading by corporate insiders. To identify the effect, I partition firms based on the extent to which this program affected the likelihood of whistleblowing at each firm. I find a relative reduction in trading profits on purchases made by insiders at more affected firms after the program was initiated. I analyze insider sales in settings where they are more likely to be informed and find a reduction in the number of sales before negatively perceived events. The results suggest that whistleblower protections and rewards can effectively deter insider trading.

I show that hedge funds react to unrealized losses on their passive positions by engaging with the management. The hedge fund managers’ psychological response is consistent with cognitive dissonance: They blame the firms’ management and switch to activism. The loss, which is hedge fund-investment specific, is distinct from economic factors such as the firm’s industry-adjusted performance. Loss-driven activism is more likely to be unfocused on specific issues and results in worse firm performance. This study shows that an overlooked consequence of unrealized losses is to trigger an active engagement with the firm.

Using data on nearly 20,000 restaurants in China during the COVID-19 outbreak, we find evidence that the government-sponsored rent reduction program reduced debt overhang problems. Rent reductions, which averaged 36,000 RMB per restaurant, increase the open rate of restaurants by 3.7%, revenue by 11,000 RMB, and the number of employees by 0.36. Larger restaurants with higher committed costs benefit more from the rent reduction. The stimulus has a positive spillover effect that boosts the revenue of restaurants in the immediate vicinity of subsidized restaurants. The treatment effect varies with organizational structure in a manner consistent with an information frictions hypothesis.

I develop a model revealing the interplay between a stock’s liquidity and the policies and value of the issuing firm. The model shows that bid-ask spreads increase not only the firm’s cost of capital but also the opportunity cost of cash, then lowering cash reserves, increasing liquidation risk, and reducing firm value. These outcomes are stronger when internalized by liquidity providers, simultaneously leading to a wider bid-ask spread. A two-way relation between the firm and the liquidity of its stock arises, implying that shocks arising within the firm or in the stock market have more complex implications than previously understood.

We show large flows of workers into the real estate agent (REA) occupation during the early 2000s from virtually all parts of the skill, wage, and education spectrums. We find those entering REA in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with house price bubbles end up in occupations paying significantly less in the long-run as compared to similar REA entrants in non-bubble areas. Even in 2017, when house prices and employment return to their pre-crisis levels, REA entrants in Bubble MSAs are in occupations earning about 6% less. These results point to lasting effects of labor allocation decisions in response to distorted price signals.

I propose a novel measure to identify family firms based on the number of family links between high-ranking coworkers. Leveraging this measure, I reexamine previous findings in the literature and derive four novel facts: i) Measures of stock ownership misclassify firms with a large family presence. ii) Family-run firms exhibit value stock characteristics, whereas founder-CEO firms display growth stock characteristics. iii) Family-run firms pay lower costs. iv) Family managers behave myopically. I conclude that failing to consider family links can lead to highly misleading results in the study of family firms.

I introduce two dimensions of uncertainty, about the upside and the downside of an asset, in a model of asset valuation under asymmetric information. This justifies capital structures with equity and risky debt for information revelation purposes. However, a capital structure with only one information-sensitive security, equity, can be optimal when investors are less informed about the dimension that matters more for valuation. This is relevant for innovative firms with a large upside subject to strong information asymmetries, which often have abnormally low leverage, and for firms at an intermediate stage of their life cycle that do not issue risky debt.

Due to the government-driven mergers of large banks, many competing firms in Japan ended up borrowing from a common lender. Using firm-level data, we find that the capital investments of competing firms that share a common lender decrease by 15% of the mean. When a common lender can exercise its voice through its former employees serving as firms’ executive directors, investments fall significantly further. Competing firms that share a common lender increase markups and profitability ratios, suggesting that the lender induces strategic coordination among its borrowers to reduce their competitive pressures. Firms use saved resources from weaker competition for cash cushions.

This article proposes a novel way to estimate consumer switching costs and uses Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide this estimate for the loan market. I show that when a distressed bank’s closure forced firms to switch, they started borrowing at lower interest rates instantly and permanently and that this drop revealed the lower bound of firms’ ex ante switching costs. A healthy bank’s closure showed no such effect. The article’s findings suggest that distressed banks hold up and overcharge firms and that by closing and resolving such banks with good-bank/bad-bank separation regulators can improve firm financing.