Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.

This paper examines the value of analysts as industry specialists. We show analysts create value in their recommendations mainly through their ability to rank stocks within industries. An industry-based recommendation strategy substantially improves the return to risk ratio and reduces price momentum tilt relative to portfolios that ignore industry information. An examination of the links among analyst information, aggregated at the industry level, and industry returns and industry momentum shows that industry returns precede industry-aggregated analyst upgrades and downgrades, and the short-term industry price momentum phenomenon is partly explained by returns of firms with more analyst coverage leading those with less in that industry. Recommendation information is not valuable for predicting future relative industry returns, however.

Using approximately 10,000 firms jointly covered by Compustat and CRSP from 1974–1993, we find substantial differences in the SIC codes designated by the two databases. More than 36 percent of the classifications disagree at the two-digit level and nearly 80 percent disagree at the four-digit level. We examine the impact of these differences upon financial research in several ways. First, we show that the classification of utilities, financial firms, and conglomerate acquisitions are affected by the choice of CRSP vs. Compustat SIC codes. Second, we show that industry classification matters in financial research by illustrating that size- and industry-matched comparisons are more powerful than pure size matches. Third, we test the specification and power of Compustat vs. CRSP classifications by simulating a typical financial experiment in which sample firms are matched to control firms by industry. We find that: i) Compustat matched samples are more powerful than CRSP matched samples in detecting abnormal performance; ii) nonparametric tests outperform parametric tests; and iii) four-digit SIC code matches are more powerful than two-digit SIC code matches. These results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of extreme values, and hold for both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq firms.

The low (high) abnormal returns of stocks with high (low) beta, which we refer to as the beta anomaly, is one of the most persistent anomalies in empirical asset pricing research. This article demonstrates that investors’ demand for lottery-like stocks is an important driver of the beta anomaly. The beta anomaly is no longer detected when beta-sorted portfolios are neutralized to lottery demand, regression specifications control for lottery demand, or factor models include a lottery demand factor. The beta anomaly is concentrated in stocks with low levels of institutional ownership and it exists only when the price impact of lottery demand is concentrated in high-beta stocks.

Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

We apply an event-study methodology on over 10,000 Morningstar star rating changes and find that Morningstar has subsantial independent influence on the investment allocation decisions of retail mutual fund investors. It is the discrete change in the star rating itself and not the change in the underlying performance measures that drives frow. We document econnomically and statistically significant positive abnormal flow following rating upgrades, and negative abnormal flow following rating downgrades. In contrast to the cross-sectional flow performance literature, we find evidence of investor punishment of performance declines, some of which is evident immediately in the month of the rating change.

Recent research focused on the market for first public offerings of common stock has indicated that investors who purchase new issues at the offering price will quickly achieve relatively large systematic profits. This is attributable to either the inability or the reluctance of investment bankers to reoffer the shares in which they deal at market-clearing prices. This paper examines factors that influence investment bankers in their pricing decisions and subsequently determine the short-run performance of new issues.

This paper investigates market manipulation trading strategies by large traders in a securities market. A large trader is defined as any investor whose trades change prices. A market manipulation trading strategy is one that generates positive real wealth with no risk. Market manipulation trading strategies are shown to exist under reasonable hypotheses on the equilibrium price process. Sufficient conditions for their nonexistence are also provided.

Using synchronous transactions data for IBM from the New York, Pacific, and Midwest Stock Exchanges, we estimate an error correction model to investigate whether each of the exchanges is contributing to price discovery. Johansen's test yields two cointegrating vectors, which together verify the expected long-run equilibrium of equal prices across the three exchanges. Two error correction terms specified as the differences from IBM prices on the NYSE indicate that adjustments maintaining the long-run cointegration equilibrium take place on all three exchanges. That is, IBM prices on the NYSE adjust toward IBM prices on the Midwest and Pacific Exchanges, just as Midwest and Pacific prices adjust to the NYSE.

According to the Diamond-Verrecchia hypothesis, if increases in short interest are correlated with information that is not yet public, they should precipitate a price adjustment. Stocks with unexpected increases in short interest are found to generate statistically significant, but small, negative abnormal returns for a short period around the announcement date. When the sample is divided into stocks with and without tradable options, nonoptioned stocks closely mimic these results but the optioned stocks do not. In a cross-sectional analysis of individual firms, the short-term negative abnormal returns are found to be 1) more negative, the higher the degree of unexpected short interest and, 2) less negative if the firm has tradable options.

We examine the stock price behavior associated with public offerings of common stock and convertible debt that are withdrawn by the issuing firm, as well as the stock price behavior associated with completed offerings. We find that stock returns are negative in the period from the announcement to the withdrawal, and are statistically insignificant from the announcement to the issuance. Stock returns are positive at the withdrawal and negative at the issuance. Furthermore, the average stock returns associated with withdrawals are significantly different from zero only when the reported reason for the withdrawals is unfavorable market conditions. Our evidence suggests that managers' decisions to withdraw equity offerings depend on recent stock price behavior, and that managers' decisions convey information about firm value to market participants.

This paper investigates the effect of company brand perceptions on investor propensities to hold stocks. We find that, after controlling for other determinants of stockholdings, there is a negative and significant cross-sectional relation between institutional holdings and brand visibility, which is consistent with the notion that individual investors prefer to invest in stocks with easily recognized products. Furthermore, we find that institutional holdings are positively related to firm size and beta. Our analysis supports the notion that institutional portfolios eschew relatively neglected small firms, whereas individuals prefer holding stocks with high recognition and, consequently, greater information precision.

We develop a general method for estimating the implied, martingale equivalent, probability density function (PDF) for futures prices from American options prices. The early exercise feature of American options precludes expressing the price of the option in terms of the PDF. There exist tight bounds for the price of American options in terms of the PDF. We demonstrate how these bounds, together with observed option prices, can be used to estimate the parameters of the PDF. We estimate the distribution for crude oil during the Persian Gulf crisis and find the distribution differs significantly from that recovered using standard techniques.

Motivated by the fact that investors have limited time and attention to process information, this paper provides a continuous-time equilibrium model to analyze the effects of a capacity constraint in the learning process of a representative investor, who optimally allocates her information capacity across multiple sources of uncertainty. Consequently, the cross-sectional structure of information and the resulting asset price dynamics are determined endogenously. The model provides implications on both consumption behavior and the cross-sectional differences in price informativeness in terms of supply of information, speed of price adjustments to fundamental shocks, and price reactions to firm disclosures.

This paper examines the association between the initialadoption of stock options for senior-level executives and subsequent changes in corporate dividend policy. The primary research hypothesis is that the addition of a stock option to a manager's compensation package provides an incentive for the executive to reduce corporate dividends. This hypothesis follows from the observation that executive stock options are generally not “dividend protected.” The results suggest that dividends are reduced relative to expected dividends. We interpret these results as suggesting that the personal incentives of executives can affect certain aspects of the observed corporate dividend policy.

This paper develops a capital asset pricing theory in a market where noise traders interact with information traders. Noise traders are traders who commit cognitive errors while information traders are free of cognitive errors. The theory includes the determination of the mean-variance efficient frontier, the return on the market portfolio, the term structure, and option prices. The paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of price efficiency in the presence of noise traders and analyzes the effects of noise traders on price efficiency, volatility, return anomalies, volume, and noise trader survival.

We show that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of raising external capital. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings, we find that, ceteris paribus, investment banks' fees are significantly lower for firms with more liquid stock. We estimate that the difference in the investment banking fee for firms in the most liquid vs. the least liquid quintile is about 101 basis points or 21% of the average investment banking fee in our sample. Our findings suggest that firms can reduce the cost of raising capital by improving the market liquidity of their stock.

We examine the wealth effects of 3 regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, wefind that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where blockholders have strong political connections.

Using a large sample of nonfinancial firms from 47 countries, we examine the effect of derivative use on firm risk and value. We control for endogeneity by matching users and nonusers on the basis of their propensity to use derivatives. We also use a new technique to estimate the effect of omitted variable bias on our inferences. We find strong evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk. The effect of derivative use on firm value is positive but more sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. However, using derivatives is associated with significantly higher value, abnormal returns, and larger profits during the economic downturn in 2001–2002, suggesting that firms are hedging downside risk.

Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in a firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. Therefore, we propose that labor uses its corporate governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual claims, and that this often pushes corporate policies away from, rather than toward, shareholder value maximization.