Using information on banks' balance sheets, I analyze the causal links between the banking and currency problems in the German crisis of 1931. I find that the crisis had two independent causes: Political shocks triggered a run on the Reichsmark; and the excessive risk-taking by banks that were “too big to fail” led to a run on banks. Due to the high level of foreign debt in the banking system, the run on the currency and the deposit withdrawals reinforced each other in a vicious circle and resulted in a banking panic and the abandonment of the gold standard.

If employers make so much money, why don't workers hire machines and expertise and make the money instead? This question has generated a large body of writing, including Stephen Marglin's much-cited article “What Do Bosses Do?” Marglin draws on history to argue that the employer, who added nothing to technical efficiency, used specialization of tasks to divide labor and impose himself as boss, thereby creating an artificial, unproductive role. These arrangements were embodied in domestic industry and were reinforced when employers turned to the factory system as a more effective disciplinary mode. This article argues that such a thesis misreads history and is essentially ideological.

The origins of a Balkan Orthodox merchant class or classes may be traced back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Not until the eighteenth century, however, did it become sufficiently strong in wealth and number to capture the trade of Hungary, South Russia, and the eastern Mediterranean. The eighteenth century was a time of expansion of French, German, English, and Russian trade in the Balkans. It was also a time of growth of the trade of Moslem Albanian and Bosnian merchants. But, in terms of its significance to the cultural, political, and general historical evolution of the Balkan peoples, most important of all was the expansion of the Balkan Orthodox merchant: the Greek trader of Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, the Greek and Orthodox Albanian merchant, sailor, and shipper of the smaller Aegean islands, the Greek, Vlach, and Macedo-Slav muleteer and forwarding agent of Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, the Serbian pig-merchant of Šumadija, the “Illyrian” muleteer and forwarding agent of Herzegovina and Dalmatia, who set up business in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) or Trieste, the “Rascian” of Pannonia, and the Greek or Bulgarian of the eastern Rhodope. The Balkan Orthodox merchants were Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian subjects, but their principal business was to bring goods into or out of the Ottoman Empire. The area of their primary business concentration stretched north and west of the political limits of the Ottoman Empire to Nezhin in South Russia, Leipzig in Germany, Vienna in Austria, and Livorno and Naples in Italy. In western Europe, they succeeded in creating an area of secondary commercial penetration.

In 1917, after scientific breakthroughs allowed for the early detection of bovine tuberculosis, the USDA began a campaign to eradicate the disease. Agents inspected nearly every cattle farm in the country and condemned roughly 4 million reactors to slaughter without full compensation. This article analyzes how the eradication program functioned, how incentives were aligned to ensure widespread participation without excessive moral hazard problems, and why the United States led most European nations in controlling the disease. The U.S. campaign was a spectacular success, reducing human suffering and death and yielding benefits in the farm sector alone that exceeded ten times the cost.

The growth in inventive activity during early American industrialization is explored by examining the careers of 160 inventors credited with important technological discoveries. Analysis of biographical information and complete patent histories through 1865 indicates that these “great inventors” were entrepreneurial and responded systematically to market demand. Their inventions were procyclical and originated disproportionately from localities linked with extensive markets. Although unexceptional in terms of schooling or technical skills, they vigorously pursued the returns to their inventions, redirected their inventive activity to meet emerging needs, and were distinguished by high geographical mobility toward districts conducive to invention and its commercialization.

On the eve of the Civil War southern per capita real income was eighty percent of northern. Treating slaves as property, real income per free southerner was four percent greater and growing at the same rate as its northern counterpart. Southern per capita income was but fifty-one percent of the national average in 1880, and only slowly began to relatively advance after 1900.

This article presents new estimates of time spent in home production in the United States during the twentieth century. Historical time-diary studies for various segments of the population are linked to estimates from recent time use surveys. The new estimates suggest that time spent in home production by prime-age women fell by around six hours from 1900 to 1965 and by another 12 hours from 1965 to 2005. Time spent by prime-age men rose by 13 hours from 1900 to 2005. Average across the entire population, per capita time spent in home production increased slightly over the century.

The Bank Panic of 1907 was one of the most severe financial crises in the United States before the Great Depression. Although contemporaries realized that the panic in New York City was centered at trust companies, subsequent research has relied heavily on national bank data. Balance sheet data for trust companies and state banks as well as call reports of national banks indicate that the contraction of loans and deposits in New York City during the panic was confined to the trust companies.

In the 1960s many American cities experienced violent, race-related civil disturbances. This article examines census data from 1950 to 1980 to measure the riots' impact on the value of central-city residential property, and especially on black-owned property. Both OLS and IV estimates indicate that the riots depressed the median value of black-owned property between 1960 and 1970, with little or no rebound in the 1970s. Census tract data for a small number of cities suggest relative losses of population and property value in tracts that were directly affected by riots compared to other tracts in the same cities.

New indices of industrial production show that Britain's industrial growth in the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century was about a third slower than currently available estimates indicate. Therefore, mid-eighteenth-century industrial output was nearly twice as high as previously assumed.

Although it has been labeled the “First Industrial Revolution,” British growth and industrialization was slow between the 1760s and the 1820s. The explanation seems to lie with low capital formation shares in national income, low rates of accumulation, and thus little change in the capital-labor ratio. What accounts for the modest investment rates? Lack of thrift? Weak investment demand? This paper argues that the answer is to be found in the enormous debt issues used, to finance the French Wars.

During the Progressive Era, advances in knowledge and specialization led to the emergence of modern-day professions. This growth in professions was accompanied by the adoption of occupational licensing regulation. In this article we explore the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation during this period. Although most studies argue that occupational licensing regulation is adopted to restrict entry and reduce competition, the evidence from the Progressive Era suggests that regulation arose to improve markets as specialization and advances in knowledge made it increasingly difficult for consumers to judge the quality of professional services.

Not long ago, the Governor of a midwestern state was approached by representatives of a particular trade anxious to enlist the Governor's support in securing passage of legislation to license their trade.“Governor,” the men said, “passage of this licensing act will ensure that only qualified people will practice this occupation; it will eliminate charlatans, incompetents or frauds; and it will thereby protect the safety and welfare of the people of this state.”The governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical. “Gentlemen,” he asked, “are you concerned with advancing the health, safety and welfare of the people under the police powers of the state, or are you primarily interested in creating a monopoly situation to eliminate competition and raise prices?”The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said, “Governor, we're interested in a little of each.”Council of State GovernmentsCouncil of State Governments, Occupational Licensin g, p. 1.

Due primarily to transport improvements, commodity prices in Britain and the United States tended to converge between 1870 and 1913. Heckscher and Ohlin, writing in 1919 and 1924, thought that these events should have contributed to factor-price convergence. It turns out that Heckscher and Ohlin were right: a significant share of the Anglo-American real-wage convergence was due to commodity-price convergence. It appears that this late nineteenth-century episode was the dramatic start of world-commodity and factor-market integration that continues today.

This article studies the long-run relationship between the capital share in national income and top personal income shares. Using a newly constructed historical cross-country database on capital shares and top income data, we find evidence on a strong, positive link that has grown stronger over the past century. The connection is stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries, in the very top of the distribution, when top capital incomes predominate, when using distributed top national income shares, and when considering gross of depreciation capital shares. Out of-sample predictions of top shares using capital shares indicates several cases of over- or underestimation.

This paper describes the geographical pattern of wages in Britain between 1760 and 1914. It then draws out some of the implications of the wages pattern and considers, in particular, the implications for the “growth pole” debate on the likely effect of industrialization upon regional income inequalities. The market forces responsible for creating and maintaining these differentials are then described, followed by a final section which discsusses the significance of changing regional wage differentials to the standar-of-living debate. It concludes that from a regional perspective the overall effects of industrialization upon living standards are indisputably favorable.

Since this country attained approximately its present continental boundaries nearly a century ago, vast shifts have occurred in the geographical pattern of its population. Immigration from abroad contributed many millions to the overall increase of more than 100,000,000 during the period 1850–1940; domestic migration carried settlement westward; and natural increase of the populations of different areas at differing ratios contributed a substantial but unmeasured element to geographical redistribution.

The enormous Nazi voting literature rarely builds on modern statistical or economic research. By adding these approaches, we find that the most widely accepted existing theories of this era cannot distinguish the Weimar elections from almost any others in any country. Via a retrospective voting account, we show that voters most hurt by the depression, and most likely to oppose the government, fall into separate groups with divergent interests. This explains why some turned to the Nazis and others turned away. The consequences of Hitler's election were extraordinary, but the voting behavior that led to it was not.

Although the late medieval Commercial Revolution is considered to be a watershed in the economic history of Europe, the analysis of the interrelationship between political and economic systems in bringing about this period of economic growth has been neglected. This article conducts such an analysis with respect to the city of Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Viewing political institutions as self-enforcing agreements rather than as exogenous rules, I present and analyze the nature and evolution of Genoa's political systems and the relations between these systems and economic growth.

As a result of recent advances in historical national accounting, estimates of GDP per capita are now available for a number of European economies back to the medieval period, including Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. The approach has also been extended to Asian economies, including India and Japan. So far, however, China, which has been at the center of the Great Divergence debate, has been absent from this approach. This article adds China to the picture, showing that the Great Divergence began earlier than originally suggested by the California School, but later than implied by older Eurocentric writers.

This article reexamines the economics of premodern apprenticeship in England. I present new data showing that a high proportion of apprenticeships in seventeenth-century London ended before the term of service was finished. I then propose a new account of how training costs and repayments were distributed over the apprenticeship contract such that neither master nor apprentice risked significant loss from early termination. This new account fits both the characteristics of premodern apprenticeship and what is known about the acquisition of skills in modern and premodern societies.