The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played a central role in the regeneration of West Germany since die Second World War, with the accession of die Federal Republic to NATO in May 1955 marking the official return of Germany to the company of civilized nations. West Germany, in turn, has become a not inconsequential member of the treaty organization. The bulk of NATO'S defense forces is located in die Federal Republic; an increasing amount of NATO'S military contribution is German; and the most controversial issue in Europe confronting the organization stems direcdy from die division of Germany and the exposed position of Berlin.

The arms control and disarmament issues on which there is no agreement are numerous and important. The purpose of this article is not to go over what is by now too familiar ground, but rather to examine the little considered question of the relationship contemplated between the United Nations and agencies that may be created to administer arms control or disarmament arrangements.

Interactions between different kinds of actors engaged in outer space and ocean exploration and exploitation can be grouped into five major categories of activities. These activities reflect the dominant interests of all the participants, and they are treated at a level of generality which facilitates comparison. The categories of activities are: i) management and regulation of common resources; 2) exploitation of specific resources; 3) coordination and financing of research, including exploration and experimentation at the international level, and arrangements governing the exchange of information gained; 4) preservation of national and international security; and 5) recreation and the control of pollution.

During the past century revolutionary organizations have, in the name of mankind, sought the violent transformation of the existing international framework. Their aim has been the liberation of nations submerged by fate or repressed by coercion and the destruction of the entire nation-state system, considered a passing phase of history. Even those revolutionary organizations dedicated to a specific national struggle have tended to see the triumph of their cause as a step toward a conflict-free world society in which the basic aspirations of all will have been achieved. In the heyday of anticolonial revolts nationalism per se tended to dominate the ideology of the various movements. In the last decade, with fewer countries to liberate from a foreign oppressor and more to be liberated from domestic regimes supported by worldwide imperialism, the universal ideological context of the revolutionary struggle has become more pronounced. Today most, but by no means all, revolutionary movements proclaim an allegiance to world revolution; nevertheless, as in the past, most continue to act as covert governments or illegal armies, underground or in exile, and to represent not the universal but the particular. Such organizations may have deep sympathies, even specific alliances, with fellow national revolutionary organizations or legitimate governments, but they are often comparable, if not parallel, to normal international arrangements. Even the most militant movements in the vanguard of world revolution, despite all their paraphernalia of antinational ideology, are nearly always established on a national basis and act as alternative national regimes. At best, revolution in one country may be actually allied with similar revolutions, but rarely is it submerged in a fully integrated, universal transnational movement.

According to the press, the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its twelfth annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 13 to 15, 1961. It was reported that diplomatic soundings of the Soviet Union's intentions on Berlin would be undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, Berwith the approval of thirteen other NATO partners and the acquiescence of France, The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, was reported to have expressed the view that the Soviet offensive on Berlin was aimed ultimately at the neutralization of Germany and the detachment of Germany and the Scandinavian counganization tries from the NATO alliance, and to have urged that the West strengthen its military forces.

The eighth annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), Europe To-Day and in 1960, was made public in April 1957. The report was divided in three parts: Volume I dealt with Europ to-day, Volume II, with Europe in 1960 and Volume III consisted of surveys of the economic situations in the individual member countries.

Economic and social cooperation through the United Nations seems destined to face new challenges and alternatives in the coming years as a result of the changed composition of the United Nations membership, the increased bargaining power of the African, Asian, and other states seeking economic and technical assistance, and the precedent of UN operations in the Congo.

In his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1964–15 June 1965 Secretary-General U Thant noted that the ten months under review had without doubt been difficult ones in the history of the United Nations. The opening date of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly had been postponed several times and, when it did meet, it had been unable to follow the normal rules of procedure due to the controversy over the applicability of Article 59 of the UN Charter. Another regrettable development of direct concern to the UN had been the announcement by Indonesia of its decision to withdraw from the Organization as from January 1, 1965.

The third Arab-Israeli war, June 5–10, 1967, has been variously described as the first major conventional war between a modern state and a not-yet-modern society, as an instance of Western imperial aggression by proxy, or as a tragic ritual of the ineluctable Middle Eastern war game. Some analysts see it is as a prelude to a Vietnam-style people's war of liberation or even a nuclear war, those more optimistic as an end to all war in the Middle East. The third Arab-Israeli war is thus likely to be studied with interest by historians, strategists, military sociologists, political scientists, and even by armaments sellers.

Among the many differences between the League of Nations and the UN systems is that characterized by the increasing expansion in the latter's structure of field operations along with the development of the administrative structure of field offices. This essay deals with the key field post, that of the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB) Resident Representative, in the most far-flung of the new UN field networks.

On March 30, 1960, the 851st meeting of the Security Council convened to consider a 29-nation request1 that the Council discuss the situation arising out of the largescale killing of unarmedand peaceful demonstrators against racial segregation in the Union of South Africa as a threatto the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Union of South Africa, as well as those of India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Guinea, and Liberia were invited to participate without vote in the proceedings. After the adoption of the agenda, reservations regarding the jurisdiction of the Council with respect to the question before it were expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, who maintained that nothing in the Charter authorized the UN to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.

The eighth annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission took place in London July 16–20, 1956, under the chairmanship of Dr. G. J. Lienesch (Netherlands). All seventeen contracting governments, with the exception of Brazil, were represented, with observers from Italy, Portugal, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, and the International Association of Whaling Companies. During the deliberations the Commission 1) received from the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics data on the operations and the catch for the past season; 2) received various scientific papers concerning the stocks of whales, and almost unanimously favoring a substantial reduction in the catch in view of evidence that the stock was declining, recommended that the catch for future seasons should not exceed 15,000 blue whale units, and, with one dissentient, recommended that the limit should be reduced in the 1956–1957 season to 14,500 blue whales; 3) after examining the returns rendered in respect of infractions of the whaling regulations, noted that, in general, there had been a decrease over the previous year; 4) received further confirmation from the Commissioner of the Soviet Union of the use of fenders of porous rubber to replace the present use of whale carcases for this purpose; 5) allocated an equivalent of $1400 towards the cost of whale marking; and 6) requested the United States to prepare a protocol for the amendment of the convention requiring every factory ship to have on board two inspectors who were generally of the same nationality as the flag of the ship, to permit consideration of a scheme to appoint independent observers in addition to the national inspectors.

At a meeting in Accra, which took place from April 27 to 29, 1961, Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea, and Modibo Keita of Mali signed a charter formally establishing a tripartite Union of African States. The charter came into effect upon its simultaneous publication on July 1 in the capitals of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali after the three heads of state had met at Bamako, Mali, on June 26 in order to examine the extent to which decisions reached at their April meeting in Accra had been implemented. The drafting of the charter evolved out of a decision announced by the three government leaders at Conakry, Guinea, on December 24, 1960, envisioning common diplomatic representation and the creation of committees to draw up arrangements for harmonizing economic and monetary policies.

To understand and appraise the United Nations in its twentieth year we must consider whence it came and where it has come. As Abraham Lincoln once so wisely said: “If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending we could better judge what to do and how to do it.” When the Charter was drafted, it was contemplated that the Great Powers would work out an acceptable peace which the United Nations could maintain. But a stable and acceptable peace—a consensus or modicum of common understanding on the basic principles of coexistence—was never established after the last world war. The Great Powers were in no position to cooperate to maintain a peace the terms of which they were unable to agree upon. Rivalry and conflict among the Great Powers led to a Cold War in which the adversaries lost sight of their common interest in peace and were prone to exploit their differences rather than to attempt to find means of composing them. Even apart from the Cold War the whole world was struggling to adjust itself to revolutionary political, economic, and social changes, and the adjustment in many areas was difficult, painful, and not altogether rational. There was widespread need of adjustment to the radically changed conditions of life which modern science and technology made possible. In many areas the striving for economic improvement was accompanied by movements to break the bonds of colonial rule and feudal and tribal relationships. The very survival of the United Nations under these circumstances attests to humanity's essential need of the United Nations as an instrument of international cooperation in a world which has become increasingly interdependent despite ideological, national, and cultural differences and outlooks.

The 44th session of the International Labor Conference was held in Geneva from June 1 to 23, 1960, under the presidency of Mr. L. Alvarado Garrido (government delegate and Minister of Labor and Indigenous Affairs, Peru). The Conference was attended by over 900 delegates, advisers, and observers from 78 member countries and 17 territories, including the Ministers of Labor from 31 countries.

The resumed 32nd session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), comprising the 1183d–1186th meetings inclusive, was held in New York on December 21 and 22, 1961, under the presidency of Mr. E. Penteado (Brazil). In the 1183d meeting Mr. Franzi (Italy) introduced a draft resolution proposing that the Republic of San Marino be admitted to the Convention on Road Traffic signed at Geneva on September 19, 1959. The resolution was adopted unanimously. The delegate from Afghanistan then submitted a draft resolution proposing the inclusion of the Mongolian People's Republic in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The draft resolution was adopted with no dissenting votes. Resolutions inviting Switzerland's attendance in a consultative capacity at sessions of ECAFE and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) were unanimously approved. A resolution was adopted maintaining the present membership of the executive committee of the Program of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees until the General Assembly had decided on the future of the Office of the High Commissioner. Mrs. Mironova (Soviet Union) explained her delegation's abstention on the vote for the resolution on the grounds that she saw no reason for the further existence of the executive committee, since all the camps for refugees in Europe would soon be closed and the refugees resettled. She expressed the Soviet delegation's view that the countries where the refugees were living could be made responsible for them.

The decision of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to occupy Czechoslovakia in August 1968, while it represents a fundamental turning point in Soviet foreign policy, most of whose implications are ambiguous yet ominous, should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the Soviet regime remains confronted with a wide array of postponed internal and external problems that demand action and yet defy resolution. The decision to arrest forcibly the processes of liberalization in Czechoslovakia stands out as an uncharacteristic act of will on the part of a regime whose four years in power have been marked by drift, indecisiveness, vacillation, paralysis, and “muddling through.” For five years the government of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin has postponed action on painful problems, has permitted events and situations to accumulate dangerously, and in general has allowed itself to be dominated by events rather than domesticating them. During its first two years in office the regime's inaction was perhaps inaccurately ascribed to prudence, caution, and calculated restraint. It now appears in retrospect that paralysis was confused with prudence, inertia was mistaken for caution, and factional indecisiveness was accepted as self-restraint.