The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was set up under, and has as its charter, the Convention for European Economic Cooperation signed in April 1948. To understand the way in which the Organization works, it is worth looking at one or two of the provisions of the convention. This agreement consists of two parts: the first a statement of the principles of individual action and cooperation on which the contracting parties are agreed; the second, the charter of OEEC.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one facet of the problem of preventing nuclear war, a problem which has engaged the statesmen of the world ever since the dust of the Nagasaki explosion settled. In the Truman-Attlee-King declaration of November 15, 1945, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada proposed that the United Nations set up a commission to study how atomic energy could be controlled so as to limit its use to peaceful purposes, how atomic weapons could be eliminated from national armaments, and how safeguards could be set up so as to ensure that all nations would comply widi the obligations which they undertook to these ends. Thus fell to the United Nations one of the most intractable problems of international organization, a problem which might be looked on as the creation of a new sphere of international law.

The 37 contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were represented at the meeting of the GATT inter-sessional committee, held in Geneva for three weeks, beginning April 14, 1958. The committee discussed at length the provisions of the Rome treaty establishing the European Economic Community. In its consideration of the question, the committee dealt with the common customs tariff which the community was to bring in, the use of import restrictions by the six signatories to protect their balance of payments situation, the so-called managed market for agriculture, and the association of the overseas territories of the community as part of the common market and the effect of this on world trade. Baron Snoy, who represented the European Economic Community, informed the committee that there would be a meeting in July at which representatives of the six countries would discuss preliminary matters affecting agriculture.

Enforcement of international decisions and awards has not enjoyed universal recognition as a problem. Judgment-enforcement, it has been contended, is separable from the general question of sanctions; since submission to adjudication and arbitration in international law is voluntary, it is argued, a state will not submit a particular dispute to third-party settlement unless it has already reconciled itself to the possibility of losing the case. By logical reduction this argument must conclude that there have been no cases of noncompliance. Other writers assure compliance by pointing to the “moral force” of a decision. Given the decentralized structure of the international arena, the “horizontal” allocation of control, and the fact that international affairs hover so perilously close to crisis level, it is tempting to accept the nonexistence of an enforcement problem and thus to sidestep the necessity for formulating enforcement strategies. The wisdom of this course of action is questionable: “Leaving things well enough alone” may, arguably, not make them worse, but it will also not make them better. Organized international decision processes (which include adjudication and arbitration as well as a host of less institutionalized decision processes) counteract relative international anarchy. The efficacy of these decision processes depends upon compliance with or enforcement of their decisions.

Mr. Jean Duvieusart (Belgian Christian Democrat) was elected President of the European Parliament on March 21, 1964, defeating Dutch Socialist Paulus Kapteyn by a vote of 57 to 51.

The 1960–1961 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tariff Conference was brought to a conclusion on July 16, 1962. The decision to hold the 1960–1961 conference was taken in May 1959, following a proposal of the United States that such a conference should be held. Approximately 4,400 tariff concessions were negotiated at the conference. There were three separate elements in the 1960–1961 conference: 1) renegotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC); 2) the “Dillon” or general round of negotiations; and 3) negotiations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the General Agreement with countries wishing to accede to GATT.

The Administrative Council of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) held its twelfth session in Geneva from April 29 to May 25, 1957, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lázaro Barajas Gutiérrez (Mexico). Reviewing its program of future meetings, the Council decided to hold the Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference in September 1958 and the Administrative Radio Conference in July 1959. In setting the date for the latter, the main consideration was the Atlantic City Table of Frequency Allocations. It was felt that sufficient progress had been made in this area to permit the confirmation of June 1, 1957, as the beginning of the final adjustment period of ten months. At the end of this period a new edition of the Radio Frequency Record was to be prepared.

Protection of the City of Jerusalem: The third part of the second session of the Trusteeship Council met from April 21 to May 4, 1948, to consider measures for the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. The USSR sent a representative (Tsarapkin) to the Council for the first time. On March 10, 1948, the Council had passed a resolution stating that the Statute for the City of Jerusalem was in satisfactory form and that the question of its formal approval should be considered by the Council not later than one week before April 29, 1948. In view of the action taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, on April 21, carried the proposal of the representative of the United States (Gerig) that the Statute be transmitted to the General Assembly, together with the resolution of March 10, for such further instructions as the Assembly might see fit to give. On April 26, the General Assembly requested the Council to study and report on suitable measures for the protection of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. In consultation with the Mandatory Power and representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee, the Council considered several proposals. The French delegate' (Garreau) proposed sending a United Nations official to Jerusalem with powers to recruit and organize an international force of 1,000 police, the United States proposed placing Jerusalem under temporary trusteeship, and Australia and the Jewish Agency favored the adoption of the draft Statute of Jerusalem.

One of the most heartening trends in research on international organizations and international affairs is the current emphasis upon an empirical, as opposed to a merely theoretical, approach to an understanding of problems. This approach involves a series of distinctive elements. A hypothesis must be offered and its terms must be defined in ways that permit observation of events and collection of data on the presence or absence of the defined items. Data must be collected systematically, rather than eclectically, to ensure the consideration of those events which do not fit the hypothesis as well as those which do. Wherever possible data is reduced to numerical form and various statistical tests are applied to determine, for example, positive or negative correlations, and to compute the statistical significance of those correlations. Conclusions are then drawn on the basis of the results of the statistical operations. While such efforts are often time-consuming and tedious, even with the aid of a computer, the results of such an effort have the enormous value of demonstrably reflecting reality. Presumably, these results can be replicated by other observers and, since the methodology has been explicitly articulated, methodological defects can be detected and their effect on the results can be fully evaluated.

Ever since Adolph Hitler's invasion of Poland, American and European interwar diplomacy has, with good reason, been judged a failure. Analyzing what went wrong, American historians have been quick to note their own nation's withdrawal from European affairs following the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Consequently, they have focused great attention on the Senate's rejection of United Statesmembership in the League of Nations, an act which has been seen as both cause and effect of the ensuing years of isolation. Indeed, nonmembership in the Geneva-based international organization came to have—for contemporaries and historians alike—deep symbolic and emotional overtones as well as diplomatic significance, appearing as the quintessence of isolationism itself.

The increasing manifestations of Soviet interest in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program and in the establishment of a Soviet “Point Four” program for the under-developed, non-Communist countries of southeast Asia are of crucial importance to the west. In great measure the ultimate defense of western civilization lies in its ability to guide the surging flow of Asian nationalism into constructive, stable and satisfying channels of economic, social and political reforms. Soviet interest in under-developed areas is not new, but since the death of Stalin, a precipitant and ingenious reversal of tactics has occurred. Nowhere has this interest been more evident than in the Economic and Social Council and in its subsidiary bodies. Though the changed Soviet tactics in no way signify a modification of the long term objectives of Soviet strategy, they do demand a corresponding flexibility and imaginativeness on the part of western diplomacy. By understanding past Soviet behavior, acquiring an accurate knowledge of early postwar Soviet policy toward underdeveloped areas, and investigating the rationale behind that policy, the direction and intensity of present Soviet policy may be better analyzed and viewed in its proper perspective.

Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand): In an order of June 10, 1960, the International Court of Justice, having received the preliminary objections of the government of Thailand to its jurisdiction within the timelimit fixed for the filing of the countermemorial, set July 22, 1960, as the timelimit within which the government of Cambodia might present a written statement of its observations and submissionson the objections.

The Executive and Liaison Committee of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) met in Berne, Switzerland, from May 15 to 20, 1961, preceded by meetings of several sub committees. Discussion was devoted chiefly to examining the reports of the various subcommittees, the recommendations of which were generally accepted, and to formulating proposals for the consideration of the congress meeting one year hence. As there was considerable hesitation regarding a system proposed by Switzerland in the Tariffication Subcommittee for the treatment of unprepaid or insufficiently prepaid mail, the Executive and Liaison Committee asked the subcommittee to reconsider the question in order to find out if the Swiss system could be applied generally by all member countries before recommending it to the congress. In view of its acceptance of all the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Development Subcommittee, the committee entrusted to the International Bureau, its administrative agent, the task of carrying out a supplementary inquiry into the technical assistance system of the UN and of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), with a view to submitting the results to the 1962 session of the subcommittee.

Scholars of international politics have recently offered the concepts of transnationalism and interdependence as alternatives to the state-centric paradigm for studying the impact of advancing technology on modern world politics.1 While these concepts in themselves are not new and may, to some extent, share the normative biases of earlier theoretical challenges to the state-centric model (e.g., regional integration theory),2 they should be examined separately because of the undeniable increase of transnational economic and social activities in the present system.

Once the object of consensus, every aspect of the traditional account of early modern Europe as an anarchic system of sovereign states is now debated—from the existence of sovereign states to the notion of anarchy, and even the European limits of that system. In the context of these disagreements, I develop a new account of international order in early modern Europe grounded in the perceptions of historical actors. I first argue that this can be achieved by studying the tools that practitioners relied on to describe and organize political authority in the world. I subsequently delve into a common, though seldom-studied, tool developed by a group of practitioners known as masters of ceremonies: courtly ceremonial (or ius praecedentiae). I make three substantive claims. First, the political authorities identified in manuals on courtly ceremonial were primarily crowns and republics, but in the later eighteenth century, all eventually came to be described as “states.” Second, all political authorities stood in a hierarchy determined by a specific set of criteria I identify, but new criteria—power and sovereignty—emerged over the course of the eighteenth century. Third, the scope of international order was not self-evident, and it certainly did not have clear “European” limits in the eyes of masters of ceremonies; non-European political authorities could easily be integrated into their orders of precedence. Ultimately, I suggest that IR scholars should reconsider why they study early modern Europe and how they study international orders.

Intense debate surrounds the effects of trade on voting, yet less attention has been paid to how fluctuations in the real exchange rate may influence elections. A moderately overvalued currency enhances consumers’ purchasing power, yet extreme overvaluation threatens exports and economic growth. We therefore expect exchange rates to have a conditional effect on elections: when a currency is undervalued, voters will punish incumbents for further depreciations; yet when it is highly overvalued, they may reward incumbents for depreciation. We empirically explore our argument in three steps. First, we examine up to 412 elections in up to 59 democratic countries and show that voters generally punish depreciation in the real exchange rate when the currency is undervalued. We also find that at extremely high levels of currency overvaluation, voters sometimes reward incumbents for depreciation. A currency peg, especially in the eurozone, appears to insulate incumbents from these effects. In a second step, we explore the microfoundations of the election results through survey experiments in three advanced industrialized and two emerging market nations with different monetary and exchange rate policies and institutions. Respondents in countries with undervalued to mildly overvalued currencies disapprove of currency depreciations, whereas those facing a very highly overvalued currency favor depreciation. Third, we examine the mechanism of political competition in exchange rate policymaking and demonstrate that sustained undervaluation is rare in countries with strong political competition. Democratic governments have electoral incentives to avoid using undervalued currencies as a means of shielding workers from import competition.

Most autocracies restrict emigration yet still allow some citizens to exit. How do these regimes decide who can leave? We argue that many autocracies strategically target anti-regime actors for emigration, thereby crafting a more loyal population without the drawbacks of persistent co-optation or repression. However, this generates problematic incentives for citizens to join opposition activity to secure exit. In response, autocracies simultaneously punish dissidents for attempting to emigrate, screening out all but the most determined opponents. To test our theory, we examine an original data set coded from over 20,000 pages of declassified emigration applications from East Germany's state archives. In the first individual-level test of an autocracy's emigration decisions, we find that active opposition promoted emigration approval but also punishment for applying. Pensioners were also more likely to secure exit, and professionals were less likely. Our results shed light on global migration's political sources and an overlooked strategy of autocratic resilience.

What motivates politicians and political parties to shift their positioning on an issue? Focusing on the case of trade policy in countries with advanced economies and plurality electoral systems, I argue that the relative positioning of parties on an existing issue can change even when the preferences of the key actors (voters and politicians) are held constant, and even when party leaders continue to represent the same constituencies. In advanced plurality countries, college-educated voters support free trade, and high-density constituencies are predominantly represented by Left incumbents. As college-educated workers migrate to high-density constituencies in pursuit of higher wages, Left incumbents increasingly embrace free trade, while Right incumbents take more protectionist positions. I provide empirical support for several observable implications of my theory.