It is now three years since the United Nations General Assembly first convened in London, and over five years since the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China announced at the first Moscow Conference their recognition of “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization … for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

The third part of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly was held at UN Headquarters from June 7 through June 28, 1962, when the sixteenth session was concluded. The Assembly considered the following agenda items, discussion of which had been deferred from the second part of the sixteenth session: 1) question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi; and 2) the question of Southern Rhodesia.

Executive Board

The fifteenth session of the Executive Board of the World Health Organization (WHO) was held in Geneva from January 18 to February 4, 1955, under the chairmanship of Dr. H. Hyde (United States). The Director-General's proposals for the provisional agenda of the eighth World Health Assembly, as amended, were approved by the Board. The Board recommended that the Assembly adopt the revised rules of procedure, which the Board had re-examined and amended in the light of comments received from governments. The Board also noted that it had carried out a study of the procedure for consideration of the annual program and budget by the Assembly, in accordance with the Assembly's request, and that it believed it would be useful for the Assembly committee on program and budget to set up a working party at the beginning of each Assembly session to make a review of the financial and budgetary aspects of the proposed program and budget estimates. Proposals relating to the establishment of committees and their terms of reference were also made to the eighth Assembly.

The United Nations Special Fund was the result of a compromise between two proposals which were debated at nineteen meetings of the Second (Economic and Financial) Committee during the twelfth session of the General Assembly. The first of these proposals was an eleven-power draft resolution, based on the recommendations of the Scheyven Committee, to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The second was a United States proposal to ncrease the financial resources of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and to establish within it a Speical projects Fund Which would be used to widen the scope of EPTA7's activities.

The Organization of American States (OAS) Council met in a special session on October 23, 1962, in Washington, D.C., to discuss the threat to the security of the western hemisphere posed by missile bases clandestinely erected in Cuba by the government of the Soviet Union. The Council voted to act as provisional Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty). In that capacity, the Council approved the same day a draft resolution calling for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles by a vote of 19 in favor, none opposed, with I abstention (Uruguay). The delegate of Uruguay explained that he had abstained on the vote because he had not yet received instructions from his government.

It is no secret from even the most cursory reader of the daily press that NATO has of late been undergoing what is commonly referred to as a “crisis”. Four factors seem to me crucial components of the difficult problems with which the fifteen nations are wrestling.

In 1961 the General Assembly declared the 1960's to be the UN Development Decade and called for intensified efforts to accelerate progress toward self-sustaining growth. During 1965, designated International Cooperation Year, the United Nations is to take stock of the progress made thus far. Next to peace and security, which are preconditions for progress in all fields, international cooperation to promote economic and social development of the less developed countries now holds the highest priority for United Nations action.

Words, like thoughts, often change their significance when used as political symbols. For a great many Swedes neutrality has come to be a synonym for peace and independence. Of course neutrality, if it succeeds, always means peace for the country itself. But it is hardly a policy intended to preserve peace among nations. It is more similar to one of those means which man has invented in order to be able to wage war. When neutrality began to appear as a conception in international law it was rooted in the view that war is a legitimate contest and that no distinction should be drawn between an aggressor state and the state attacked. When in modern war a mighty aggressor looks upon the neutrality of small countries not as a useful limitation of the theater of operations but as an obstacle to victory, that power simply forces its will upon the neutral. At the same time the great contest of our time arises from a conflict between authoritarian states and free democracies and tends to be total, involving all spheres of national and individual life. Moreover, international law no longer implies a sovereign right to go to war but moves towards a distinction between an unjust war of aggression and a just war of defense. All this means that the states attacked are not likely to look upon impartial neutrality as a matter of course and a proper standard of conduct.

On August 30, 1954, a close vote on a motion to prevent debate in the French National Assembly consigned to history a spectacular scheme for the unification; of western Europe. The defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) precipitated a seven-week crisis in the western world that only adroit diplomacy, spurred by a sense of desperation, could overcome. In the ensuing conferences of London (September 28— October 3) and Paris (October 20–23), the foreign ministers accomplished two vital purposes. They salvaged the Atlantic alliance and they brought Adenauer's; Germany into the family of free nations.

The Governing Body's 116th session was held at Geneva, on June 30, 1951. Having elected its new chairman (Mr. Paul Ramadier) and vice-chairmen (Sir J. F. Watson and Mr. Léon Jouhaux), the Governing Body reappointed its various standing committees for the duration of its three year term of office and appointed its representatives on the Joint Maritime Commission. Delegations were also appointed to attend the Migration Conference (Naples, 2–16 October, 1951), the fourth session of the Inland Transport Committee (Genoa, 4–15 December, 1951), the Meeting of Experts on Women's Work (Geneva, 11–15 December, 1951), the third session of the Asian Advisory Committee (Geneva, 10–13 November, 1951), and the sixth session of the General Assembly.

Recent schemes for international currency reform are unrealistic to the extent that they are derived as optimum solutions to economic problems alone. International currency arrangements are instances of international organization generally, and consequently fall within the scope of political sociology as much as—if not more than—of pure economics. Political complications must therefore not only be acknowledged, as they usually are, but analyzed as well, as they often are not. This essay represents an inquiry in that direction.

From its 921st through its 923d meetings the Security Council considered the complaint of the government of Cuba that the United States was planning direct military intervention in Cuba.Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States and the first speaker, deplored the fact that because of continued provocation over nearly a two-year period the United States had been forced to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and denied as false propaganda the Cuban charges that the United States was contemplating a military attack on Cuba. Mr. Roa, the Cuban representative, stated in his opening remarks that Cuba considered the Security Council the proper organ before which to bring its case, and that his country opposed any effort to transfer the examination of its claim to the Council of the Organization of American States. He charged, inter alia: 1) that United States materials had been air-lifted to counter-revolutionary groups in the Cuban mountains; 2) that United States Embassy officials had been engaged in espionage and in conspiracy with counterrevolutionary elements; 3) that false and harmful propaganda against Cuba was being broadcast from the United States, with the support of the United States government; 4) that mercenaries were being trained at Guantanamo Naval Base, with a view to launching a number of small military expeditions against different points of the island; and 5) that destroyers had been placed on the alert in Key West, ninety miles from Cuba. The ultimate objective of these movements, Mr. Roa added, was a military invasion of his country.

While many scholars expect people's ideological orientations to drive their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs), research has found surprisingly limited support for this common assumption. In this article we resolve this puzzle by introducing the perceived ideological profile of IOs as a critical factor shaping the relationship between ideological orientation and such beliefs. Theoretically, we argue that citizens accord IOs greater legitimacy when they perceive these organizations as ideologically more congruent with their own orientations. Empirically, we evaluate this expectation by combining observational and experimental analyses of new survey evidence from four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States. We find that citizens indeed perceive IOs as having particular ideological profiles and that those perceptions systematically moderate the relationship between people's ideological orientations and their sense of IOs’ legitimacy. These findings suggest that political ideology is a more powerful driver of legitimacy beliefs in global governance than previously understood.

How do racial stereotypes affect perceptions in foreign policy? Race and racism as topics have long been marginalized in the study of international relations but are receiving renewed attention. In this article we assess the role of implicit racial bias in internal, originally classified assessments by the US foreign policy bureaucracy during the Cold War. We use a combination of dictionary-based and supervised machine learning techniques to identify the presence of four racial tropes in a unique corpus of intelligence documents: almost 5,000 President's Daily Briefs given to Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford. We argue and find that entries about countries that the US deemed “racialized Others”—specifically, countries in the Global South, newly independent states, and some specific regional groupings—feature an especially large number of racial tropes. Entries about foreign developments in these places are more likely to feature interpretations that infantilize, invoke animal-based analogies, or imply irrationality or belligerence. This association holds even when accounting for the presence of conflict, the regime type of the country being analyzed, the invocation of leaders, and the topics being discussed. The article makes two primary contributions. First, it adds to the revival of attention to race but gives special emphasis to implicit racialized thinking and its appearance in bureaucratic settings. Second, we show the promise of new tools for identifying racial and other forms of implicit bias in foreign policy texts.

Thousands of words have been written on “strains within NATO” and the “conflicts of interest” which attend any international organization. For several years—almost from its inception—various prognoses have been made as to how soon NATO or its subordinate agencies would fly apart from the centrifugal forces of diverging self-interest. As early as 1953 General Gruenther warned that with the recovery of self-confidence, the cohesive glue of fear would have less effect. Yet, as Secretary Dulles stated last spring at Copenhagen, we are often inclined to ignore the successes of NATO and to concentrate on its problems.

A proposal for an international inspectorate lies at the heart of every contemporary plan for armament control. Alternatives to the increasing perils of the unprecedented arms race of our era are made dependent on the development of a reasonably effective method of monitoring treaty compliance. Reduction of tension through control of weapons can be attempted only by the creation of a type of political instrument with which the world has had little previous experience. The achievement of a system of inspection, when viewed in the perspective of the history of international organization, is a task of political and administrative architecture on an unprecedented scale. Even the more modest proposals envisage staff and budgetary resources comparable, if not greater, in size than those of the present UN. More significantly, these plans imply an extension of international authority within national borders. Therefore, if arms control should become a viable instrument of international diplomacy, a rapid development of international political, judicial, and administrative techniques will be required.

Some sixty-five years ago, when on April 14, 1890, the Union of American Republics was established, the great hope for world peace, the great promise of bringing international relations under the rule of law, lay in the development of arbitration. The Plan of Arbitration proposed by the Conference was for its time a radical one. Arbitration was to be obligatory for all disputes except those which in the judgment of a state might peril its independence; and the example thus set by the American States was not without its effect at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The limitation of armaments was obviously beyond the plans of practical statesmen. But even so, that was not ground for discouragement. If only the procedure of arbitration could be given greater authority and extended into ever-widening fields, it might be possible to look forward to an agreement upon the limitation of armaments when there was no longer the same need of them.