Mr. Jean Duvieusart (Belgian Christian Democrat) was elected President of the European Parliament on March 21, 1964, defeating Dutch Socialist Paulus Kapteyn by a vote of 57 to 51.

The Executive and Liaison Committee of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) met in Berne, Switzerland, from May 15 to 20, 1961, preceded by meetings of several sub committees. Discussion was devoted chiefly to examining the reports of the various subcommittees, the recommendations of which were generally accepted, and to formulating proposals for the consideration of the congress meeting one year hence. As there was considerable hesitation regarding a system proposed by Switzerland in the Tariffication Subcommittee for the treatment of unprepaid or insufficiently prepaid mail, the Executive and Liaison Committee asked the subcommittee to reconsider the question in order to find out if the Swiss system could be applied generally by all member countries before recommending it to the congress. In view of its acceptance of all the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Development Subcommittee, the committee entrusted to the International Bureau, its administrative agent, the task of carrying out a supplementary inquiry into the technical assistance system of the UN and of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), with a view to submitting the results to the 1962 session of the subcommittee.

The increasing manifestations of Soviet interest in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program and in the establishment of a Soviet “Point Four” program for the under-developed, non-Communist countries of southeast Asia are of crucial importance to the west. In great measure the ultimate defense of western civilization lies in its ability to guide the surging flow of Asian nationalism into constructive, stable and satisfying channels of economic, social and political reforms. Soviet interest in under-developed areas is not new, but since the death of Stalin, a precipitant and ingenious reversal of tactics has occurred. Nowhere has this interest been more evident than in the Economic and Social Council and in its subsidiary bodies. Though the changed Soviet tactics in no way signify a modification of the long term objectives of Soviet strategy, they do demand a corresponding flexibility and imaginativeness on the part of western diplomacy. By understanding past Soviet behavior, acquiring an accurate knowledge of early postwar Soviet policy toward underdeveloped areas, and investigating the rationale behind that policy, the direction and intensity of present Soviet policy may be better analyzed and viewed in its proper perspective.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one facet of the problem of preventing nuclear war, a problem which has engaged the statesmen of the world ever since the dust of the Nagasaki explosion settled. In the Truman-Attlee-King declaration of November 15, 1945, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada proposed that the United Nations set up a commission to study how atomic energy could be controlled so as to limit its use to peaceful purposes, how atomic weapons could be eliminated from national armaments, and how safeguards could be set up so as to ensure that all nations would comply widi the obligations which they undertook to these ends. Thus fell to the United Nations one of the most intractable problems of international organization, a problem which might be looked on as the creation of a new sphere of international law.

The United States was the principal architect and builder of the United Nations, and the great mass of the American people welcomed the new edifice with enthusiasm and high—perhaps too high—hopes for a new world. Now, two decades and many crises later, United States opinion is wiser and more ambivalent. A large majority of the public still gives general support to the United Nations, but its enthusiasm is tempered by experience, and a vociferous minority holds views ranging from biting criticism to total rejection.

The International Monetary Fund entered into a stand-by agreement with the government of Honduras authorizing drawings equivalent to $7.5 million for a one-year period. The arrangement was to serve as an assured secondary line of reserves to strengthen the country's international reserve position. The Fund entered into a stand-by arrangement authorizing the government of India to draw up to $100 million over the following year; this arrangement was made in support of India's reserve position, which had been under considerable strain in previous months.

The eleventh special session of the Trusteeship Council was 'Held at UN Headquarters in New York on April 10, 1961, to consider the agenda item: report of the UN plebiscite commissioner for the supervision of plebiscites in the southern and northern parts of the trust territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. Introducing the report, Mr. Abdoh, the UN plebiscite commissioner, noted that the report included all the pertinent facts about the organization, conduct, and results of the plebiscites. In order that the General Assembly would have ample time to examine the report during the resumed fifteenth session, the Council did not discuss it but limited itself to transmitting the report to the General Assembly, as provided in a draft resolution sponsored by Bolivia and India and approved by the Council. After adopting its draft report to the General Assembly on the item, the Council set June 1, 1961, as the tentative opening date for its 27th session.

The Administrative Council of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) held its twelfth session in Geneva from April 29 to May 25, 1957, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lázaro Barajas Gutiérrez (Mexico). Reviewing its program of future meetings, the Council decided to hold the Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference in September 1958 and the Administrative Radio Conference in July 1959. In setting the date for the latter, the main consideration was the Atlantic City Table of Frequency Allocations. It was felt that sufficient progress had been made in this area to permit the confirmation of June 1, 1957, as the beginning of the final adjustment period of ten months. At the end of this period a new edition of the Radio Frequency Record was to be prepared.

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was set up under, and has as its charter, the Convention for European Economic Cooperation signed in April 1948. To understand the way in which the Organization works, it is worth looking at one or two of the provisions of the convention. This agreement consists of two parts: the first a statement of the principles of individual action and cooperation on which the contracting parties are agreed; the second, the charter of OEEC.

The 37 contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were represented at the meeting of the GATT inter-sessional committee, held in Geneva for three weeks, beginning April 14, 1958. The committee discussed at length the provisions of the Rome treaty establishing the European Economic Community. In its consideration of the question, the committee dealt with the common customs tariff which the community was to bring in, the use of import restrictions by the six signatories to protect their balance of payments situation, the so-called managed market for agriculture, and the association of the overseas territories of the community as part of the common market and the effect of this on world trade. Baron Snoy, who represented the European Economic Community, informed the committee that there would be a meeting in July at which representatives of the six countries would discuss preliminary matters affecting agriculture.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentarians' Conference was held in Paris on November 12–16, 1962, and was attended by parliamentarians from all fifteen NATO countries.1 One of the Conference's principal objectives was to look into the possibility of turning itself into an Atlantic Assembly, and it took the first step toward this goal by accepting its political committee's recommendation to set up a special subcommittee, consisting of experienced parliamentarians, which would study the problems of such a reform. According to the political committee's report, the Atlantic nations were served by a multitude of separate international institutions, each controlled by a separate executive council. There were no formal means by which they could consult, plan, or act in coordination. The report complained that the present arrangements under which the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference received information from NATO was inadequate: it did not receive a formal annual report and did not have the right to put questions either to ministers or formally to the NATO secretariat.

The sixth session of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Council—the sixteen-member governing body of the Organization—met on February 20–22, 1962, in London and considered various matters relating to the work program of the Organization, including arrangements for the forthcoming Oil Pollution Conference. In addition, the Council decided to set up a working group of experts to advise on ways and means of tackling the problem of facilitation of travel and transport in the maritime field.

This article presents an interpretation of the conflicts between universalism and nationalism as they affected United States policy toward the creation of the United Nations. Drawing on heretofore unavailable sources, the author stresses the rising influence of nationalism in the evolution of decisions on the veto power, trusteeships, and regionalism. His focus is on the decision–making process during Roosevelt's last year and the initial months of the Truman administration. He contends that Cordell Hull's universalist UN blueprint, which Roosevelt supported, was inexorably eroded by critics within the American government, especially military spokesmen. These leaders took advantage of the apprehension about the Soviet Union's future policy to further their own ambitions for a strong post–war military posture. Truman was sympathetic to the voices of nationalism, and when he became president the shift away from a strong UN became more pronounced.

The 1960–1961 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tariff Conference was brought to a conclusion on July 16, 1962. The decision to hold the 1960–1961 conference was taken in May 1959, following a proposal of the United States that such a conference should be held. Approximately 4,400 tariff concessions were negotiated at the conference. There were three separate elements in the 1960–1961 conference: 1) renegotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC); 2) the “Dillon” or general round of negotiations; and 3) negotiations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the General Agreement with countries wishing to accede to GATT.

One of the most heartening trends in research on international organizations and international affairs is the current emphasis upon an empirical, as opposed to a merely theoretical, approach to an understanding of problems. This approach involves a series of distinctive elements. A hypothesis must be offered and its terms must be defined in ways that permit observation of events and collection of data on the presence or absence of the defined items. Data must be collected systematically, rather than eclectically, to ensure the consideration of those events which do not fit the hypothesis as well as those which do. Wherever possible data is reduced to numerical form and various statistical tests are applied to determine, for example, positive or negative correlations, and to compute the statistical significance of those correlations. Conclusions are then drawn on the basis of the results of the statistical operations. While such efforts are often time-consuming and tedious, even with the aid of a computer, the results of such an effort have the enormous value of demonstrably reflecting reality. Presumably, these results can be replicated by other observers and, since the methodology has been explicitly articulated, methodological defects can be detected and their effect on the results can be fully evaluated.

The resumed 30th session of the Economic and Social Council (ESOSOC) was held in New York on December 21 and 22, 1960, under the presidency of Mr. C. W. Schurmann (Netherlands). At the beginning of the 1135th meeting, the President read a note from the Secretary-General concerning the projected working agreement between the United Nations and the International Development Association (IDA), and introduced a draft resolution co-sponsored by Denmark and Japan callingon the President to negotiate with IDA with a view to drafting such an agreement. Mr. Makeev, speaking for the Soviet Union, stated that his government could not favor the draft resolution unless the proposed agreement included a provision recalling the terms of Article 58 of the Charter, relating to the coordination of the activities of the specialized agencies; the President replied that, although he was authorized to negotiate with representatives of IDA, he could not impose conditions. The delegates of China and New Zealand stated that they supported the draft resolution, and added that the essential point was to ensure liaison between the various organs dealing with development. The representative of Afghanistan likewise voiced support, pointing out that the draft resolution in essence merely requested the President to negotiate with representatives of IDA. The draft resolution was adopted without dissenting voice with the understanding that the President would take into account the observations of the members of the Council in the course of the negotiations

Protection of the City of Jerusalem: The third part of the second session of the Trusteeship Council met from April 21 to May 4, 1948, to consider measures for the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. The USSR sent a representative (Tsarapkin) to the Council for the first time. On March 10, 1948, the Council had passed a resolution stating that the Statute for the City of Jerusalem was in satisfactory form and that the question of its formal approval should be considered by the Council not later than one week before April 29, 1948. In view of the action taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, on April 21, carried the proposal of the representative of the United States (Gerig) that the Statute be transmitted to the General Assembly, together with the resolution of March 10, for such further instructions as the Assembly might see fit to give. On April 26, the General Assembly requested the Council to study and report on suitable measures for the protection of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. In consultation with the Mandatory Power and representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee, the Council considered several proposals. The French delegate' (Garreau) proposed sending a United Nations official to Jerusalem with powers to recruit and organize an international force of 1,000 police, the United States proposed placing Jerusalem under temporary trusteeship, and Australia and the Jewish Agency favored the adoption of the draft Statute of Jerusalem.

Enforcement of international decisions and awards has not enjoyed universal recognition as a problem. Judgment-enforcement, it has been contended, is separable from the general question of sanctions; since submission to adjudication and arbitration in international law is voluntary, it is argued, a state will not submit a particular dispute to third-party settlement unless it has already reconciled itself to the possibility of losing the case. By logical reduction this argument must conclude that there have been no cases of noncompliance. Other writers assure compliance by pointing to the “moral force” of a decision. Given the decentralized structure of the international arena, the “horizontal” allocation of control, and the fact that international affairs hover so perilously close to crisis level, it is tempting to accept the nonexistence of an enforcement problem and thus to sidestep the necessity for formulating enforcement strategies. The wisdom of this course of action is questionable: “Leaving things well enough alone” may, arguably, not make them worse, but it will also not make them better. Organized international decision processes (which include adjudication and arbitration as well as a host of less institutionalized decision processes) counteract relative international anarchy. The efficacy of these decision processes depends upon compliance with or enforcement of their decisions.

Official international organizations are mechanisms which states join because they believe that membership will enable them more effectively to achieve the broad goals of their respective foreign policies. While there is no question that there has been a considerable element of idealism in its creation, the countries which have joined the United Nations have done so because they believe – or hope – that one or another of the instrumentalities provided by United Nations machinery can be used to their advantage. They may wish to improve their standard of living, to provide some increased measure of security either through implementation of the idea of world organization or through other specific policies, or to promote, perhaps, an expansion of their influence. With fifty–nine different Members, it would hardly be surprising to find fifty–nine differing points of view, and it should not be surprising to find these countries playing practical politics to get out of the United Nations precisely what they joined it to achieve, or, since there may be differences, what they desire to achieve after they have once been admitted. Each Member is, in short, using – or trying to use – United Nations machinery to further its own foreign policy.

The European Parliamentary Assembly held its second meeting in Strasbourg, May 13 and 14, 1958, under the chairmanship of Robert Schuman. Mr. Paul Finet, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), presented the sixth general report on ECSC activities. Speaking of developments which the High Authority had to take into account in planning its future action, Mr. Finet referred to the direct exposure of the coal and steel industries to the consequences of an economic recession, the increasing competition and falling prices on the steel market, the need for stabilization of coal production and consumption, and the desirability of encouraging technical research and increasing safety in the mines. Turning to the matter of ECSC's cooperation with the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Mr. Finet pointed out that the absence of a decision concerning the seat of the European institutions constituted a major obstacle, but that the High Authority was ready to contribute toward further integration of the communities. Regarding a free trade area, the High Authority considered it essential that ECSC's power of action within the community should remain unimpaired. The High Authority believed that the price-fixing system prevailing within the European Economic Community called for the adoption of similar rules within the free trade area and that the granting of governmental subsidies should be prohibited.