The 147th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization (ILO) was held in Geneva from November 15 to 18, 1960. With respect to the operational programs of the International Labor Office, the Governing Body decided: 1) to include the question of technical assistance in the agenda of the 45th session of the International Labor Conference, to be held in June 1961; and 2) to merge the Manpower and Employment Committee and the Technical Assistance Committee into a single Committee on Operational Programs, in order to coordinate better the operational activities of ILO.

The current concern with the human environment, which has given rise, in part, to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, comes at a time when the energies, efforts, and resources of the developing countries are being harnessed as never before to achieve their respective development objectives. The compelling urgency of the third world's development efforts found endorsement in the proposals for the Second United Nations Development Decade (DD II). While to a large extent the concern with environmental issues has arisen out of the problems experienced by the industrially advanced countries, the developing countries are not unconcerned with or even immune from these problems. It was with this general thinking in mind that the Preparatory Committee for the Second United Nations Development Decade unanimously decided to include in the strategy for the decade the following statement which was accepted by the General Assembly: “Governments will intensify national and international efforts to arrest the deterioration of the human environment and to take measures towards its improvement and to promote activities that will help to maintain the ecological balance on which human survival depends.” The General Assembly in a recent resolution on the matter of the human environment further affirmed that environmental policies should be considered in the context of economic and social development, with account taken of the special needs of development in developing countries.

Listed below is the membership of United Nations bodies for 1966. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated in parentheses. Where names of individuals are listed, the members serve in their personal capacities and not as representatives of states; their nationalities are given for information only.

As events since October 1973 have again underscored, security of supply and price of energy resources have enormous strategic and economic implications for any industrialized country. Nevertheless, trade in energy resources between Canada and the United States has not always been closely managed by the central governments that are responsible for national security and economic development. In fact, the energy trade involves a wide variety of actors that continually seek transnational contacts and alliances of opportunity to further their own self-interest almost as if the national border did not exist.

Without a counterpart for any other country there is in the United States government a deputy assistant secretary of state for Canadian affairs, a post created in December 1972. This, like the lower-level Office of Canadian Affairs established in 1965, was an institutional recognition of the increasing importance of Canadian-American relations. Were these offices also harbingers of increased state-centric attention to relations between the two countries, which until then had been subject primarily to transnational and transgovernmental management of affairs? Or were they rather recognition that in addition to the uniquely complex web of transborder relationships outside of or at levels below those dealt with by high political authorities, state-centric relations were increasing because of the importance of and increase in unofficial and bureaucratic transactions?

Barring the global catastrophe envisioned by the Club of Rome, poverty will prove a more intractable problem than low productivity in the Third World. Much greater attention will have to be paid to the distribution of income, jobs, and foodgrains in the future if increases in production are to actually reduce hunger. The failure of many countries to manage their food supplies adequately and to provide basic food security to their populations is explained both by an urban bias in planning and by the sheer administrative complications and costs of stabilizing the foodgrains markets. For many countries dependency was politically easier. Major efforts to increase basic food production are essential in most developing countries, but the political adjustments associated with that decision may be difficult. The institutional patterns required to induce an agricultural revolution will challenge existing patterns of power and social stratification.

The effort to federate the British Caribbean Territories has involved the use of a method much discussed in connection with the federation of states—the functional approach. From this experience can be derived lessons concerning that approach which would seem to be of value to the consideration of the problem of international federation.

A police force, domestic or international, must meet two requirements: it must be reliable, and it must be effective. While obviously it cannot be effective if it is not reliable, it can be reliable without being effective, and it is for this reason that the two prerequisites must be distinguished. A police force, in order to be reliable, must be loyal to the political authorities and share their conceptions of law and justice. A police force, in order to be effective, must stand in a certain relation of power to that fraction of the population which is likely to call forth police action by breaking the law.

Some of the current spate of writing about outer space is so highly imaginative as to discourage serious students of international organization and law from pursuing detailed studies of very real problems which now confront the UN. Antarctic possibilities are only slightly less fabulous and some of the problems there raised may be even more immediate. There are those who are troubled by the difficulty of mastering a new massive subject matter some of which is shrouded in unfamiliar scientific terminology and some of which is imprisoned in official security classifications. Actually these difficulties are no greater here than elsewhere. A study of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) like Codding's required familiarity with pulse radionavigation systems as well as voting procedures; the political and legal delegates to the recent Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea were also required to deal with hydrography and ichthyology. The dark shadow of secret archives clouds the crystal ball for many a student of international relations who wishes to edge up on the contemporaneous scene. When charged with inadequacies, the present writers will not “take the Fifth” but will plead guilty.

Words spoken and actions taken at the United Nations echo around the world, and have very great impact on the hundreds of millions of individuals whose opinions, collectively, make up world opinion. World opinion, in its turn, has a distinct and traceable impact on diplomacy and international relations. Many consider it the only real weapon the UN possesses.

In their first full year of operation, the United Nations and the specialized agencies spent under $25 million; ten years later, in 1956, their total regular budgets were almost $85 million. In that same year the Suez crisis led to the creation of the Emergency Force and the clearing of the Canal, adding about $25 million to the 1957–1958 expenditures. During the past three years 22 governments joined the Organization, adding much to its operating costs but little to its coffers. With the Middle East still in turmoil, and social upheaval dominating world politics, there is increasing agitation for both a permanent UN Force and a drastically expanded economic assistance program. As the Organization seeks to grapple with an ever-mounting range of responsibilities, with the consequent shift from reliance on voluntary programs to regular budgetary outlays, it is quite likely that the estimated expenditures of over $98 million for the Organization and the agencies in 1958 will be doubled within the next five years.

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty has been in existence since April 4, 1949. Article 9 of this treaty gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the imposing headquarters on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne in Paris bear witness to its reality. In his chapter dealing with the nature of the Community, Stanley Hoffmann discusses the question of whether a true Atlantic Community exists outside the pages of the treaty. The present study will examine the existence of that Community insofar as two of its principal members are concerned: France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Little is known about the impact of international organizations. Neither a rudimentary theory of IGO impact exists nor are there sufficient case studies to develop meaningful generalizations. To answer the question whether they make a difference, the effect of intergovernmental organization (IGO) policies must be evaluated.

Like a chronic sore that never quite cripples, hurts most of the time, and sometimes becomes dangerously inflamed, the issue of China in the United Nations has plagued United States policy for almost twenty years.

This article presents a formal model that shows how states can credibly reassure each other simply by maintaining a cooperative outward narrative. The reassurance literature to date has focused largely on costly signaling, whereby benign states must distinguish themselves by taking specific actions that hostile types would not. The mere lack of overtly expressed hostility without costly signals has been considered “cheap talk,” on the assumption that this behavior is costless for hostile states and thus uninformative. In contrast, this paper argues that maintaining a cooperative façade while secretly formulating and executing exploitative policies carries inherent trade-offs, and thus constitutes a credible reassurance signal. Foreign policy planning and implementation requires communication among various individuals, groups, and organizations, which has some probability of being observed and punished by outside actors. Yet efforts to conceal the policymaking process and reduce this probability are costly—they require investments in internal monitoring and restrictions on internal communication that can substantially degrade policy outcomes. Thus, to the extent that a state's foreign policymaking process is transparent—that is, that concealing internal communications is difficult—the absence of positive signals of hostility is a credible signal of its benign intentions. The argument is illustrated with a case study of German reassurance signals during the July Crisis preceding World War I.

How do international organizations change the discussion of human rights violations, and how does their message reach the broader public? I show that national media is a key conduit. I analyze media coverage from the Philippines to show that the content of media coverage of the “war on drugs” changed after a major decision by the International Criminal Court. The ICC increased the proportion of media coverage focusing on human rights by triggering contestation between pro- and anti-human-rights actors. Original survey experimental evidence shows that this coverage shift blunts the effect of ICC actions on support for the war on drugs. This highlights an indirect role for international organizations in shaping media coverage and helps explain why they have struggled to win public opinion battles. Though their actions amplify the voices of human rights supporters, media coverage concurrently amplifies the voices of their opponents, which can crowd out coverage that might otherwise have decreased support for problematic polices.

Staff Rules: Pursuant to a General Assembly resolution of November 20, 1947, the Secretary-General (Lie), on May 13, 1948, reported on codification of staff rules for members of the staff of United Nations Secretariat. Specifically, there were provisions relating to duties and responsibilities, salaries and allowances, appointment and probation, promotions, leave, separations, travel, disciplinary measures, staff welfare, and permanent and temporary personnel. The rules became effective on July 1, 1948 and superseded all other provisions in force before that date.