Too much emphasis has been placed on formal state policies and on ties between individual firms to explain Japanese economic behavior and impediments to imports in Japanese markets. We need to look instead at informal governance by trade associations. In so doing, the concept of relational contracting should be applied not just to dyadic relationships between individual firms but also to relationships between entire industries. Whole industries engage in relational contracting to ensure the stability of both prices and supplies. These industry agreements stabilize Japanese markets but at the same time keep imports out of them. This informal governance complements state policies to support uncompetitive industries. These agreements are more likely to occur and succeed between selling and buying industries that each are relatively concentrated, when upstream products are standardized, when upstream goods constitute a smaller share of downstream production costs, when these sectors have not experienced previous conflicts that undermine cooperation, and when the Ministry of International Trade and Industry wants a domestic supply of its products.

The purpose of this research is to examine the conditions for successful United Nations elective officeholding through an interregional comparison of three types of variables. Previous studies have primarily emphasized two types of determinants. Some have suggested that behavior in the United Nations is controlled by the environment of international politics, while others have attempted to link a nation state's level of socioeconomic development to elective officeholding success. This research suggests that the legislative variable may be the most useful predictor of elective officeholding. The legislative dimension is based upon the premise that the political processes in the Organization represent a quasi-legislative system. An examination of the three types of variables led to the conclusion that legislative behavior is the most consistent predictor of elective officeholding success across regions. This finding does not negate the salience of environmental interactions or nation state attributes, but it does suggest that nation state participation in the political processes of the Organization appears to be the best predictor of officeholding success.

United Nations technical assistance is unique in many ways. Its popularity is attested by pledges and contributions from eighty-two nations, some of which are not members of the UN. Its success is indicated by increasing contributions from all nations of the world and increasing requests for assistance from underdeveloped countries. Most significant of all, the UN technical assistance program is the only setting where the Soviet Union, its constituent republics, and the eastern European countries in its orbit cooperate widi western powers in economic activities not specifically and directly for their own national purposes. Nowhere else can one find delegates from the United States, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and many other nations wrestling not with high politics and ways to advance their power position, but, rather, with the practical problems of irrigation in Iran, statistical research in India, and malaria control in Ceylon.

Charting the course of attitudes in Britain toward the United Nations is mainly a matter of defining small gradations within a fairly limited range, a range varying from sympathetic concern—and ritualistic commendation—at one end of the spectrum to barely dis uised indifference at the other. Among a small section of radical public opinion the Organization can still (August 1961) arouse fervent support, while the right-wing Beaverbrook press and its sympathizers lose few opportunities of pointing out its deficiencies. Nevertheless, during most of its fifteen years' existence, so far as public interest in Britain in its political activities is concerned, the limited impact the United Nations has had on most of the major issues of peace and war has discouraged “popular opinion” from waxing very enthusiastic-or bitter-about it; indeed, although a generally accepted part of international life, it has for long periods languished relatively unnoticed in a diplomatic backwater. Only at such moments of crisis as Korea, Suez, or the Congo, when the Organization has been forced into the mainstream of international politics has this rather tepid reaction been punctuated by heightened tension—and acrimony.

In the present climate of opinion it is customary to view the attitudes and actions of the USSR in the United Nations — as elsewhere — as dictated only by malice and evil.

Since the gravest issues of peace and war may hinge upon the assessment which is made of the Soviet attitude, it is essential to seek an understanding of the ideas and forces which have shaped it. We have, therefore, attempted in the first place to assess the Soviet position as Moscow may see it, in some instances deliberately giving the benefit of the doubt, where doubt plausibly enters in, to the Soviet side; but the elements of explanation which have inevitably intruded themselves reflect the western frame of reference. The word “may” is in italic since this is necessarily an essay in interpretation; Soviet pronouncements obviously cover only part of the story and have their strong propaganda implications and limitations.

Ten years have passed since the initial publication of Emery Reves's international best-seller, The Anatomy of Peace, and the rapid growth of numerous organizations which took up the cry for world government at the dawn of the Atomic Era. Open conflict in Korea in 1950, following several years of severe international tension, seemed to lend some grim support to early world federalist warnings that the world would either “federate or disintegrate” within the span of a few years. But the international atmosphere has improved somewhat in recent years, and the world has not conformed with the early federalist prediction. Indeed, world federalists themselves are still very much alive and active on this still unfederated planet—not only in the United States, but in more than a score of other non-communist countries as well.

The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organizational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during the period 1945–57 and those appointed from 1958–70 as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.

As this is being written, representatives of the thirty-three nations that are signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have just met again in Geneva. Their deliberations, though usually given minor notice in the press, are important. About four-fifths of the world's international trade is carried on by the countries participating in GATT.

The First All-African People's Conference, a nongovernmental assembly attended by more than 300 political and trade union leaders representing 200 million Africans in 28 countries plus observers from Canada, China, Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, took place in Accra, Ghana, from December 8 to 13, 1958. The conference was called by a preparatory committee composed of representatives from eight independent states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic); the 28 dependent and independent African countries participating were: Angola, Basutoland, Belgian Congo, Cameroons, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Occidental Afrique, Senegal, Sierre Leone, South Africa, South West Africa, Tanganyika, Togoland, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Mr. Tom Mboya, general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, was reported to have been designated chairman of the conference by the preparatory committee.

Although rebel groups are players on the international stage, little is known about their financial strategies at this scale. Existing research suggests that rebels succeed in cross-border trade by using informal networks that evade state authority. Yet rebels face a critical challenge: they operate in a normative environment that values state recognition and penalizes their illegitimate status. New evidence reveals that rebels can overcome this barrier and better connect to global economies not by evading the state but by infiltrating its institutions. Drawing on unprecedented data—the internal records of armed groups and their trading partners—I examine how rebels use state agencies in conflict zones to manufacture a legal cover for wartime trade. By using state agencies to provide false certification, rebels can place the stamp of state on their trade deals. This strategy of legal appropriation is a fundamentally different model of how conflict markets skirt sanctions and connect to global buyers. I develop a framework for how this strategy works that traces how international sovereignty norms and sanctions regimes create incentives for rebels, firms, and bureaucrats to coordinate around this legal veneer across the supply chain. The framework and evidence contribute theoretical and policy understandings for rebel governance, state building and fragmentation, and illicit global markets.

A distinguishing feature of the modern state is the broad scope of social welfare provision. This remarkable expansion of public assistance was characterized by huge spatial and temporal disparities. What explains the uneven expansion in the reach of social welfare? We argue that social welfare expansion depends in part on the ability of the governed to compel the state to provide rewards in return for military service—and crucially, that marginalized groups faced greater barriers to obtaining those rewards. In colonial states, subjects faced a bargaining disadvantage relative to citizens living in the colony and were less likely to win concessions from the state for their wartime sacrifices. We test this argument using a difference-in-differences research design and a rich data set of local spending before and after World War I in colonial Algeria. Our results reveal that social welfare spending expanded less in communes where the French subject share of the population was greater. This paper contributes to the state-building literature by highlighting the differential ability of the governed to bargain with the state in the aftermath of conflict.

The 147th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization (ILO) was held in Geneva from November 15 to 18, 1960. With respect to the operational programs of the International Labor Office, the Governing Body decided: 1) to include the question of technical assistance in the agenda of the 45th session of the International Labor Conference, to be held in June 1961; and 2) to merge the Manpower and Employment Committee and the Technical Assistance Committee into a single Committee on Operational Programs, in order to coordinate better the operational activities of ILO.

The permanent neutrality of Austria is not rooted in ancient traditions as is its model, the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. It was established as late as 1955 and may, therefore, give rise to the question of why, in an age of collective self-defense, such a seemingly outdated decision was taken.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on September 9, 1960, its first loan to Israel, in the amount of $27.5 million to help build and equip a new sheltered deep-water port at Ashdod, on the Mediterranean Sea. The Bank's loan was to cover all the foreign exchange requirements and part of the local currency costs of die first stage of the project, scheduled to be completed early in 1965; diis stage was to include the construction of about two miles of breakwaters, dredging the port area to proper depths for ocean-going ships, extension of piers to a length adequate for the accommodation of five ships at once, construction of a track and roadway within the port area and rail links outside it to a building quarry, construction of transit sheds, paved open storage areas, port utilities, and auxiliary structures, and the supply of some harbor craft, cranes, and cargo-handling equipment. Amortization on the loan, which was for a term of 25 years and bore interest at the rate of 5¾ percent per annum, was to begin in August 1965.

The first part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 20 through December 20, 1960, when it was adjourned. The second part of the session was to open on March 7, 1961. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. Frederick R. Boland (Ireland) was elected President of the session, having obtained 46 votes out of a possible 80. At the same meeting, the Assembly's 864th, the following fourteen countries were admitted to membership in the UN: the Republic of Cameroun, the Togolese Republic, the Malagasy Republic, the Republic of Somalia, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of the Niger, the Republic of Upper Volta, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the Republic of Gabon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Cyprus. At the 876th plenary meeting, the Republics of Senegal and Mali were admitted to membership, as was the Federation of Nigeria at the 893 d meeting, thereby bringing the total membership of the UN to 99. A special report of the Security Council on the subject of the admission to membership of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, considered by the Assembly at its 954th meeting, noted the failure of the Council to recommend Mauritania for admission; the Assembly decided to postpone indefinitely further consideration of the question. At its 895th plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted by a vote of 42 to 34, with 22 abstentions, the recomementation contained in the report of the General Committee that the Assembly reject the request of the Soviet Union for the inclusion in its agenda of the question of the representation of China in the UN, and decided not to consider at its fifteenth session any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China (Nationalist) or to seat representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China (Communist). With regard to the representation in the UN of the Congo (Leopoldville), the General Assembly, at its 924th meeting, adopted by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions, the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in its report; the Assembly thereby accepted the credentials issued by the head of state (President Joseph Kasavubu) and communicated by him to the President of the Assembly.

Two stand-by arrangements were announced by the International Monetary Fund on September 23, 1960, one with the government of El Salvador, authorizing drawings up to the equivalent of $11.25 million for a period of six months in order to strengthen El Salvador's international reserve position prior to the marketing season for the country's cotton and coffee crops, and the other to Haiti, making available the equivalent of $6 million for a one-year period, in support of Haitian currency convertibility. El Salvador had made similar arrangements with the Fund in previous years and had repurchased in full any drawings made under these arrangements. The arrangement with Haiti was to become effective on October 1, 1960, at the expiration of Haiti's current $4-million agreement with the Fund established a year previously in connection with a stabilization program.

Without a counterpart for any other country there is in the United States government a deputy assistant secretary of state for Canadian affairs, a post created in December 1972. This, like the lower-level Office of Canadian Affairs established in 1965, was an institutional recognition of the increasing importance of Canadian-American relations. Were these offices also harbingers of increased state-centric attention to relations between the two countries, which until then had been subject primarily to transnational and transgovernmental management of affairs? Or were they rather recognition that in addition to the uniquely complex web of transborder relationships outside of or at levels below those dealt with by high political authorities, state-centric relations were increasing because of the importance of and increase in unofficial and bureaucratic transactions?

As events since October 1973 have again underscored, security of supply and price of energy resources have enormous strategic and economic implications for any industrialized country. Nevertheless, trade in energy resources between Canada and the United States has not always been closely managed by the central governments that are responsible for national security and economic development. In fact, the energy trade involves a wide variety of actors that continually seek transnational contacts and alliances of opportunity to further their own self-interest almost as if the national border did not exist.

Terrorists attack civilian targets but there is variation in how many civilians they kill. Terrorists may deliberately harm civilians, or they may adopt a less bloody approach, demolishing businesses, transit systems, and other civilian property while employing tactics to avert civilian casualties. One such tactic is to warn civilians before an attack, allowing them to flee the area. With warnings as an example, this study considers why terrorists might adopt casualty-aversion tactics. An analysis of 12,235 bombings by 131 terrorist groups in the years 1970 to 2016 finds that warnings are most common when terrorists fight democracies and when they lack territorial strongholds. Ideological factors such as religion are not significant predictors of warnings. These findings suggest a need to revisit the claim that religion incentivizes indiscriminate terrorism. They also suggest a strategic logic behind casualty-aversion tactics. Terrorists fighting democracies may spare civilians to appear legitimate in citizens’ eyes. Terrorists without strongholds may spare civilians because they rely on the state's population for support. At first glance, my findings appear to contradict civil war literature arguing that militants with strongholds use violence more discriminately. However, terrorism occurs in areas of state control. Militants with strongholds can use indiscriminate terrorism against state-governed civilians without alienating their own supporters elsewhere.